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ABSTRACT 
This study is a contribution to the on-going debate about the path that Africa 
has taken in realising the vision of its renewal. The central theme of the study 
is the idea of Africa's 'new partnership' with the industrialised North, which is 
envisaged under the New Partnership for Africa 's Development (NEPAD). 
Acknowledging that asymmetrical partnerships have existed between Africa 
and the North, particularly in the last century, the question this study poses is: 
to what extent does the idea of the 'new partnership' represent something 
new? The study argues two points. Firstly, it argues that the idea of the new 
partnership has become a terrain of contestation between the Africanist and 
the post-modernist social forces. Secondly, the study argues that it is unlikely 
that conceptualising the idea of the new partnership in post-modernist terms 
will result in sustainable development and rebirth of Africa . That is particularly 
the case, because post-modernity suggests a certain degree of loyalty to the 
prevailing and asymmetrical global order. Against this background, the study 
concludes that the extent to which Africa will enjoy the benefits of a truly 
revised partnership with the North, and thus fulfil the vision of its rebirth, will 
be determined, by and large, by the modalities of accommodation and 
struggle between these social forces. 
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CHAPTER 1 
A GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) adopted in Abuja, 
Nigeria, in October 2001, has captured the imaginations of politicians; policy-
makers; scholars; and civil society formations, both in Africa and abroad. Some 
have greeted it enthusiastically as the first African-owned economic initiative 
ever. that not only places a duty on African leaders to set anew the continent's 
political and economic image, but also recognises that sustainable development 
and ultimate integration of Africa into the world economy depend, by and large, 
on changed investor perceptions of the continent. Hence conscious and 
deliberate efforts are being made by the architects of NEPAD, particularly South 
Africa, to, among other things, promote good govemance; reduce the scourge of 
conflicts in Africa and; promote regional integration, with a view to making the 
continent "more attractive to investment and a better place in which to do 
business" (Games, 2003:1). On the contrary. others have expressed 
considerable scepticism, pointing to the national and continental forces that drive 
the NEPAD project. 
While the former group perceives NEPAD as a continental project that embraces 
all the peoples of Africa in an endeavour to reverse their marginalisation in the 
face of globalisation, the latter, it would seem, perceives it as a project that is 
driven by a bourgeois economic ethos that seeks to promote the interests of 
global capital by placing the continent within the neo-liberal orthodoxy, upon 
which the contemporary world economy is founded. 
It can be deduced from the afore-going that even though NEPAD is still in its 
embryonic stage, it has become a terrain of contestation between different social 
1 
forces. Against this background, it is therefore vital that input and contribution 
from different sectors of society is welcome to inform debates among policy-
makers in individual African countries, the leadership of the continent as a whole, 
and the different societal formations, about the consequences of their 
deliberations in pursuit of this developmental project. 
The significance of this thesis, therefore, must be seen in this light. The thesis is 
a contribution to the on-going debate about the path that African leaders have 
taken in realising the vision of an African rebirth. It seeks to provide a more 
nuanced reading of NEPAD in an attempt to interrogate certain ambiguities and 
contradictions that underpin it. Its central focus is the idea of the new partnership 
between Africa and the industrialised North. The relevant and crucial question 
the thesis seeks to answer is: what does the idea of the new partnership entail 
that is likely to have meaning for Africa's development this time around? In other 
words, what is new about this partnership? 
Since NEPAD is a programme that falls within the ambit of the rebirth and 
renewal of Africa (Ajulu, 2002:9), it is imperative that the thesis sets the context 
of the discussion by teasing out the central features of, and the debates that 
inform, the African Renaissance. 
1.2. The African Renaissance 
The term 'African Renaissance' has become popular in African political discourse 
in the past seven years, or so. It has been given different meanings by different 
sectors of society, both at local and global levels. In South Africa's ruling party, 
the African National Congress (ANC), it is described as a 'concept', a 'policy' as 
well as a 'vision' of Africa in years to come. To others, it is a marketing tool for 
Africa to the rest of the world (Enterprise, cited in Independent Projects Trust, 
1999). Others still, refer to it as a 'grand geo-strategy' for Africa's renewal that 
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seeks to challenge the contemporary geo-political order, particularly the northern-
dominated hegemonic nirvana (Independent Projects Trust, 1999). 
However one chooses to describe it, there is at least consensus on one fact; 
namely that the renaissance of Africa has been an on-going historical process. 
Of course, scholars and politicians alike differ on the actual phases of this 
process. For instance, Michael Muendane (cited in Ajulu, 2001 :30-31) identifies 
the first Pan African Congress, held in London, in 1900, as the beginning of the 
African Renaissance. In a somewhat concurring tone, Ajulu (2001 :31), citing 
Mamdani (1998), reminds us that " ... from its inception in the Diaspora, the Pan-
African movement was a reaction to slavery and colonialism and sought to 
reassert African dignity and humanity". Nabudere (2001) and Ndi-Zambo (2001) 
seem to be in agreement with this view. 
Others argue that the renaissance of Africa started a bit later. Moeletsi Mbeki 
(1997), for instance, points to the emergence of an African educated elite, which 
propagated the idea of Negritude in the 1930s, and the voices heard in the 
African Diaspora from the likes of Marcus Garvey. From the 1930s onwards, he 
argues, there were numerous efforts by the African educated elite to return to the 
sources of African civilisation. In this regard, he cites A.C. Jordan's famous 
Ingqumbo YemiNyanya; the establishment of the ANC Youth League in 1944; 
and Okot'p Bitek's Wer pa Lawino, all of which gave impetus to the idea of the 
renaissance. 
Notwithstanding the differences of opinion about the beginning of the African 
Renaissance, there is consensus about its second phase; namely the 
independence period. At no time did the idea of a rebirth of Africa gain more 
momentum than during the independence period. This can be attributed to the 
fact that Africans happened to share a common heritage of colonialism (Milazi, 
2001 :43) and were therefore united in their struggles to eradicate it. Precisely 
because they considered colonialism to be the extension of capitalist exploitation 
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on their continent, Africans were determined to eradicate it in all its forms and 
reassert African dignity and humanity. Thus, whatever differences that prevailed 
on the continent, Africans were at least united by that vision . 
The rebirth of Africa, according to independence leaders, would be achieved 
through the unity and solidarity of the African states and the eradication of all 
forms of colonialism. The independence of Ghana in 1957 was seen as 
phenomenal in that it gave an impetus to the furtherance of this cause. In his 
much quoted speech, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana said "Seek ye first political 
kingdom and all else shall be given! ". Convinced that the independence of Ghana 
would be meaningless if it was not linked to the total liberation of Africa (Legum, 
1962:44), Nkrumah called on all African states to unite. He declared: 
... the twentieth century has become the century of colonial emancipation, the 
century of continuing revolution which must finally witness the total liberation of 
Africa from colonial rule and imperialist exploitation ... (Nkrumah, cited in Ajulu, 
2001 :31). 
To achieve unity on the continent, Nkrumah called on African states to pool 
together, as it were, their resources in order to be able to challenge global 
inequalities, failing which the continent would be "subject to neo-colonialism and 
balkanisation" (Southall, 1999:151). He stressed : 
At present most of the independent African states are moving in directions which expose 
us to the dangers of imperialism and neo-colonialism. We therefore need a common 
political basis for the integration of our policies in economic planning, defence, foreign 
and diplomatic relations. The basis for pol itical action need not infringe the essential 
sovereignty of the separate African states. These states would exercise independent 
authority, except in the fields defined and reserved for common action in the interests of 
the security and orderly development of the whole continent (Nkrumah, 1963, cited in 
Maloka, 2001 :1). 
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However, like the renaissance of Europe in the 15th century, the African 
Renaissance was marked by controversial debates. Of importance were 
qualitative (and not substantive) ideological differences. While the critical 
perspective 1 was a dominant force of the independence period, it was interpreted 
in various ways and applied to various degrees, depending on the balance of 
forces in place. This had profound implications for the form and course in which 
the renaissance debate could be pursued. 
In one form, the renaissance of Africa was based on a discourse that understood 
(neo) colonialism essentially as the subjection of the continent to the whims of 
growing global capital. This conceptualisation was evident in the promotion of 
economic nationalism as the central feature of the renaissance of the 
independence period (Ajulu, 2001 :31). Julius Nyerere's Ujaamaa Vijijini 
(Socialism in Villages) must have arisen out of this particular context. Through 
this programme, Nyerere sought to find appropriate ways and means of tackling 
the central question of Africa's politico-economic backwardness (Ajulu, 2001 :32). 
For him, the key to the problem of neo-colonialism was a people-centred and 
people-owned form of development. This vision was influenced, to a significant 
degree, by a Marxist- Leninist reading of history, particularly that of imperialism. 
For Nyerere, as for many neo-Marxists , in stratified colonial societies means of 
production were owned and controlled by the colonial ruling elite. This 
relationship to the means of production provided the basis of its dominance 
(Haralambos and Holborn, 1995:524). Therefore, it would seem that the Pan-
African vision of development, as understood by Nyerere, was one that 
emphasized the communal character of indigenous systems of production and 
distribution. 
1 Critical theorists, in particular the Dependenc;a school of thought, were very critical of the 
shortcomings of the prevailing modern world system . For them, development in Africa could 
ensue only once the system was overthrown and replaced by world system based on socialist 
principles. It must be stressed, however, that post-independence Afr ica has never been a 
homogeneous entity. As will be shown shortly, in some countries , more capitalist socio-economic 
pol icies were adopted in pursuit of the goals of development and empowerment. 
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It is important to note, however, that Nyerere did not call his development 
paradigm Marxist or communist. Neither did he refer to it as Socialism as 
understood in the West. Rather, he preferred to label it "African socialism", thus 
emphasizing the 'Africaness' of Tanzanian Socialism. This idea was shared by 
the likes of Tom Mboya of Kenya. Mboya once noted: "African socialism was not 
just socialism". Rather, it 
... was bound up with African reaction against colonialism. The African is anxious that his 
attitude of mind, his approach to problems, should be identified as an African approach. 
After independence .. . he wants to see that Africa is recognised in her right and on her 
own merits ... (Cited in Ajulu , 2001 :31) 
Indeed, Nyerere was not a Marxist. Unlike many Marxists who saw the 
elimination of the state as a historical necessity, Nyerere, like many African 
leaders of his time, seems to have believed that, for development to ensue, the 
state had to playa central role. Not that such a state would be an honest broker 
between competing interests, for Nyerere was not a pluralist by conviction. 
Indeed, the privatisation of state assets and the creation of a de facto one party 
state in Tanzania under his rule suggest he was not. The state, for Nyerere, 
would be biased towards the poor precisely because "[it was] the principal 
hegemonic and organising force in Africa's socio-economic and political change" 
(Milazi, 2001:41). 
In the other form, the renaissance was based on a discourse that understood 
(neo) colonialism as the perpetuation of so-called western modernity at the 
expense of Africa's ancestral heritage. Modernization theorists had argued that 
Africa could develop and 'catch-up' with the industrialised Western countries if it 
pursued liberal developmental methods. This argument was based on, among 
others, Walt Rostow's (1960) analysis of the stages of development of Western 
countries over centuries (Schraeder, 2000:24). Rostow (cited in Schraeder, 
2000:24) claimed that "all countries evolve through the same 'stages of growth' 
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as leaders seek to transform 'backward' agriculturally based societies into 
modern industrial economies". 
But the 'modernisation' of Africa and the imposition of Western civilisation par 
excellence on the African way of life during the colonial era did more harm than 
good. Africa 's way of life, production and trading patterns were significantly 
"blunted, halted, and turned back" (Rodney, 1982:224. See also Ajulu , 2002). It is 
within this reading of historical socio-economic and political modernisation that 
Mobutu Sese Seko's recours a I'authenticite (recourse to authenticity) emerged. 
Mobutu's recours a I'authenticite, as elaborated by Young and Turner (cited in 
Ajulu , 2001 :32), was a movement that sought to reinvigorate the moral, cultural, 
philosophical, social and economic values that were distinctly reflective of a 
Zairian nation. In other words , as Young and Turner perceive it, it was a call for a 
return to Africa's ancestral heritage so that economic modernity could be pursued 
outside the dictates of the western capitalist system that had deleterious effects 
on the African way of life. 
While Nyerere's Ujamaa Vijijini and Mobutu 's recours a ,'authenticite, had a 
qualitative difference in form and method of approach to the renaissance 
discourse, they shared a strong sense of both nationalism and Socialism (to the 
extent that the latter concept was defined as distinctly African). Sese Seko, too, 
may not have made reference to Marxism or Socialism in his renaissance 
course. In fact, it is not uncommon to find politicians, scholars and individuals 
denouncing, in theory, their Marxist stance while in practice advocating it in at 
least one of its various forms . Sese Seko's strong anti-imperialist, and by 
extension anti-capital ist, stance located him, albeit not entirely, within the critical 
tradition . 
Of course, confusion arises with regards to the conceptualisation and actual 
implementation of Socialism as an ideology. Heywood (1992) helps us to 
understand at least one dimension of th is confusion . He contends that while 
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socialism in Europe arose out of the harsh social and economic conditions 
created by the growth of industrial capitalism, in Africa it developed as a reaction 
to colonialism rather than class exploitation per se (Heywood, 1992:93-94). In the 
case of Africa, he continues, the idea of class exploitation was substituted by that 
of colonial exploitation, thus resulting in the emergence of a potent fusion of 
nationalism and socialism (Heywood, 1992:93-94). Concurring with him, Tordoff 
(2002:8) argues, "Socialism was a loose concept in Africa and was subject to 
varying interpretations". Milazi (2001 :47) takes the point even further, and 
argues that adherence to Socialism in Africa "is more rhetoric than anything 
else". As he laments, "While adherents of [Socialism] are all united by a common 
desire, to abolish the exploitation of man by man, the difference .. . is on how this 
great and noble aim can be achieved" (Milazi, 2001 :47). 
From the afore-going, three important points are worth noting. First, " ... the 
notion of African Renaissance has historically been a terrain of contestation 
between different social forces ... " (Ajulu, 2001 :33). Second, that notwithstanding, 
at least two central pillars of African rebirth during the independence period can 
be identified : retaining the distinct African culture one the one hand, and breaking 
the imperialist stranglehold on the other. Third, these two pillars provided a 
glimpse of the declaration of intent, coupled with celebrated patriotism and a 
sense of belonging, to help set out a Pan-African route to tackling the central 
question of Africa's politico-economic backwardness. 
It was not too long, however, before the spirit of the renaissance withered. To 
help us understand the underlying complementary forces of this interregnum, 
Moeletsi Mbeki (1997), cites the emergence of a new class division among 
Africans and the East-West rivalry during the Cold War. Not that the latter is 
unimportant, but for the purposes of the thesis, discussion must be confined to 
the former cause. 
There is resounding consensus among scholars of African politics that, since 
independence, development in Africa has been characterised by significant shifts 
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and ideological dynamics (Among others see Milazi, 2001; Tordoff, 2002; 
Olukoshi, 2002; Adesina, 2002a). The post-independence state was preoccupied 
with commitment to the nationalist project, as a means of achieving development 
(Tordoff, 2002; Adesina, 2002a). The Tanzanian and Zairian cases to which I 
have referred are classic examples of this sort. The state played a critical 
entrepreneurial role, especially given that the private sector was severely 
underdeveloped. The consequence was a plethora of public parastatals " ... 
consistent with nationalist efforts to establish domestic control over productive 
forces and accelerate economic development" (Fatton Jr., 1992:124). In 
Olukoshi's terms, this was the essence of the "post-colonial social contract" (cited 
in Adesina, 2002a:7). 
However, different economic visions underscored this contract (Adesina, 
2002a:7). There was African Socialism in Tanzania and Zambia, and Capitalism 
in Kenya2 and Cote d'ivoire. But as Adesina (2002a:7) argues, even in this latter 
'capitalist camp' there was a strong state, deeply rooted in the Keynesian 
economic system. This was characterised by "commitment to social policy 
outcomes and growth [and] commitment to nation-building was an overriding and 
common vision" (Adesina, 2002a:7). 
The two dominant facets of post-independence Africa (bourgeois and Africanist) 
were to be found in the dynamics of the state itself and the extra-continental 
forces. It is interesting to note how the ruling elite was somehow caught between 
the two strands. According to Milazi (2002:44), the ruling elite was made up of 
the state bourgeoisie and the private bourgeoisie. The latter consisted of private 
industrial and commercial capital). Amilcar Cabral (1979) provided an insight into 
the conflicting ideological characterisation of this elite. He argued that, at the end 
2 There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that, since independence, Kenya has pursued a 
mixed economic strategy of both privately owned and state-owned enterprises. This enabled that 
country to build up its economy. Between 1964 and 1973, Kenya's economy was growing at 
significant rate of 6,5 percent (Adepoju, 1993:1). Hence it also became well placed to playa 
critical economic leadership role in East Africa . 
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of formal colonial rule, the African ruling elite was faced with two conflicting 
options. Either it had "to give free rein to its natural tendencies to become 
'bourgeois', . .. and necessarily to subject itself to the imperialist capital ... [a] 
betrayal of the objectives of national liberation" (Cabral, cited in Adesina, 
2002a:8). Or, it had to do what he calls "committing suicide as a class, to be 
restored to life in the condition of a revolutionary worker completely identified with 
the deepest aspirations of the people to which [it] belongs", and this, he argued, 
involves "repudiating the temptations to become 'bourgeois' and the natural 
pretensions of its class mentality" (Cited in Adesina, 2002a:8) The latter was the 
essence of what is often referred to as the 'sympathetic bourgeoisie' . 
While for some time in the 1970s alternative politics in Africa were dominated by 
this injunction, there was a paradigm shift to the dominant aspirations of the 
bourgeois class in the 1980s and, in particular in the 1990s3 (Adesina, 2002a:8). 
Thus, the African ruling elite underwent what Ralph Miliband (1978) calls the 
process of 'bourgeoisification' and therefore became a comprador bourgeoisie. It 
assumed a particular class identity - informed by a consciousness that had a 
distinctive class character. By cooperating with certain global forces, and 
continually maintaining, strengthening and extending its domination over the 
working / peasant class , the African ruling elite became an instrument of the 
global bourgeois class. The interests it defended became class interests. 
The afore-going analysis is important in understanding the dynamics of the 
renaissance of Africa in its historical perspective. It shows that while the post-
colonial social contract provided the basis for the pursuit of an African rebirth, the 
systemic convergence of certain national bourgeois elements and international 
forces undermined the very ideal of the 'nationalist' developmental cause. 
According to Fatton Jr. (1992: 129), this convergence was "based on an 
3 The underlying causes of this shift are diverse. Adesina (2002a:8) correctly mentions the 
ascendancy of neo-classicalism in Europe and America and the beginning of the debt crisis in 
Africa and Latin America. These heralded a new global balance of forces and provided a basis for 
a systemic convergence of national bourgeois elements and international forces, in pursuit of the 
interests of global capital. 
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opportunistic alliance of transnational [and domestic] agents that share roughly 
similar interests and ideological outlook". He continues : 
Thus, when African ruling classes enter into relations of dependence, it is not necessarily 
because they succumb to the inherent forces of imperialism but rather because their 
priorities and values tend to coincide with those embodied in these forces . The African 
state, however much it may be moulded by extra-continental agents, is above all a 
domestic structure of repression through which indigenous ruling classes organise their 
dominance however covert it may be (Fatton Jr., 1992:129. Emphasis mine). 
1.3. South Africa and the third African Renaissance debate 
The revival of the African Renaissance - as the notion is now used - started in 
South Africa4 from 1996, the year when Thabo Mbeki, as South Africa's then 
Executive Deputy President, delivered his famous "I am an African!' speech, on 
the occasion of the adoption of the new constitution (Maloka, 2001 :2; Ajulu, 
2001 :33). According to Ajulu (2001 :33), "[t]his speech was significant not only 
because it sparked off the [third] renaissance debate, but more profoundly 
because it prompted South Africans to reflect on their identity crisis - were they 
part of Africa or Europe". 
The African Renaissance, as elaborated by Thabo Mbeki in the "Attracting 
Capital to Africa" Summit, held in Chantilly, Virginia, in April 1997, sought to 
promote on the one hand socio-cultural, political and economic regeneration of 
the continent, and on the other to improve Africa 's geo-political standing in global 
affairs (Mbeki, 1997, cited in Maloka, 2000:2-3). Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko 
interpreted Mbeki 's notion of the renaissance in two ways: Africanist and globalist 
4 It is important to note that while in the independence period the renaissance was championed 
by countries like Ghana, Zaire, Togo - among others, the new renaissance is championed by a 
once pariah state - South Africa . South Africa's lead in the current renaissance revival is 
significant in that it somehow provides a glimpse of the role this country can play in the socio-
economic and political re-engineering of the continent, given the relative competitiveness and 
size of its economy. 
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(Maloka, 2000:3). It was with the latter interpretation that Mbeki was associated, 
mainly because the African National Congress (ANC), of which he is now the 
President, describes the African Renaissance interchangeably as a 'vision' and a 
'policy' "not only relating to Africa but in all our international relations globally" 
(ANC, Strategy and Tactics5 , December 1997, cited in Mbeki, 1997). 
Within the globalist perspective, Mbeki was very clear on what he saw as 
imperative. On the one hand, there was a need for political and economical re-
engineering of the continent, by which he meant the nurturing of African 
business, which could stand on its own or in partnership with international 
corporations in the extraction of Africa's natural resources. On the other hand, he 
talked of the urgent need for the transformation of the world political and 
economic order, including its institutions (Maloka, 2000:3). In the latter spirit, 
South Africa 's former President, Nelson Rholihlahla Mandela hailed the African 
Renaissance as "the creation of a new world order ... " (Seale, cited in 
Independent Projects Trust, 1999). For President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, it 
meant "a rebirth and renewal that is reshaping not only African societies but also 
African relations with the rest of the world" (Africa News Online, cited in 
Independent Projects Trust, 1999). 
The idea of the renaissance was consolidated and popularised on such 
occasions as the World Economic Forum. It then laid the foundation and became 
the central pillar of The Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery 
5The five important elements of the African Renaissance that were developed by the ANC, in its 
Developing Strategic Perspectives on South African Foreign Policy document, centred around the 
following: 
1) Recovering the continent as a whole; 
2) Establishing political democracy on the continent; 
3) Breaking the west I imperialist stranglehold on the continent; 
4) Mobilising the peoples of Africa in order that they took their destiny into their own 
hands, with the further objective of insulating themselves and the continent from the 
geo-strategic interests of the west; 
5) Developing people-centred development approaches so as to meet people's basic 
needs. 
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Programme (MAP), signed in March 2000, in Pretoria, by Presidents Thabo 
Mbeki, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria. 
At the 3yth OAU Summit held in Lusaka, in July 2001, MAP was merged with the 
OMEGA Plan (that had been developed by President Abdoulae Wade of 
Senegal. This Plan was similar to MAP in terms of vision and objectives.) to form 
the New Africa Initiative (NAI). In the same month, leaders of the Group of Eight 
industrialised countries (G-8) endorsed this programme. The Heads of State 
Implementation Committee in Abuja, Nigeria, agreed to its Policy Framework in 
October 2001. It was at that meeting that the name New Partnership for Africa's 
Development (NEPAD) was adopted (Ohiorhenuan, 2002: 6). 
1.4. The New Partnership for Africa's Development 
It is common knowledge that NEPAD is a project of African development. 
However, a closer reading of the NEPAD document, which provides a guide to 
how this development is to be pursued and achieved, reveals that different 
interests underpin this developmental project. It also suggests, at least by 
implication, that there has not been consensus on the part of the peoples of 
Africa on how exactly the continent should be extricated from the malaise of 
poverty and underdevelopment. I have found out that the NEPAD document can 
be broken down into two main different and often conflicting, interpretations. 
The first is the Africanist interpretation, which is informed mainly by the critical 
theory. This interpretation casts doubt on the possibility of Africa developing in an 
environment where the central ideological underpinnings that characterise 
Africa's relations with the North remain unchanged. 
The second interpretation is what I refer to as the post-modernist interpretation, 
mainly because it either regards critical theory as obsolete in the contemporary, 
global and competitive world, or takes the International Monetary Fund's and the 
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World Bank's diagnosis of the African situation at face value. This interpretation, 
while acknowledging the development chasm between Africa and North, 
emphasises endogenous transformation processes in political and economic 
govemance in Africa . It perceives development in Africa ensuing primarily 
because of such transformation. 
It must be stated from the very outset that however much consensus may have 
been sought between these interpretations, the influence of the outside world, 
which, as I have noted, manifested itself much more clearly in the 1980s and into 
the 1990s, has had a critical role to play in the final draft of the NEPAD 
document. No wonder then the document is characterised by both radicalism and 
humility. 
Against the background of these two broad interpretations, it is important that we 
examine the NEPAD document in order to interrogate the ambiguities and 
contradictions that underpin it. 
The opening paragraph of the docu ment reads: 
The New Partnership for Africa 's Development is a pledge by African leaders to 
eradicate poverty on the continent and to place African countries, both 
individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development 
and thus halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process (NEPAD, 
2001: para 1). 
To this noble end, NEPAD seeks to establish peace and security, democracy and 
political govemance, and economic and corporate govemance, as essential 
requirements for addressing Africa's developmental needs. Having leamed from 
their own experiences that peace, security, democracy, good govemance, 
human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable 
development, African leaders, through NEPAD, are making a pledge to work, 
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both individually and collectively, to promote these principles in their countries 
and sub-regions and on the continent (NEPAD, 2001: para 71). 
NEPAD identifies the following as key sectoral priorities towards achieving the 
goal of sustainable development on the continent: bridging the infrastructural gap 
between Africa and the developed world, and the development of human 
resources, including the reversal of the brain drain. 
Recognising, however, the small size of most African countries, both in terms of 
populations and per capita incomes (something which makes them less attractive 
to foreign investors) (NEPAD, 2001: para 90), NEPAD places a duty on African 
countries to pool together, as it were, their resources to enhance regional 
development and economic integration on the continent, so as to improve 
international competitiveness. In this regard, NEPAD calls for the strengthening 
of the already existing sub-regional economic groupings (NEPAD, 2001: para 
91 ).6 Priority is to be given to building capacity so as to enhance the 
effectiveness of existing regional structures and rationalisation of existing 
regional organisations. A leading role in financing regional studies, programmes 
and projects, will be played by the African Development Bank (NEPAD, 2001: 
para 93). This programme focuses on the following priority areas: infrastructure, 
especially information communications technology (leT) and energy; human 
resources, including education, skills development and reversing the brain drain; 
health; agriculture; and access to the markets of the developed world for African 
exports (NEPAD, 2001: para 94). 
The document goes as far as saying that the objective, in each sector, is to 
bridge the existing gaps between Africa and the developed world, so that the 
6 These groups are the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS), the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). 
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continent's international competitiveness is improved and that it is able to 
participate meaningfully in the globalisation process (NEPAD, 2001: para 95). 
There is a realisation in the document that critical to Africans taking responsibility 
for the continent's destiny, there is a need to establish a new relationship 
between Africa and its Northern development partners, including multilateral 
institutions (NEPAD, 2001 : para 183). This new partnership is a call for combined 
efforts between Africa and developed countries to improve the quality of life of 
Africa's people as a matter of greatest urgency (NEPAD, 2001: para 171). 
A number of responsibilities and obligations on the part of the developed world 
and multilateral institutions are expected by Africa . These include supporting 
peace processes on the continent; debt reduction; an increase in Official 
Development Assistance (ODA); the involvernent of multilateral institutions, such 
as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), in key infrastructure 
projects on the continent; admission of goods from Africa into the markets of the 
developed world; and governance reforms of multilateral institutions to better 
cater for the needs of Africa (NEPAD, para 185). 
These responsibilities and obligations are based on the recognition of the 
centuries-old historical injustice and the need to correct it. Therefore, as the 
document reads, the new partnership is about overcoming the development 
chasm that has existed between Africa and the developed world over centuries 
(NEPAD, 2001 : para 8). The merit of this realisation is that it raises concerns 
about the Africa - North dichotomy, and the global system in general, without 
prejudice. It acknowledges that the impoverishment of the continent is not only as 
a result of the inadequacies of, and shortcomings in, the policies pursued by 
many countries in the post-independence era, but that it was also accentuated by 
the legacy of colonialism and the operations of the international economic system 
(NEPAD, 2001: para 18). The latter continue to thwart Africa's path to 
sustainable development. In this regard, the document reads: 
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In the absence of fair and just global rules globalisation has increased the ability of the 
strong to advance their interests to the detriment of the weak, especially in the areas of 
trade, finance, and technology. It has limited the space for developing countries to control 
their development, as the system has no provision for compensating the weak. The 
conditions of those marginalized in this process have worsened in real terms. A fissure 
between inclusion and exclusion has emerged within and among nations (NEPAD, 2001: 
para 33). 
For this reason, African leaders propose the transformation of the international 
order, including its institutions. They say, "We hold that it is within the capacity of 
the international community to create fair and just conditions in which Africa can 
participate effectively in the global economic and body politic" (NEPAD, 2001: 
para 41). 
The extent to which Africa presses for such transformation, and the extent to 
which the North is prepared to heed to it is not entirely clear. Two things are 
certain . Firstly, for their part, African leaders do not state how such 
transformation is to be effected and to what degree is it going to benefit the 
peoples of Africa. Secondly, the hostile attitude of the North towards the spirit of 
the new international economic order (NIEO) of the 1970s has not waned. 
While leaders of the G-8 declare that ''We accept the invitation from African 
Leaders ... to build a new partnership between the countries of Africa and our 
own, based on mutual responsibility and respect" (G-8 Africa Action Plan, 20027: 
para 1), they tend to emphasize what Africa must do more than what should be 
done to address the global politico-economic set-up. G-8 leaders express their 
enthusiasm about the commitment African leaders have made to good 
governance, human rights , investment-driven economic growth and economic 
governance as the key to poverty reduction (G-8 Africa Action Plan, 2002: para 
3). They declare: 
7 G-8 Africa Action Plan was adopted by the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialised countries, at the 
Kananaskis Summit, held in Canada, in June 2002 . Through this Plan, G-8 leaders endorsed the 
NEPAD programme. 
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We welcome this commitment. In support of the NEPAD objectives, we each undertake 
to establish enhanced partnerships with African countries whose performance reflects the 
NEPAD commitments. Our partners will be selected on the basis of measured results . 
Th is will lead us to focus our efforts on countries that demonstrate a political and financial 
commitment to good governance and the rule of law, investing in their people, and 
pursuing policies that spur economic growth and alleviate poverty. We wi ll match their 
commitment with a commitment on our own part to promote peace and security in Africa, 
to boost expertise and capacity, to encourage trade and direct growth-oriented 
investment, and to provide more effective official development assistance (G-8 Africa 
Action Plan, 2002: para 4). 
Emphasizing the importance of good governance, G-8 leaders hail NEPAD 
because, they say, it acknowledges that the primary responsibility for the future 
of Africa lies with Africa itself (G-8 Africa Action Plan , 2002: para 6). For this 
reason , they support the adoption, on 11 June 2002, of the Declaration on 
Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (DDPECG) and the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). They perceive the APRM as a 
mechanism that will help inform their considerations of eligibility for enhanced 
partnerships (G-8 Africa Action Plan, 2002: para 7). To this extent, G-8 leaders' 
perceptions about the constraints to Africa's development coincide with those of 
some sections of African society, the post-modernists to be exact. 
In support of the new partnership, the G-8 countries, have committed themselves 
to do the following, among other things : fostering trade, investment, economic 
growth and sustainable development; and implementing debt relief. 
In terms of fostering trade, investment, economic growth and sustainable 
development, G-8 leaders acknowledge that: 
'For some elements in the North, underdevelopment in Africa is the result of lack of political will to transform 
and 'catch up' with the developed world . For some US leaders, most of the problems in Africa are of its own 
making. They say poor economic performance on the continent is as a resul t of Africa 's poor governance 
(Sunday Times, 2 November 2002). Reversing this trend, according to this line of thinking, requires that 
Africa 'sets its house into order' by being good. 
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In order to achieve adequate growth rates , Africa must have broader access to markets. 
The launch of multilateral trade negotiations by World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
members in Doha, which placed the needs and interests of developing countries at the 
heart of the negotiations, wi ll help create a framework for the integration of African 
countries into the world trading system and the global economy, thus creating increased 
opportunities for trade-based growth . We are committed to the Doha development 
agenda and to implementing fully the WTO work programme, as well as to providing 
increased trade-related technical assistance to help African countries participate 
effectively in these negotiations . .. (G-8 Africa Action Plan, 2002: para 11 , Article III) . 
Against this background, G-8 countries undertake to help Africa attract 
investment, both from within Africa and from abroad, and to implement policies 
conducive to economic growth. This means, among other things, supporting 
those African initiatives that are aimed at improving the climate for investment, 
including sound economic policies and efforts to improve the security of goods 
and transactions, consolidate property rights, modernise customs, institute legal 
and judicial reforms, and help mitigate risks for investors (G-8 Africa Action Plan, 
2002: para 11 Article 111.3.1). 
With regard to debt relief, G-8 countries undertake to assist the Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPCs) to reduce poverty by enabling them to exit the HIPC 
process with a sustainable level of debt (G-8 Africa Action Plan, 2002: para 11 
Article IV 4.1). However, they say that debt relief alone is not sufficient for long-
term debt sustainability. According to them, sound policies; good governance; 
prudent new borrowing and sound debt management by HIPCs, as well as 
responsible financing by creditors must complement debt relief. In that context 
these countries must continue to demonstrate a commitment to poverty 
reduction, sound financial management, and good governance (G-8 Africa Action 
Plan, 2002: para 11 Article IV 4.2). 
It must be noted, however, that no mention of debt cancellation, which is 
necessary to enable Africa 's development to get off the ground, is made here. In 
fact, it is not clear why the architects of NEPAD themselves opted for the IMF 
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and World Bank - managed HIPC initiative and not for total debt cancellation. 
Perhaps, they, like the Fund, the Bank and the G-8, do not see debt relief as a 
necessary step and a pre-requ isite for a fresh start to relations between Africa 
and the North. 
1.5. The problem area 
While there is consensus about the need for a new partnership between Africa 
and the North, the precise meaning of what is 'new' has increasingly become 
nebulous and highly polemical due to conceptual and ideological interpretative 
differences this has received both in Africa and abroad. 
One the one hand, recognising the centuries-old historical injustice and the need 
to correct it, Africanists seem to define the new partnership mainly in terms of the 
transformation of the world 's political and economic order in favour of Africa's 
development. On the other hand, there are those sections - found both in Africa 
and abroad - that define it in post-modernist terms according to which Africa 
must make a commitment to good governance as a measure to change investor 
perceptions about the continent, with a view, in the long-term, to integrating into 
the global economy. 
1.6. Object of the thesis 
The objective of the thesis is a modest critique of the idea of the new partnership 
between Africa and the industrialised North, as envisaged in the NEPAD project. 
The thesis argues that there is no reason to believe that conceptualising and 
implementing the new partnership in post-modernist terms will result in 
sustainable development in Africa. On the contrary, there are indications that 
Africa's position in the globalisation process will deteriorate further, and surely 
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this will fall foul of the objectives of an African rebirth and renewal, which NEPAD 
is meant to achieve. 
This argument is based on the premise that the post-modernist interpretation 
does not systematically and rigorously problematize the central ideological 
currents that underpin Africa's relations with the North. This is mainly because 
this interpretation is moulded by the historical bourgeois circumstances in which 
it developed, and by the political ambitions it seeks to serve. This can be seen in 
its tendency to emphasize good governance in Africa, which is narrowly defined 
as the provision of stable environments for private capital, guarantee the sanctity 
of contracts and the independence of central bankers (Adesina, 2002b:7). Rather 
than making agents of private capital and central bankers politically accountable 
to the people, this notion of 'good governance' promotes what Adesina (2003) 
calls "clusters of authoritarianism" with various structures of governance. 
Moreover, good governance is now made a requirement that Africa must meet 
before receiving financial support from the North. However, this 'trade-off' or 
quid-pro-quo element, which is reminiscent of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) logic, fails to give Africa's developmental needs the serious 
attention they deserve. Rather, it continues to integrate the continent into the 
global economy in a manner that reflects neo-colonialism and subordination 
(Keet, 2000:24). Therefore, the good governance that is tiresomely emphasized 
both in the NEPAD project and in the G-8 Africa Action Plan is emblematic of the 
post-modernist orthodoxy that permeates the contemporary global political 
discourse. 
Against this background, the thesis further argues that genuine sustainable 
development and the renaissance of Africa depend entirely on two 
complementary bases. The one is the transformation and adjustment of the 
international order to the priority demands for development of the South. This is 
more relevant today than ever before, given the unprecedented global political 
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and economic instability, these being an epochal consequence of the systemic 
crisis of neo-liberal capitalism. The other relates to the promotion of socio-
economic and political accountability and responsiveness in Africa - this being a 
genuine democratic need of the people of the continent. 
1.7. Research methods and methodology 
This work does not pretend to break any new ground. Rather, it significantly 
relies on secondary material to provide an in-depth analysis of the relations 
between Africa and the North, both in historical and contemporary contexts, so 
as to make sense of the idea of the new partnership. 
1.8. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into four main chapters, while the general introduction and 
conclusion make up chapter one and chapter six, respectively. 
Chapter Two: Africa's quest for development 
Essentially, this chapter traces historical developmental efforts (and the debates 
that informed them) in Africa since independence and the problems thereof. The 
objective of this undertaking is to provide the context within which NEPAD 
emerged. 
Chapter Three: The New Partnership for Africa's Development 
This chapter is an in-depth examination of the NEPAD strategy and approach in 
support of Africa 's development. The objective of this undertaking is to establish 
the context for a discussion of certain ambiguities and contradictions that 
underpin this programme of African renewal. 
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Chapter Four: The New Partnership for Africa's Development and the fallacy of 
neo-liberalism: A theoretical appraisal 
This chapter provides a more nuanced reading of NEPAD and teases out its 
central ideological underpinnings. Firstly, it argues that while NEPAD is prima 
facie characterised by the injunction of Africanist and bourgeois facets, it is more 
inclined to the latter. This inclination is mainly the result of Africa's large 
dependence on foreign aid, and consequently the convergence of domestic and 
global forces that generally adhere to neo-liberal capitalism as an engine of 
growth and development. Secondly, the chapter critically evaluates the validity 
and pitfalls of neo-liberalism. Thirdly and lastly, it concludes by arguing that neo-
liberal capitalism has entered a systemic crisis - a crisis that cannot be 
overcome within the broader framework of neo-liberalism itself. 
Chapter Five: A new partnership or another false start? Implications and 
possibilities for the Renaissance 
This chapter critically evaluates each of the interpretations of the new partnership 
against the objectives of the African Renaissance. It argues that the adherents of 
the post-modernist interpretation na'ively declare their confidence on neo-
liberalisrn without providing compelling empirical evidence of its wholesome 
successes, particularly in Africa where the unique socio-economic and political 
conditions bear testimony to the contrary. Consequently, their 'prescribed' path to 
Africa 's developrnent will damage the objectives of rebirth and renewal. 
Against this background, the chapter argues that central to sustainable 
developrnent and renewal of Africa are two complernentary bases: the one, 
improved systems of governance on the continent in its own right, and the other, 
the transformation of the current global order into one with humankind as its 
central dimension. These two bases provide a glimpse of a strategic partnership 
between Africa and the North. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
This is essentially the summary of the main arguments of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AFRICA'S QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 . Introduction 
The development chasm between Africa and the North is more conspicuous 
today than ever before. 'The poverty and backwardness of Africa stand in stark 
contrast to the prosperity of the developed world" (NEPAD, 2001: para 2). 
Africa's position in the global economy is that of "dependence, 
underdevelopment and servitude" (Rodney, 1982:25). To help reverse this rather 
abysmal situation, African leaders and peoples alike have long been engaged in 
politically conscious efforts to find ways and means of bringing about sustainable 
development on their continent. 
This chapter, therefore, traces historical developmental efforts in Africa. The 
main objective of this undertaking is not only to demonstrate that Africa's quest 
for development has been an on-going historical process, but importantly, it is to 
provide a context within which the idea of NEPAD emerged. The argument of the 
chapter is that, the idea of NEPAD emerged at a particular critical juncture, when 
the international community, particularly countries of the South, sought to 
promote an understanding of what development beyond mere growth in gross 
domestic product (GOP) terms should be precisely about. The essence of this 
new global consensus culminated in the adoption of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) at the 56th Session of the UN General Assembly in September 
2001 . To that extent parallels can be drawn between Africa's renewal programme 
and MDGs. 
2.2. Conflicting developmental debates in historical perspective 
The development of Africa has been the subject of contentious debate between 
the advocates of modernization and critical theorists. In the 1950s, a liberal 
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tradition dominated the African developmental discourse. Liberal scholars 
assumed that the development of Africa, as well as of other developing regions 
of the world, would ensue if the continent were to follow similar political and 
economic methods to those pursued in Europe and other developed countries 
over centuries. This was the essence of the Modemization theory. One of the 
proponents of this theory was Walt Rostow (1960), whose analysis of the stages 
of development of Western countries over centuries was that, "all countries 
evolve through the same 'stages of growth' as leaders seek to transform 
'backward' agriculturally based societies into modem industrial economies" 
(Rostow cited in Schraeder, 2000:24). The standard measure of modernization 
was the growth of a country's gross domestic product (GOP) (Schraeder, 
2000:24-25). The assumption was that African states were at the starting point of 
a developmental path. As such, they still had to undergo the mechanization of 
agriculture and industrialization of most urban areas (Schraeder, 2000:24). The 
end result of modernization, according to its advocates, would be the melting 
away of 'traditional' ways of life and the corresponding rise of 'modernity'. The 
latter would be marked by the emergence of "industrialized, modern, and pluralist 
democracies" (Schraeder, 2000:25). 
The economic difficulties, the rise of political extremism, religious intolerance, 
ethnic conflicts and other problems of the independence era discredited 
modernization. Instead, critical theorists emerged in the 1960s, whose approach 
to development was Marxist in its orientation. They challenged the very prevailing 
global order on the basis of its inherent exploitative nature. Many critical theorists 
subscribed to the body of literature called Dependency theory9. This theory 
essentially assumes that the modern world system is characterized by the 
9 Of course, dependency theory has got some variants, such as the World Systems Theory. The 
latter does not perceive the world system as polarised between the wealthy core and the 
subservient and impoverished periphery. Rather there is an intermediate semi-peripheral area, 
which has some similarities with the core (complexity of economic activities, strength of the state 
machinery and cultural integrity - among other features), but at the same time is exploited by the 
core, the fact that it can too exploit the periphery notwithstanding (Wallerstein , 1974:349). For the 
purposes of the discussion in context, the thesis ignores this variant. It focuses on dependency 
theory in general. 
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exchange of goods and services in the global market. Because in this system 
there is extensive division of labour, this exchange takes place between the 
different geographical zones of the system. There is a core, which produces and 
trades high-wage, advanced technology goods. There is a periphery, which is 
weak (because it is modelled in a colonial form and sometimes lacks some 
degree of autonomy) and that produces and trades low-wage, low technology 
commodities , such as agriculture and mineral products. The exchange is 
therefore unequal and exploitative because the core politically controls the 
system. The periphery is exploited, impoverished and politically controlled by the 
core. 
Dependency is analyzed mostly as an economic condition and is thus considered 
to be the result of the flow of the economic surplus from the Third World to 
Western capitalist countries. It is therefore considered to be a component of the 
regional polarization of the global economy (For an in-depth discussion on 
dependency see Wallerstein1o, 1974; Caporaso, 1978; So, 1990; Amin, 1990; 
Hout, 1993). 
Putting this theory into the African context, Walter Rodney (1982) argues that, 
long before the spread of global capitalism by the end of the 16th century, Africa, 
like other regions of the non-European world, was developing politically and 
economically. But as Europe invaded Africa, thus bringing in direct colonial rule, 
the African continent was increasingly included within the global capitalist 
system. All forms of independent development on the continent were 
extinguished because European domination led to the development of 
underdevelopment: the gradual impoverishment of the African continent as 
previous African development was "blunted, halted, and turned back (Rodney 
cited in Schraeder, 2000: 47). 
10 Wallerstein goes a step further to discuss the role of the semi-periphery in the world system . 
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The thesis will argue that, while the critical perspective was a dominant force 
during the independence period in Africa, the ascendancy of rightwing 
monetarism and conservative politics in Britain and America in the early 1980s 
precipitated a paradigm shift towards a post-modernist orthodoxy, as neo-
classical ism began to permeate the global political discourse. It will argue further 
that, this shift has worsened the position of Africa in the global economy in real 
terms, something that makes a new global consensus on matters of development 
the real necessity. While NEPAD is supposed to serve as a building block for this 
consensus, some forces, locally and internationally, persistently seek to fit it 
within the prevailing post-modernist orthodoxy. 
2.3. Independence and the politics of African development 
There is a prevailing view that, long before the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) was established, African leaders had acknowledged the importance of 
cooperation and integration among African states in the economic, social and 
cultural fields. These fields were considered very crucial in expediting 
transformation and sustained development of the African continent (South 
African government website: http://www.gov.za/2001 ; Economic Co-operation 
and Development Department (ECDD) of the African Economic Community 
(AEC) 2000: http://www.panafricanperspective.com/aec.html). 
Conscious and deliberate efforts to this end were made as early as in April 1958 
when the Conference of Independent African States was held in Accra, Ghana. 
This was followed by the All African Peoples Conference, held in December 1958 
in the same country. These conferences provided a glimpse of how transformed 
and developed Africa could become were it to realistically implement their 
objectives. In the All African Peoples Conference, three elements of Pan-
Africanism were identified. These included the rejection of violence as a means 
of struggle; the promotion of inter-racial cooperation in the continent, while 
maintaining that Africa remained for Africans and ; the linking up of Ghana's 
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independence with the total liberation of the whole continent (Legum, 1962). 
Nkrumah's ideas of African unity were very crucial in the latter element. 
Even though there was a considerable divergence of opinion between the 
Casablanca Block (the proponents of a revolutionary African unity or the 
Nkrumahists) and the Monrovia Block (the gradualists or reformers) on how 
transformation and sustained development on the continent were to be attained, 
the proposal for an African Union, as put forward by Dr. Okpara (the Premier of 
the Eastern Region of Nigeria) in London in August 1961, provided a road map. 
This proposal was centered on three main elements. The first envisaged Africa 
as organized into five Economic Regions (North, East, Central, South and West) 
with common customs, currency, transport and research organizations. The 
second element envisaged these regions as welded into political unions. The 
third element envisaged that these regions should form a Federation, a 
Confederation, or a Common Market (Legum, 1962:59). 
Consequently, after considerable deliberations and discussions, an historic 
compromise between the gradualists and Nkrumahists was reached. Thirty-two 
African Heads of State signed the Charter of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) at the Addis Ababa Conference, on 25 May 1963. Thus, a continental 
organization had been born, with Headquarters in Addis Ababa. To this extent, 
unity - however defined - had been achieved for the first time. Perhaps, that is 
why some praised the formation of the OAU as phenomenal. However, whether 
such sentiments were based on the common vision of African leaders, or merely 
on the romanticisation of the concept of 'unity', would be proved by the political 
and socio-economic dynamics of the post independence era. 
Before one can cast an eye on the developments since the 'phenomenal' 
formation of the OAU, it is imperative that we understand what the Charter of the 
organization entailed. Article II (1) of the Charter states that, the Organization 
shall have the following purposes: 
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a. To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; 
b. To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a 
better life for the peoples of Africa; 
c. To defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; 
d. To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and 
e. To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter 
of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
In Article II (2), the Charter says, to the ends mentioned above, the Member 
States shall coordinate and harmonize their general policies, especially in the 
following fields: 
a. Political and diplomatic cooperation ; 
b. Economic cooperation, including transport and communications; 
c. Educational and cultural cooperation; 
d. Health, sanitation and natural cooperation; 
e. Scientific and technical cooperation; and 
f . Cooperation for defence and security. 
Under Article III, the Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II 
solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles: 
1. The sovereignty of all Member States; 
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States; 
3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State 
and its inalienable right to independent existence; 
4. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, 
conciliation or arbitration; 
5. Unreserved condemnation , in all its forms, of political 
assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of 
neighbouring States or any other States; 
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6. Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African 
territories which are still dependent; and 
7. Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocks. 
As can be seen from the above selected summary of the Charter, the 
establishment of the OAU was an important historical compromise , given that the 
interests of both the Casablanca and the Monrovia groups had been 
accommodated. Also important were the goals stated in Article II (2) of the 
Charter. 
Having established a continental organization, African leaders were now hoping 
that they had made a major breakout from peripheralization and had marked the 
entry of their continent on to the stage of world politics. This hope had its basis in 
figures like Kwame Nkrumah, who had a Pan-African ideal (Rich, 2000:18). 
However, rather than seeing Africa becoming free from the vagaries of 
imperialism and neo-colonialism, Africans saw their continent's continued 
occupation of a peripheral position in the global system. Thus, relations of 
dependence between the continent and Europe were further entrenched . 
Many explanations have been advanced for Africa's abysmal situation and 
structural position in the global economy. Some tend to emphasize internal 
problems, such as the absence of participatory democratic governance, alarming 
levels of corruption, and bad economic policies adopted by some African leaders 
(see Osaghae, 1999; Szeftel, 2000a; Szeftel , 2000b; Szeftel, 2000c; Nabudere, 
2001; Ndi-Zambo, 2001). Others emphasize the structural problems of the 
capitalist world economy, which perpetuate Africa's dependence on its former 
colonial powers or other industrialized states. According to this explanation, this 
engenders an unfavourable global terrain, in which Africa is bereft of the political 
and economic influence needed to change the system in its favour (Lambrechts, 
2001 :31 ; see also Dependency theorists). 
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It is my contention that, rather than seeing these explanations as contradictory, it 
is important that they are seen as complementary. Onimode (1992) and Osaghae 
(1999) concur. The first scholar reasons that the internal factors alone did not 
cause crises in Africa. It is necessary, therefore, in the campus of this debate to 
try and ponder some of these explanations in an attempt to understand the 
dynamics of the post-independence political economy. 
Perhaps the first problem with post-independence Africa, which ultimately led to 
economic decline and caused the crisis, was the nature of the African state itself. 
Towards the end of the 19th century, when colonialism was taking root, European 
colonialists secured metropolitan structural power over Africa (Rich, 2000:16). 
This structural power was designed to help facilitate an expanding capitalist 
sector, which was rooted in the cheap labour of the colonized indigenous peoples 
and the extraction of raw materials (Donald cited in Rich, 2000:16-17; Gutkind 
and Wallerstein, 1976: 12; NEPAD, 2001 : para 19). It was "only those sectors 
producing for export, in the import trade, and in the structures and services 
required to collect raw materials and distribute imports . . . " that were developed 
(Gutkind and Wallerstein, 1976: 12). As such, there could not be national 
economic stnuctures that would create sustained increases in per capita 
productivity. Consequently, at independence, the continent was left with a huge 
wreckage of fragmented , retarded and virtually undeveloped economies (Green 
and Seidman, 1982:251). 
As Osaghae (1999:186) correctly argues, it was natural to expect the new African 
leaders to change or do away with the structures that had distorted the African 
state , but they failed to transform these inherited perverse colonial economic and 
social structures (Onimode, 1992:8). Instead, they simply replaced the old 
colonial rulers "without any fundamental change in the character of the colonial 
state (Ake, cited in Osaghae, 1999:186). The failure to transform the state, 
therefore, had deleterious implications for the economic and political future of the 
continent. For instance, when the real prices of primary commod ities collapsed in 
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the mid-1970s, coupled with the oil crisis of the same period, Africa's economic 
performance started deteriorating (Aju[u, 2001 :28). A[so important is that, weak 
neo-co[onia[ states could not empower people, they could not govern effectively 
and could not develop long-term policies. This inability became one of the 
constraints to sustainable development on the continent (NEPAD, 2001 : para 
23). 
The second problem with post-independence Africa relates to the continued 
existence of an authoritarian state and its denial of democracy. The [ate 1960s 
were characterized by a move away from plural politics towards the centralization 
of power, usually in the hands of one party. Crucial differences existed , however, 
between one-party systems: how they came into being; whether they were de 
facto or de jure ; whether they had a strong ideo[ogical base or not; and whether 
or not they made certain provisions for inner-party democratic participation 
(Tordoff, 2002:7). [n many countries, inner-party participation increasingly 
became rare, as was the case with Convention People's Party (CPP) in Ghana 
and in Ma[awi under Hastings Kamuzu Banda. Even though some countries, 
such as Tanzania, were less authoritarian, they were characterized by a 
complete absence of political p[uralism and therefore, arguably, lack of 
participatory democracy. 
Of course, [inks can be made between the lack of participatory democracy and a 
lack of accountability and transparency. As the private sector was severely 
underdeveloped in Africa, the state had to assume a developmental role. This 
resulted in the emergence of a plethora of bureaucracies. Given the dominance 
of one party in many African states, bureaucrats were highly politicized. 
According to Adedeji (cited in Hope Sir., 2000: 18), this provided an opportunity 
for personalism and patronage as the means through which authority and 
influence were exercised. Politicians and bureaucrats began to forge dependent 
patron-client relationships, through which administrative decision-making 
occurred . 'This process, inevitably, led to a cooperative and institutionalized 
33 
abuse of public office for private and personal gain" (Hope Sir., 2000: 18). 
Consequently, kleptocratic or vampire states emerged, where the ruling elite and 
their associates systematically looted their countries' wealth , diverting billions of 
dollars of state funds into private foreign bank accounts (Hope Sir., 2000:19; 
Onimode, 1992:11). Many stories about Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Sani 
Abacha of Nigeria, who are alleged to have each stolen large sums of money 
from their governments, continue to be told even today. 
The consequences of corruption are detrimental for the process of development. 
Politically, entrenched corruption necessitates the suppression of political 
opposition and public criticism through the state instruments of law and order. 
Not only does this reduce the capacity of the state to deliver basic social 
services, but it also creates a legitimacy crisis and ultimately protracted social 
conflicts, causing untold human suffering and a quagmire of economic decay. 
The third policy problem with post-independence Africa relates to unproductive 
investment activity expenditures. Governments often failed to set their priorities 
right. "Besides distorted national priorities, due partly to lack of democratic 
participation in the choice of these national priorities , there [was] also excessive 
politicisation of essentially technical and economic questions" (On imide, 
1992:10). Table 1 below shows the extent of the damage caused by distorted 
national prioritisation. 
Table 1: Unproductive investment in Africa - net rates of return on capital 
Region 1961- 73 1973- 80 1980 - 87 
Sub-Saharan Africa 83.8 23.5 6.2 
South Asia 47.8 38.5 36.5 
.. Source. World Bank, Sub-Saharan Afrrca . From Crrsls to Susta inable Growth- A Long-term 
Perspective Study, L TPS, 1989:26 cited in Onimode, 1992: 1 O. 
Looking outside the continent and the failures of the post-independence state, 
one finds the structural constraints of the modern capitalist world system, which, 
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as we have already noted, deprive the continent of the political and economic 
influence necessary to change the system in its favour. 
After the Second World War, the US emerged as the global superpower, while 
Britain had to recover from the economic devastation caused by war. At the top 
of the US's priorities was the creation of a stable international financial order, in 
particular the stability of currencies; the upholding of the stability of the 
contemporary capitalist world system; and the reconstruction of Europe (Leysens 
and Thompson, 1999:34). To this end, the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) (or the World Bank), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were 
established as the international financial institutions and a trading forum 
respectively. 
The World Bank's role was two-fold: The primary role was to help reconstruct 
devastated Europe. The secondary role was to help former colonies build their 
economies in the same manner as Western Europe had built theirs. In line with 
its intention of reconstructing Europe, the US went ahead of the World Bank and 
channelled one per cent of its national income every year, for four years, into 
Europe - in total the equivalent in today's money of US$75 billion - through the 
Marshall Plan under the aegis of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) (Brown, 2002). Because of this aid, Western Europe 
managed to develop as a result of such protectionist measures as the Schuman 
Plan of 1950, which laid the foundation for the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), an historic economic cooperation that brought France and 
Germany together. The ECSC laid the foundation for the European Economic 
Community in 1957 (or the European Union, as we know it today) (Leysens and 
Thompson, 1999:40). 
The role of the IMF was to help with short-term balance-of-payments problems 
and other currency-related problems in countries that experienced difficulties with 
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the value of their currencies. Since its establishment, GATT was aimed at 
creating a liberal intemational trading system. 
With these institutions created , the US exerted its influence and dominance in 
finance, production and trade structures, and managed to entrench the rules, 
regulations and norms goveming the intemational political economy. Such rules 
and regulations, however, were to favour the dominant players in the 
international system, notably the US . Thus, the world 's political and economic 
climate changed considerably. Against this background, it is imperative that we 
assess the implications for the developing world, particularly Africa . 
When the war ended in 1945, the US had control of more than 70 percent of the 
world 's gold and foreign exchange reserves, and more than 40 per cent of its 
industrial output. Most of the Third World was still colonised and contained just 
less than 1 per cent of the world's industrial capacity (Brett, 1985:63). 
The US had set the gold exchange standard, in terms of which it undertook to 
peg the value of the dollar to gold at a rate of US$35 to an ounce (Leysens and 
Thompson, 1999:35). In 1971 , US President, Richard Nixon, announced that 
America was changing from a fixed exchange rate for the dollar to a floating 
exchange rate system. In terms of the latter, currency values were to be largely 
linked to, and determined by, market forces and increasingly by financial market 
speculation (Leysens and Thopmson, 1999:37). 
The problem with the floating exchange rate system was that, it created a lot of 
uncertainty in the international economic system, with disastrous consequences 
for the newly independent African states. Financial market speculation is 
determined by a number of factors , which include political stability, the economic 
viability of a country, and its economic policies. Under a floating exchange rate 
system, market forces and financial market speculation determine the value of, 
say gold, on the basis of what banks and other private buyers are willing to pay 
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for it. This means that they can buy gold at US$10 an ounce if they so choose, 
given, of course, their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with any of the above 
mentioned factors. 
Since many newly independent African states were barely large enough to be 
economically viable, had Socialist-oriented economic policies, and some were 
politically unstable, the value of their currencies was subjected to a profound 
fluctuation . And since many of them depended on one or two non-petroleum 
primary commodities: cocoa, rubber, etc, (and the demand for such commodities 
was determined by market forces) they ended up producing more for little. This 
was the beginning of the collapse of their commodity prices, which became more 
intense in the early 1970s. According to Bond (2001 a:61), there was a 77 percent 
decline of non-petroleum commodity prices from 1973 to 1988. 
The collapse of commodity prices was exacerbated by the oil shocks of 1973. In 
that year, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided to 
raise the price of oil by 400 per cent. The OPEC countries deposited their riches 
in the banks in the West. These banks lent vast sums of money to the developing 
world so that the latter could meet their import needs, particularly of oil. While the 
developing world benefited from these loans, this only lasted up until 1979, when 
OPEC once again raised the price of oil. The response of the US and Western 
Europe was to raise interest rates from -4 percent to 4 percent (see Leysens and 
Thompson, 1999: 38; Bond, 2001a:61). Since many developing countries, 
particularly those of Africa, were getting barely enough from their commodities, 
they could hardly service their debt. Mexico, in 1982, declared a moratorium on 
its international debt repayments and this marked the beginning of the debt crisis. 
In Africa, the onset of the debt crisis "dashed any hopes of sustainable economic 
growth" (Ajulu, 2001 :28). 
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2.4. The emergence of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
ideology 
Convinced that the liberal international economic order that was set up at Bretton 
Woods perpetuated the dependency of the South on the North, and convinced 
that the countries of the North "promoted the principle of free trade to serve their 
own interests, but engaged in protectionist economic policies when it suited 
them" the Group of 77 (G-77) at the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development I (UNCTAD I) proposed the New International Economic Order 
(NIEO)". They proposed that this conference should be a forum to discuss 
matters relating to trade, production and financial issues with the developed 
world, instead of discussing them through GATT (Leysens and Thompson, 
1999:39) . 
Thus the G-77 proposed the following: an integrated programme for commodities 
(lPC) to control and stabilize commodity prices; extension of the generalized 
system of preferences (GSPs) on tariffs for developing country exports; a debt 
relief programme; increasing official development assistance (ODA) flows to the 
South; democratization of the UN, IMF and the Bank in favour of the developing 
world and the promotion of the economic sovereignty of the developing world by, 
inter alia, giving them more control over their own natural resources, and giving 
them enough access to technology, regulation of multinational corporations, and 
allowing developing country exports greater access to the markets of the 
developed world (Kukreja cited in Leysens and Thompson, 1999:39; see also 
Murphy, 1983). 
2.5. Africa's silent revolution: Towards the Lagos Plan of Action 
Recalling the historical goals stated in Article II (2) of the Charter of the OAU, and 
having due regard for the crises of the post- war international economic order 
11 The NIEO had been inspired by dependency theory. 
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(coupled with the G-77's reaction thereto) the OAU convened its 16th Summit in 
Monrovia, in July 1979. At that Summit, African leaders discussed and examined 
economic and political problems facing the continent. They reached very 
historical decisions. They resolved, inter alia, (1) to take concrete measures to 
realize national and collective self-reliance in the economic and social domains 
faced by the New International Economic Order, (2) to recognize the need to take 
urgent measures in giving indispensable political support to the process of 
realizing rapid economic growth in the context of collective self-reliant 
development (Anyang' Nyong' 0, 2002:1). Against these ends, it was resolved 
that the following were essential: 
1. Promotion of economic and social integration of African 
economies to enhance self-reliance and self-centred 
development; 
2. Creation of national, sub-regional and regional institutions in 
pursuit of this self-reliance; 
3. Giving primacy to human resources development; 
4. Placing science and technology at the centre of Africa's 
development processes; 
5. Ensuring self-reliance in food production and guaranteeing the 
African people proper and adequate nutrition, together with 
other basic needs of a civilized standard of living; 
6. Undertaking proper planning in all sectors of development 
with more emphasis on agriculture, industry, an environmentally 
sound use of natural resources - with the aim of achieving 
modern economies at the national, sub-regional and regional 
levels by the year 2000. 
At the request of the African Heads of State and Government for a sound plan to 
put these objectives into practice, the Secretary General of the OAU and the 
Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa organized the 
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Second Extraordinary Session of the Heads of State and Government in Lagos, 
Nigeria in July 1980. The Session passed the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the 
Final Act of Lagos for the economic development of Africa (Anyang' Nyong' 0, 
2002: 1). The LPA, anchored on principles of self-reliance and self-sustaining 
development and economic growth, explained in detail, sector by sector, on how 
Africa could achieve its targets (Maloka, 2001 :2; Anyang' Nyong' 0, 2002:2; 
Ndulu et aI, 1998:4). At the same time, it declared the aim of economic and even 
cultural and social integration for the continent. It identified the following priority 
areas: food and agriculture; human resources development; transport and 
communications and industry. At the core of the LPA, was the creation of sub-
regional bodies throughout the continent and the establishment of an African 
Common Market, and in the end, an African Economic Community (Maloka, 
2001 :2). The Treaty establishing the AEC was later signed in Abuja, Nigeria, in 
June 1991. 
When the LPA draft was presented to the World Bank, the latter criticized it for 
"not giving enough room to the private sector, not conceding to the reforms 
necessary in the public sector to stimulate economic growth and being too 
ambitious in its projections of what Africa could achieve in terms of industrial 
growth" (Anyang' Nyong' 0, 2002:2). This criticism, as Anyang' Nyong' 0 correctly 
admits, was based on the hostile behavior of the Bank towards the idea of NIEO. 
The Bank came up with an alternative. It appointed a commission of assessors to 
evaluate African economies, ostensibly to provide a panacea to the problem of 
underdevelopment. The commission was headed by Professor Elliot Berg. On 
the basis of this evaluation, the Berg Report titled Accelerated Development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, identified the cause of 
underdevelopment as lying in the involvement of the African state in the 
economy, what it called 'bad governance' and corruption, resulting from 
overblown bureaucracies (Anyang' Nyong' 0, 2002:2). The report, therefore, 
recommended the rolling back of the state from the economy through 
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privatization and the opening up of the economy to private sector participation 
through liberalization (Anyang' Nyong' 0 , 2002:2). 
These economic reform policy packages ultimately became the conditions that 
African states had to meet in return for financial aid from the Bank and the 
Northern donor community (see Watts, 1999; Duncan and Howell , 1992; Baylies, 
1995). Rather than enter a self-reliant path of development, as was initially 
thought, African states had thus entered into the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) of the Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
which were later to become notorious as a result of their impact. 
2.6. The impact of SAPs in Africa: Re-visiting the developmental debates 
The impact of SAPs in African economies has varied considerably. While there 
are a few countries that managed to register growth gains in the early 1990s 
under SAPs (NEPAD, 2001: para 24), the number of the so-called Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) in Africa grew from 21 in 1980 to 32 in 1995 
(Rugumamu, 1999:11). Even in situations where there were modest growth 
rates, SAPs hardly contained any measures to protect the poor against the 
negative consequences of such economic growth (Lensik, 1996:116). In fact, 
other shortcomings of SAPs are well documented : rising unemployment, 
declining wages, rising poverty and economic stagnation or decline (see 
Adepoju, 1993; Kanji and Jazdowska, 1993; Bromley and Bush, 1994; Will iams, 
1994; Krugman, 1995; Dembele, 1998; NEPAD, para 24). Consequently, Africa's 
share in global trade fell from half to 0.3 percent in the 20 years of IMF and World 
Bank 'rescue' packages (Mail & Guardian, 12 -18, Apri l 2002). 
While SAPs were doing mainly the reverse of what they were geared to 
achieve,'2 the multinational financial institutions and donor community alike 
12 SAPs were meant to induce long-term economic growth by changing the relative prices and the 
structure of production and consumption, through such measures as privatisation policies; 
reduction of the public sector; and generally the rationalisation of institutions of the state 
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argued that, the failure of these programmes was the result of inappropriate 
application. It would seem, on the one hand, that Africa's external dependence 
had denied her the opportunity to develop, both economically and politically. On 
the other, such dependence enabled the North and multinational financial 
institutions to shape the economic and political design of the continent. The latter 
is very true because in some instances, the imposition of SAPs compromised the 
very sovereignty of African countries, as they began to be run by the 
multinational financial institutions. In this respect, Merle reminds us of the 
situation in one of the countries that adjusted: 
[In] Mozambique, the programme of structural adjustment has ensured that Western 
financial institutions (aided by their agencies) have effectively taken over the runn ing of 
the country's economic policy while at the same time forcing the ruling FRELIMO regime 
to break its alliance with its former support base among the peasantry and working class 
. .. (Cited in Rich, 2000:23). 
The conflict between the LPA and the Berg Report, and ultimately the 
introduction of SAPs, demonstrates a conflict of developmental debates in Africa 
between different schools of thought. While the LPA was based on more 
conventional state-managed models of development, geared toward a greater 
degree of African regional self-reliance in the longer run, the Berg Report was 
based on greater economic liberalization of African economies and a significant 
shift to agricultural production for export (Rich, 2000:20). 
The recommendations of the Berg Report were reflective of the resurgence of 
neo-classicalism in Britain and America under Thatcher and Reagan. The 
ascendancy of rightwing monetarism and conservative politics in these countries 
in the 1980s had two major consequences on domestic and global politics. At the 
domestic level, the state, which had once been considered a crucial player in the 
economy, was 'rolled back' and its role assumed by the invisible hand of the 
(Rugumamu, 1997:11). NEPAD (2001: para 24) hails SAPs in this regard, for removing serious 
price distortions 
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market. Consequently, the welfare gains of the people came under attack from 
these governments, as they implemented policies of privatization , reduced social 
spending, reduced taxation on the rich , deregulation and liberalization. 
At the global level , the Thatcher and Reagan regimes promoted the 
transformation of the IMF and the World Bank, particularly in their operations in 
the developing world; hence the structural adjustment. However, embedded in 
orthodox neo-classical theory, SAPs were based on a mistaken (or more 
precisely lack of) analysis of African conditions. They assumed that, by modelling 
African economies on those of Western Europe and North America the problem 
of underdevelopment and indebtedness in Africa would be addressed. 
A more realistic programme that took Africa's conditions into consideration was 
required. For its part, the LPA had failed to do so. While it sought to promote 
individual and collective self-reliance as a measure of linking Africa's 
development to Africa's genuine needs, the LPA was characterized by numerous 
problems. The critical one was the lack of resources to kick-start self-reliant 
development. The LPA had to rely heavily on the international financial 
institutions (IFls) and international donor community in general, hence the 
political conditionalities with ludicrous results. Another problem with the LPA was 
that, it set its goals without any declaration of intent to transform the domestic 
structures of governance and production (Fatton. Jr, 1992:130). Consequently, 
the LPA came to naught as it did very little to improve the lot of the African 
masses (Fatton. Jr, 1992:130). 
It was against this background that attempts were made at the 21 st Summit of the 
OAU in 1985, to revitalize the spirit of the LPA. The Summit adopted an African 
Priority Programme for Economic Recovery. These efforts resulted in the 
Economic Commission for Africa in conjunction with African governments 
adopting a Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and 
Development, 1986 -1990 (APPER) (Maloka, 2001 :2; Anyang' Nyong' 0, 
2002:3). Later, this was converted into the United Nations Programme of Action 
43 
for Africa's Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD ) Anyang' 
Nyong' 0, 2002:3). 
"In these documents, African leaders tried to come to terms with SAPs and to 
propose economic programmes and objectives according to which their 
governments could engage the external world in a joint endeavour to tackle 
economic and social backwardness in Africa" (Anyang' Nyong' 0 , 2002:3). They 
tried to address the problem of external debt, inadequacy of investment 
resources and unequal exchange in trade. 
It was argued by the Bank that, African governments should take the issue of 
'good governance' very seriously in addressing the continent's developmental 
needs. Furthermore, the Bank recommended that, SAPs needed to be taken on 
their own, and that African governments, ECA and the OAU needed to spell out 
in clear terms how APPER and UN-PAARED could be implemented (Anyang' 
Nyong'o, 2002:3). It was in th is spirit that the ECA, in 1989, produced The African 
Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Program for Socio-Economic 
Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP), in which African governments 
conceded to the demands of the Bank (Fatton. Jr, 2000:130; Anyong' Nyong' 0, 
2002:3). This compromise was, however, to be interpreted by some quarters of 
the African community as a shift away from the LPA. 
2.7. Global change and new patterns of integration in Africa 
After a very long political and economic wrangle between Africa and the North on 
the one hand, and Africa and multilateral financial institutions on the other, 
attempts were made to translate the commitments of the LPA into more concrete 
form in the early 1990s through the establishment of the African Economic 
Community. By this time, a new global balance of forces had emerged. The Cold 
War and ideological dualism had ended; huge politico-economic blocks had been 
established in Western Europe, North America and South East Asia; the pace of 
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globalisation had accelerated, the market had become the single organising 
principle of the world economy and Africa's position in the global economy had 
deteriorated very considerably (see Stallings, 1995; McCarthy, 1996; Ajulu, 2001; 
Ndi-Zambo, 2001). This had a number of implications for Africa 's path towards 
development. 
The first implication was that, Africa could no longer rely on the Soviet Union as a 
source of support and an alternative model of development. The US had re-
emerged13 as the world 's superpower, with market capitalism being viewed as 
the only rnodel of development. The collapse of the Soviet Union was very 
instrumental in that the attitudes of aid donors were changed: 
The Soviet donors were no longer able, and the Western donors no longer felt obliged, to 
bolster corrupt and tyrannical regimes on the grounds that those regimes were friends or 
allies. Equally, the tyrants could no longer count on such support (Rimmer, 1993:13). 
Against this background, Africa could no longer avoid the issue of governance, 
which had long been overdue. Acknowledging this fact, the ECA held the Arusha 
Conference on Popular Participation for Democracy in Africa and later produced 
The African Charter for Popular Participation for Development (1990). 
Appreciating these developments, the UN produced a New Agenda for 
Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN NADAF, 1991), which stressed in no 
uncertain terms that, good governance is a sine qua non for Africa's economic 
recovery (Anyang' Nyong' 0, 2002:3). 
The second implication was that the formation of huge regional blocks in Europe, 
the Americas and in East Asia posed a threat to multilateralism and to the trade 
position of the countries naturally outside these blocks (McCarthy, 1996:212; 
13 In the history of political economy, the US emerged for the first time as the major superpower in 
1945 after Europe and Japan had been completely devastated by war. But soon afterwards, it 
had to be involved in a deep ideological confrontation wi th the Soviet Union during the Cold War, 
thus making the world bipolar. When the latter ended in 1989, the world became unipolar with the 
US re-emerging as the single superpower. 
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Asante, 1997:1). The revival of the spirit of regionalism in the last quarter of the 
century was started by Europe, when it decided to move quickly with economic 
integration. Contributing to this decision was the slow progress made in the 
GATT deliberations, the beginning of negotiations over the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and a number of proposals for an Asian integration 
(Stallings, 1995:7). These regional blocks, particularly the European Union and 
the NAFTA, tended to resort to protectionist measures when it suited them. 
Now that multilateralism was under severe threat, Africa foresaw the possibility of 
becoming more marginal in the global economic and political landscape. This 
realisation triggered a new '4 wave of regional integration in Africa. 
The first integration arrangements differed from the new ones on a number of 
grounds, however. The first forms of integration were either legacies of the past-
such as the East African Community (EAC) and Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) - or new arrangements based on the predominant development theories 
of the day. The latter put more emphasis on industrialisation through 
protectionism and the development of closed markets in state-run economies 
financed to a greater extent by official development assistance (ODA) or 
domestic commercial borrowing (Mistry, 2000:557). 
The new integration arrangements, by contrast, had a common market element. 
They were started by the creation of a Free Trade Area (FTA), aimed at a 
Customs Union as a secondary step, and a Common Market as a third step. 
When all the sub-regional groups'S had achieved the common market, they 
14 The first wave of regionalism globally started in 1957 with the establishment of the European 
Economic Community, the forerunner of the European Union (Asante, 1997:2). In Africa, regional 
integration 's first wave was in the early 1 960s with the establishment of the OAU, followed in the 
early 1970s by the East African Community and the West African Economic Community. It is 
important to stress that regionalism was also central to the OAU agenda, the Monrovia Summit 
and the LPA. 
15 These sub-regional groups include the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market of Eastern and South Africa (COMESA), 
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would then take the most advanced form of economic integration, that is an 
Economic Union (McCarthy, 1996:214). The last two steps of integration were 
embodied in the LPA and were followed up in 1991 by the Abuja Treaty, 
establishing the African Economic Community (AEC).16 
The AEC Treaty came into force in May 1994. In its objectives, the AEC aims to 
promote economic, social and cultural development and the integration of African 
economies in order to increase economic self-reliance and promote an 
endogenous and self-sustained development (AEC Treaty, Article IV 1 (a)). It 
further aims to establish, on a continental scale, a framework for the 
development, mobilisation and utilisation of the human and material resources of 
Africa in order to achieve self-reliant development (Article IV (b); see also South 
African government website, at www.gov.zaJyearbookl2001Jforeign.html).17 
Despite these efforts, the deep fault line that divides the peoples of the globe 
between rich and poor has continued to widen, and this is a major threat to global 
prosperity, security and stability. The widening of this divide has been 
precipitated by globalization, with the resultant re-emergence of the market as 
the single organizing force of the global economy. This brings us to the third 
implication of the dramatic international re-arrangement in the last decade of the 
last century. 
Globalization, as an evolving historical process, is driven by policies of 
liberalization in trade and finance. It is also characterized by the global 
dominance of multinational corporations (MNCs) and multilateral institutions, 
such as the WB, IMF and WTO. These institutions insist on the gospel (based on 
a mistaken "trickle-down" theory of economics) that, for Third world countries to 
the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC, later transformed into 
Southern African Development Community -SADC). 
16 There is a resoundi ng consensus that, a journey towards this goal has been characterised by delays, lack 
of resources and political differences (See Mistry, 2000; Bell, 1986; McCarthy, 1996). For a brief overview of 
new patterns of integration in Africa and shortcomings thereof see Annexure A. 
17 For further details on the AEC and its implementation schedule see Annexure B. 
47 
meet the demands of the current global order they must liberalize their 
economies. 
This theory, however, has been proven wrong by empirical evidence. Since 
African countries began liberalizing in the early 1980s, the capacity of the state to 
deliver basic social services has been significantly reduced, Africa's external debt 
has escalated and today has reached alarming levels (See Tiepoh, 2000; 
Tordoff, 2002; ACBF, 2002), and consequently, Africa's ability to achieve its 
developmental goals has been constrained (See Jones and Witting ham, 1998; 
Keet, 2000; Keet, 2002a). The continent's contribution to global trade and its 
position in the global economy continue to decline. This has a negative bearing 
on the future of the world economy. 
In the light of the continent's rather appalling economic performance and 
deteriorating position in the global economy, African leaders have made yet other 
conscious and deliberate efforts in the new century to place their continent on a 
path of sustainable growth and development. Such efforts culminated in the 
adoption of the New Parinership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001, as a 
programme of African economic recovery, and in the transformation of the OAU 
into the African Union in July 2002. The adoption of NEPAD coincided with the 
adoption of UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 18 The latter was 
18 These goals are: 
The eradication of extreme poverty and hunger. This means halving the proportion of 
people whose income is less than US$1 a day and the proportion of people who 
suffer from hunger between 1990 and 2015; 
Achieving universal primary education. This means ensuring that children 
everywhere will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling by 2015; 
The promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women through the 
elimination of gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and to 
all levels of education by no later than 2015; 
Reducing child mortal ity rate by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015; 
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preceded by important UN Conferences since the 1990s, which have popularised 
various concepts and promoted a better understanding of the complex 
relationship and interaction between various factors, which contribute to 
development beyond mere GDP growth (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:4). Recalling these 
conferences and underscoring the importance of sustainable development, 
Africanist elements within the leadership of Africa are convinced that: 
While growth rates are important, they are not in themselves sufficient to enable African 
countries to achieve the goal of poverty reduction. The challenge for Africa, therefore, is 
to develop the capacity to sustain growth at levels required to achieve poverty 
reduction and sustainable development. This , in turn, depends on other factors such as 
infrastructure, capital accumulation, human capital, institutions, structural diversification, 
competitiveness, health, and good stewardship of the environment (NEPAD, 2001: para 
64). 
In many quarters, NEPAD is hailed as the most comprehensive initiative to 
transform the political and economic standing of the continent. For their part, 
African leaders emphasize that, NEPAD "differs in its approach and strategy from 
all previous plans and initiatives in support of Africa's development, although the 
problems to be addressed remain largely the same" (NEPAD, 2001: para 59). In 
other words, they see it as an initiative that combines strategies and means 
identified, and tries to build on the gains made; while at the same time it avoids 
the mistakes committed by the earlier initiatives. 
Improving maternal health by reducing by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio 
between 1990 and 2015; 
Combating HIVI AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 
Ensuring environmental sustain ability, including halving the proportion of people 
without sustainable access to safe drinking water by 2015, and to have achieved a 
significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020; and 
Developing a global partnership for development (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:5; Brown, 
2002). 
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2.8. In conclusion 
This chapter has been concerned mainly with the efforts made thus far in Africa 
towards the goals of economic development. These include the phenomenal 
establishment of the OAU in 1963, the adoption of the LPA (1980), the coming 
into being of the AEC in 1994, and the adoption of NEPAD in 2001, coupled with 
the transformation of the OAU into the AU in an attempt to make it respond more 
promptly to Africa's pressing demands. 
It would seem that NEPAD emerged at a particularly critical conjuncture when 
Africa's needs for development had become desperate, and when the majority of 
the international community had become unanimous in acknowledging the 
failures associated with orthodox neo-classicalism and in pursuit of more people-
centred development. The MDGs are precisely about this new global consensus. 
While NEPAD should be intended, from an African point of view, to chart a new 
way, build on MDGs, and to promote a pan-African development, some forces 
seek to reduce it into yet another way of conceding to the prevailing neo-classical 
global order. These forces are not only found abroad, but are also present in 
Africa. However, before any critique is made, it is imperative that we examine in 
detail the NEPAD project in terms of its approach and strategy in support of 
Africa's development. The following chapter is dedicated precisely to that. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter is an examination of the NEPAD strategy and approach. It examines 
what NEPAD is all about, what it proposes to do and how it proposes it. The 
objective of this undertaking is to set the context within which to discuss the 
problematic areas, not only in the document, but also in the programme itself. 
This chapter is basically the original NEPAD document as adopted in Abuja in 
October 2001. However, a few minor editorial changes and explanatory footnotes 
are inserted to make the chapter flow thematically. 
3.2. The New Partnership for Africa's Development 
The New Partnership for Africa's Development is a programme, a vision and a 
strategy of Africa's renewal. It is an outcome of the conscious and deliberate 
efforts made by African leaders to address the current socio-economic and 
political challenges facing the continent. Such challenges as poverty, 
underdevelopment and the continued marginalisation of Africa in the 
globalisation process needed a radical intervention, spearheaded by African 
leaders, to develop a new vision that would drive and guarantee Africa's rebirth. 
The central objectives of NEPAD are to eradicate poverty; to place African 
countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and 
development; to halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process and 
enhance its full and beneficial integration into the world economy and; to 
accelerate the empowerment of women. 
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3.3. Programme of action: the strategy for achieving sustainable 
development in the 21 st century 
The New Partnership for Africa's Development sets out the following goals: 
To achieve and sustain an average GDP growth rate of over 7 per cent 
per annum for the next 15 years; 
To ensure that Africa achieves the agreed International Development 
Goals (IGDs)19/ MDGs, to which the previous chapter referred (NEPAD, 
2001: para 68). 
The strategy of the New Partnership for Africa's Development has the following 
expected outcomes: economic growth and development and increased 
employment; reduction in poverty and inequality; diversification of productive 
activities, enhanced international competitiveness and increased exports and; 
increased African integration (NEPAD, 2001: para 69). 
3.4. Conditions for sustainable development 
3.4.1. Peace and Security Initiative 
This Initiative comprises three elements (NEPAD, 2001: para 72). The first is the 
promotion of long-term goals for development and security. The second is the 
enhancement of Africa's institutions to respond more promptly to early warnings 
and deal more effectively with conflict prevention, management and resolution. 
This is envisaged in four main areas: prevention, management and resolution of 
conflicts; peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement; post-conflict 
reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction; combating the proliferation of 
illicit arms, weapons and landmines (NEPAD, para 74). The third is the setting up 
19 It must be noted that the NEPAD document makes reference to International Development 
Goals (IGDs), and not to MDGs , because it was published before the 56th UN General Assembly 
of September 2001 (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:7). 
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of an institutional framework within which African leaders can commit themselves 
to the core values of NEPAD. 
3.4.2. Democracy and Political Governance Initiative 
NEPAD acknowledges that democracy is necessary for development (NEPAD, 
2001: para 79). Therefore, this Initiative is intended to build the political and 
administrative framework of African countries, in accordance with the core 
principles of democracy: transparency, accountability, integrity, respect of human 
rights and promotion of the rule of law (NEPAD, 2001 : para 80). Target areas of 
reform include administrative and civil services, strengthening parliamentary 
oversight, promotion of participatory decision-making, adoption of effective 
mechanisms aimed at combating corruption, and setting up of measures to 
promote judicial reform (NEPAD, 2001: para 83). For these reasons and the ones 
cited below, under the Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative, African 
leaders adopted the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and 
Corporate Governance20 and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)21 in 
June 2002. 
20 In terms of this Declaration, the participating Heads of State and Government of the member 
states of the African Union agreed to work together in policy and action in pursuit of the following 
objectives: 
Democracy and Good Political Governance 
Economic and Corporate Governance 
Socio- Economic Development 
African Peer Review Mechanism (DDPECG, 2002: para 6). 
21 The APRM is an instrument that is voluntarily acceded to by Mernber States of the African 
Union as an African self-monitoring mechanism (APRM, 2002: para 1). Its mandate is to ensure 
that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic 
and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration for 
Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (APRM,2002: para 2). The main 
objective of the APRM is to help foster the adoption of policies. standards and practices that lead 
to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional 
and continental economic integration through the sharing of experiences and the reinforcement of 
successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for 
capacity building (APRM, 2002: para 3). 
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3.4.3. Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative 
Recognising that the capacity of the state is of critical importance in creating 
conditions for economic growth and sustainable development (NEPAD. 2001: 
para 86). this initiative aims to promote concrete programmes to enhance the 
quality of economic and public financial management and corporate governance 
(NEPAD. 2001 : para 88). For this reason. a Task Force of Ministers of Finance 
and Central Banks was given the responsibility to review economic and corporate 
practices in various African countries and regions and to make recommendations 
on the appropriate standards and codes of good practice. Such 
recommendations were brought to the attention of the Heads of State 
Implementation Committee whose responsibility is to mobilise resources 
necessary for the building of capacity so that all countries complied with the 
mutually agreed standards and codes of conduct (NEPAD. 2001: para 89). 
3.5. Regional and sub-regional approaches to Development 
Recognising the small size of most African countries. both in terms of populations 
and per capita incomes (something which makes them less attractive to foreign 
investors). NEPAD places a duty on African countries to pool together. as it were. 
their resources to enhance regional development and economic integration on 
the continent. so as to improve intemational competitiveness (NEPAD. 2001: 
para 90). In this regard. NEPAD calls for the strengthening of the already existing 
sub-regional economic groupings (NEPAD. 2001: para 91 ).22 Priority is on 
building the capacity so as to enhance the effectiveness of existing regional 
structures and rationalisation of existing regional organisations. A leading role in 
financing regional studies. programmes and projects. will be played by the 
African Development Bank (NEPAD. 2001: para 93). This programme focuses on 
22 These groups are the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). the Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS). the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). 
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the following priority areas: infrastructure, especially information and 
communications technology (lCT) and energy; human resources, including 
education, skills development and reversing the brain drain; health; agriculture 
and access to the markets of the developed world for African exports (NEPAD, 
2001: para 94). The objective, in each sector, is to bridge the existing gaps 
between Africa and the developed world, so that the continent's international 
competitiveness is improved and that it is able to participate meaningfully in the 
globalisation process (NEPAD, 2001: para 95). 
3.6. Sectoral priorities of NEPAD 
NEPAD identifies the following as key sectoral priorities towards achieving the 
goal of sustainable development on the continent: bridging the infrastructural gap 
between Africa and the developed world and development of human resources, 
including the reversal of the brain drain. In addition to these, it pays particular 
attention to agriculture, the environment, culture and science and technology. 
3.6.1. Bridging the infrastructural gap 
Here emphasis is on five aspects: 
(a) All infrastructure sectors 
These infrastructure sectors include roads, highways, airports, seaports, 
railways, waterways, and telecommunications facilities - at sub-regional or 
continental levels (NEPAD, 2001: para 96). The objectives in this respect include 
improving access to, and the affordability and reliability of, infrastructural services 
for firms and households; enhancing regional cooperation and trade through the 
expanded cross-border development of infrastructure; increasing financial 
investments in infrastructure by reducing the risks facing private investors, 
especially in the area of policy and regulatory frameworks; building adequate 
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knowledge and skills in technology and engineering with a further objective of 
installing and maintaining 'hard' infrastructural networks in Africa (NEPAD, 2001: 
para 102). In meeting these objectives, means to be pursued include increasing 
investment in infrastructure, especially in refurbishment, and improving system 
maintenance practices that will sustain infrastructure; working with the African 
Development Bank and other development finance institutions in Africa with a 
view to mobilising sustainable financing; promoting public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) as a means of attracting private investors, and focusing public funding on 
the pressing needs of the poor (NEPAD, 2001: para 103). 
(b) Bridging the digital divide: investing in information and communication 
technologies 
Understanding the importance of ICTs in enhancing Africa 's comparative 
advantage, NEPAD has set itself the objectives of doubling the teledensity of 2 
lines per 100 people by 2005, with more emphasis on household access; 
lowering the cost and improving reliability of service; achieving e-readiness in 
Africa; developing and producing a significant portion of ICT-proficient youth and 
students from which Africa can draw trainee ICT engineers, programmers and 
soft-ware developers and developing local-content software, based especially on 
Africa's cultural legacy (NEPAD, 2001 : para 107). To this end, NEPAD identifies 
the need to work with regional agencies such as the African Telecommunications 
Union and the Africa Connection to help design model policy and legislation for 
telecommunications reform, and protocols and templates for e-readiness 
assessments; work with regional agencies to help build a strong regulatory 
capacity; establish a network of training and research institutions to help build 
high-level manpower; promote and accelerate existing projects to connect 
schools and youth centres; work with development finance institutions in Africa, 
multilateral initiatives (G-8 DotForce, UN Task Force) and bilateral donors to help 
establish financial mechanisms for mitigating and reducing sector risks (NEPAD, 
2001 : para 108). 
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(c) Energy 
Given the critical importance of energy, both for domestic use and for production 
purposes, NEPAD focuses on the rationalisation of the territorial distribution of 
existing, but unevenly allocated, energy resources. The intended consequence is 
the increase in Africa's access to reliable and affordable commercial energy 
supply from 10 to 35 percent or more in the next 20 years; the reversal of 
environmental degradation that is accompanied by traditional use in rural areas; 
the exploitation of and development of the hydropower potential of river basins in 
the continent; the integration of transmission grids and gas pipes in order to 
facilitate cross-border energy flows; the reformation and harmonization of 
petroleum regulations and legislations in Africa (NEPAD, 2001: para 109). 
To these ends, NEPAD acknowledges the need to establish an African Forum for 
Utility Regulation and regional regulatory associations and; to establish a task 
team to accelerate the development of energy supply to low income housing, 
among other things (NEPAD, 2001: para 110). 
(d) Transporl 
Underscoring the importance of transport towards achieving the goals of 
sustainable development, NEPAD aims to help facilitate the cross-border 
movement of people, goods and services (NEPAD, 2001: para 111). To this end, 
it seeks to establish and promote PPPs in such areas as the construction, 
development and maintenance of ports, roads, railways and maritime 
transportation; the development of transport corridors; and the rationalisation of 
the airline industry and the building of capacity for air traffic control (NEPAD, 
2001: para 112). 
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(e) Water and sanitation 
In accordance with the IGDs / MDGs, NEPAD aims to improve access to 
adequate and clean drinking water supply, in particular to the poor; and to 
manage water resources so that they contribute to national and regional 
development initiatives (NEPAD, 2001: para, 113). To these ends, it identifies 
four important actions: accelerating work on multipurpose water resource 
projects, such as the SADC Water Secretariat's investigation of the use of the 
Congo River and the Nile River Basin Initiative; mitigating the effects of climate 
change in Africa; collaboration with the Global Environmental Sanitation Initiative 
(GESI) so as to promote sanitary waste disposal methods and projects; and 
supporting the UN Habitat programme on water conservation in African cities 
(NEPAD, 2001 : para, 114). 
3.6.2. Human resource development initiative, including reversing brain 
drain 
Here, the focus is on poverty reduction, bridging the education gap, reversing the 
brain drain, and improving the health system. 
(a) Poverty reduction 
Given the centrality of poverty reduction in sustainable development, NEPAD 
sets out to provide quality leadership that will give priority to this very need; to 
pay particular attention to women, mainly because they are the ones who have 
borne the brunt of poverty for centuries in Africa; put the empowerment of the 
poor in any poverty reduction strategies and to support the existing poverty 
reduction initiatives at the multilateral level, such as the Comprehensive 
Development Framework of the World Bank and the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
approach linked to the debt relief programme for the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPCs) (NEPAD, 2001: para, 115). 
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To meet these stated objectives, NEPAD identifies the need for country plans 
that are aimed at poverty reduction; to work with the World Bank, the IMF, the 
African Development Bank and UN agencies, so as to accelerate the adoption 
and implementation of the Comprehensive Development Framework, the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy and other related approaches; to help create a gender task 
team that will focus mainly on issues affecting women and to establish a task 
team that will look into the adoption and acceleration of participatory and 
decentralised processes for the provision of infrastructural and social services 
(NEPAD, 2001: para 116). 
(b) Bridging the education gap 
Acknowledging the importance of education towards the realisation of the goals 
of sustainable development, NEPAD sets out to work with donors and multilateral 
institutions with a view to ensuring that the IDG of achieving universal primary 
education by 2015 is realised; to help improve curriculum development, quality 
improvement and access to ICT; to help expand access to secondary education 
and to improve its relevance to Africa's development and to help promote 
networks of specialised research and institutions of higher learning (NEPAD, 
2001: para 117). 
To these ends, NEPAD, with the help of the United Nations Educational Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and other major international donors, 
seeks to review the current initiatives; review the levels of expenditure on 
education by African governments and recommend acceptable standards of 
government expenditure on such education; to accelerate the introduction of ICT 
in primary school education and to review and make proposals for the research 
capacity needed in each region of the continent (NEPAD, 2001: para 118). 
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(c) Reversing the brain drain 
Acknowledging the harm that brain drain has caused in Africa, NEPAD seeks to 
reverse it so that Africa's critical human capacities are retained for the 
development of the continent (NEPAD, 2001: para, 121). To this end, NEPAD 
seeks to create the necessary political, social and economic conditions in Africa 
so as to offer better incentives to curb the brain drain and attract the much 
needed investment; to develop a database that would determine the magnitude 
of the brain drain, to promote networking between experts in the country of origin 
and those in the Diaspora and; to establish scientific and technical networks so 
as to nurture cooperation between those abroad and those at home, especially in 
the execution of some of the NEPAD projects (NEPAD, 2001: para 122). 
(d) Health 
NEPAD seeks to have a secure health system that meets the needs of the 
people and supports disease control effectively; that significantly reduces the 
burden of disease on the poorest peoples of Africa and to foster cooperation 
between medical and traditional practitioners, among others (NEPAD, 2001: para 
123). To these ends, it acknowledges the need to strengthen Africa's 
participation in the processes of procuring affordable drugs and explore 
alternative delivery systems for essential drugs and supplies; to lead carnpaigns 
for increased international financing support for the struggle against HIV/AIDS 
and other communicable diseases; to work jointly with other international 
agencies, such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) and donors so as to 
ensure that support for Africa is increased by at least US$10 billion a year; to 
encourage African governments to pay particular attention to health in their 
budgets and to help mobilise resources aimed at capacity-building so that African 
countries are better able to improve their health infrastructure and management 
(NEPAD, 2001: para 124). 
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3.6.3. Agriculture, the environment, culture and science and technology 
initiatives 
NEPAD places emphasis on the development of these initiatives. With respect to 
the agricultural initiative, NEPAD acknowledges the weakness and unproductive 
nature of agrarian systems, upon which the majority of Africa's people depend. 
Added this problem, NEPAD acknowledges the external constraints such as 
drought, partiality of economic policy (which tends to favour the urban people) 
and the instability of the global commodity process (NEPAD, 2001: para 129). Of 
critical importance, therefore, is the necessary support that governments must 
give in the provision of irrigation equipment and in the development of arable 
lands in rural areas. Also important is the improvement of the rural infrastructure, 
such as roads and electrification (NEPAD, 2001: para 132). NEPAD also 
acknowledges the importance of multilateral institutions and the donor 
community in these efforts. 
The environment initiative is aimed at intervening in the following areas: 
combating desertification, conserving wetlands, reducing invasive alien species, 
reducing global warming , establishing cross-border conservation areas, 
introducing environmental governance and improving financing (NEPAD, 2001: 
para 138). Particular attention is paid to these because there has been a 
consensus, since the UN Conference on Human Environment, held in 
Stockholm, in June 1972, that sustainable development is impossible without 
sound environmental protection.23 
23 From the 5th to the 16th of June 1972 at Stockholm, the United Nations held a Conference on 
the Human Environment, the purpose of which was to respond to the problem of environmental 
degradation. Twenty years later, in Rio de Janeiro, this organization held a Conference on 
Environment and Development. Th is Conference agreed that the protection of the environment 
and social and economic development were fundamental to sustainable development. As such, 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and the Statement of Principles for 
Sustainable Management of Forests were adopted . Of crucial importance was the adoption of a 
global programme entitled Agenda 21, a "blueprint for sustainable development as a framework 
for addressing the combined issues of environmental protection and equitable distribution for all" 
(Ohiorhenuan, 2002:4). Agenda 21 formed the basis for a new public purpose on both 
international and national scales. As such, it made a call for a comprehensive plan of action to be 
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Given the central part played by culture in development efforts in Africa, NEPAD 
seeks to protect and nurture indigenous knowledge, which embraces tradition-
based literacy, artistic and scientific works, inventions, scientific discoveries, 
designs, marks and symbols, undisclosed information and all other tradition-
based innovations and creations resulting from intellectual activity in the 
industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields (NEPAD, 2001: para 140). 
In respect of science and technology, NEPAD seeks to promote the utilization of 
technological know-how in the areas that offer high growth potential, such as 
biotechnology and natural sciences and in production , manufacturing and export 
(NEPAD, 2001 : para 142). To this end, it acknowledges the need to introduce 
regional cooperation on product standards development and dissemination and 
on geographic information systems; to develop networks in the existing centres 
of excellence in Africa to help displaced scientists and researchers of Africa; to 
work with UNESCO, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and other 
international organisations to help harness biotechnology so as to develop 
Africa's rich biodiversity and indigenous knowledge base, by improving 
agricultural productivity and developing pharmaceutical products; to use geo-
science in the exploitation of mineral wealth in Africa and to develop skills-based 
product engineering and quality control in support of diversification in the 
manufacturing sector (NEPAD, 2001: para 143). 
3.7. Mobilising resources for Africa's development 
To achieve the above stated objectives towards sustainable development, Africa 
needs a huge bulk of resources. Mobilising such resources is centred on capital 
flows and market access initiatives. 
implemented at these levels by the United Nations, ind ividual governments and a plethora of 
other major groups of civil society worldwide (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:4). The Rio Conference then 
was crucial in that it set a historic agenda for sustainable development. 
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3.7.1. The capital flows initiative 
Under this initiative, NEPAD focuses on increased domestic savings, debt 
reduction, and increased overseas development assistance. 
(a) Domestic savings 
Domestic savings, which need to be significantly increased, include national 
savings by firms and by households, more effective tax collection to increase 
public resources and the rationalisation of government expenditures. Taking into 
account the proportions of domestic savings that are lost as a result of capital 
flight, NEPAD acknowledges the need for attractive locations for residents to hold 
their own wealth. Against this background, the creation of conducive conditions 
for private sector investments by both domestic and foreign investors is seen as 
a great necessity (NEPAD, 2001: para 145). 
(b) Debt relief 
Against the objective of linking debt relief with costed poverty reduction 
outcomes, NEPAD advocates that debt relief be extended beyond its current 
levels (based on debt sustainability)24. This will require debt service payments 
amounting to a significant portion of the resource gap. "In the interim, debt 
service ceiling should be fixed as a proportion of fiscal revenue, with different 
ceilings for international development assistance (IDA) and non-ODA countries. 
To secure the full commitment of concessional resources - debt relief plus ODA 
- that Africa requires, the leadership of [NEPAD] will negotiate these 
24 In 1996, the World Bank and the IMF introduced the first Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) 
Initiative. Under this initiative, individual creditors made pledges to reduce third world country debt 
to "sustainable levels". In 1999, they launched the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, in which they 
doubled the amount of relief to be provided. Under this Initiative, those countries seeking debt 
forgiveness were required to outline the specific goals and programmes of their poverty-reduction 
strategies. Then, they would qualify for temporary debt relief called "Passing the decision-point". 
After an interim implementation of "a set of key, pre-defined social and structural reforms and 
maintained good macroeconomic performance", they would qualify for permanent debt-relief 
called "Passing the completion point" (Thomas, 2001 :43). 
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arrangements with creditor govemments" (NEPAD, 2001: para 146). However, 
engagement by individual African countries with the current debt mechanisms, 
such as HIPC and Paris Club, are welcomed before recourse to NEPAD can be 
made. On its part, the leadership of NEPAD will mobilise African countries to 
share experiences and then engage to improve debt relief strategies (NEPAD, 
2001: para 146). 
On the basis of these outlined objectives, the leadership of NEPAD seeks to 
engage the international community to help provide more debt relief for countries 
participating in the NEPAD processes (NEPAD, 2001: para 147). Moreover, it 
seeks to set up a form in which African countries can share experiences and 
work on mobilising for the improvement of debt relief strategies, the ultimate aim 
being to end the process of reform and qualification in the HIPC processes 
(NEPAD, 2001: para 147). 
(c) ODA reforms 
The ODA flows to developing countries have either been too low or not delivered 
effectively. It is for this reason that NEPAD seeks more increased flows in the 
medium-term, coupled with reform of ODA delivery system, with a view to 
ensuring more effective utilisation by the recipient countries. Therefore, the 
leadership of NEPAD will develop a common African position through which to 
engage the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), together with other donors on 
developing a charter central to the development partnership. Such a charter will 
identify the Economic Governance Initiative as a prerequisite for enhancing the 
capacity of African countries to utilise increased ODA flows, and will propose a 
complementary, independent assessment mechanism for monitoring donor 
performance. The NEPAD leadership will support a Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) Learning Group to engage in the PRSP process, together with the 
IMF and the World Bank (NEPAD, 2001: para 148). 
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To these ends, the NEPAD leadership seeks to set a counterpart to the 
OECDIDAC structure, in which a common African position on ODA reform will be 
developed; to engage other donor agencies, through the ODA reform, with a view 
to establishing a charter for the development partnership; to work in appreciation 
of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) to set about a PRSP Learning 
Group and; to help establish a framework through which donor and recipient 
country performance will be assessed (NEPAD, 2001: para 149). 
(d) Private capital flows 
With a view to increasing private investment flows to Africa as a central aspect of 
sustainable development, NEPAD seeks to address investor perception of Africa 
as a 'high risk' continent by creating peace and security, political and economic 
governance, infrastructure and poverty reduction; to implement a PPP capacity-
building programme through the African Development Bank and other regional 
development institutions and to help promote the deepening of financial markets 
within African countries, coupled with cross-border harmonisation and 
integration , among other things (NEPAD, 2001 : para 151). 
3.7.2. The market access initiative 
Under this initiative, NEPAD focuses on diversification of production , agriculture, 
mining, manufacturing, tourism and services, promoting the private sector, 
promoting African exports, and removing non-tariff barriers. 
(a) Diversification of production 
Recognising the fact that the vulnerability of African economies is largely due 
their dependence on primary production and resource-based sectors, the 
NEPAD leadership seeks to promote diversification of production as a matter of 
urgency, through harnessing Africa's resource base; to develop a strategy of 
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economic diversification based on sectoral linkages; to support growth of private 
enterprise, through the promotion of micro-enterprises in the informal sector and 
small and medium enterprises in the manufacturing sector (which are key 
engines to economic growth and development) and to encourage governments to 
remove constraints to business activity, with a view to offering more opportunities 
for the creative talents of African entrepreneurs (NEPAD, 2001 : para 153). 
(b) Agriculture 
Recognising the importance of agriculture in Africa, where more than 70 percent 
of the population lives in rural areas, the leadership of NEPAD seeks to help 
improve productivity in this particular area, especially among small-scale and 
women farmers; to help improve food security and nutrition for all; to help 
promote measures against natural resource degradation and to encourage 
production methods that are environmentally sustainable; to help in the 
integration of the rural poor into the market economy and provide them with 
better access to export markets; to assist in developing Africa into a net exporter 
of agricultural products and to become a strategic player in the development of 
agricultural science and technology ( NEPAD, 2001 : paras 134, 154). 
At the African level, important actions that must be taken include the 
establishment of small-scale irrigation schemes, improving local water 
management and increasing the exchange of information and technical expertise 
with the international community; improving land tenure security under traditional 
and modern forms of tenure and the promoting the necessary land reform; 
fostering regional, national and household food security through the development 
and management of increased production , transport, storage and marketing of 
crops, livestock and fisheries and reducing the urban bias of public spending in 
Africa by transferring resources from urban to rural activities (NEPAD, 2001 : para 
155). 
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At the international level, new partnership schemes to address donor fatigue for 
individual, high profile agricultural projects must be developed; South-South 
partnership must be developed, with a view to helping Africa carry out and 
develop its research and development capabilities in agriculture; international 
markets must be promoted by improving the quality of African produce and 
agricultural products, especially processed products, so as to meet the standards 
required by those markets; African networking with external partners in the areas 
of agricultural technology and know-how, extension services and rural 
infrastructure must be supported; investment in research in the areas of high-
yield crops and durable preservatives and storage methods must be supported 
and provision must be made to help build national and regional capacity for 
multilateral trade negotiations, including food, sanitation and other agricultural 
trade negotiations (NEPAD, 2001: para 155). 
(c) Mining 
NEPAD makes a case for the improvement of mineral resource information, the 
creation of a regulatory framework that is conducive to the development of the 
mining sector; and the establishment of best practices that will ensure efficient 
extraction of Africa's natural resources and minerals of high quality (NEPAD, 
2001: para 156). 
To these ends, the African leadership needs, inter alia, to help harmonise 
policies and regulations to ensure compliance with minimum levels of operational 
practice; harmonise commitments to reduce the perceived investment risk in 
Africa; harmonise information sources on business opportunities for investment; 
enhance collaboration with a view to promoting knowledge-sharing and value 
addition to natural resources and establish an African School of Mining System 
for the development and production of education, skills and training at all levels 
(NEPAD, 2001 : para 157). 
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(d) Manufacturing 
Underscoring the importance of manufacturing in the development process, 
NEPAD acknowledges the need to increase the production and improve the 
competitiveness and diversification of the domestic private sector, in particular in 
the agro-industrial, mining and manufacturing sub-sectors, with potential for 
exports and job creation (NEPAD, 2001: para 158). To this end, NEPAD 
acknowledges the urgent need for Africa to develop new industries or upgrade 
the existing ones, where African countries have comparative advantages, 
including agro-based industries, energy and mineral resource-based industries; 
to acquire membership of the relevant international standards organizations; to 
establish an accreditation infrastructure, such as the International Standards 
Organisation (ISO) system and to make available the appropriate funding to 
ensure the membership of international structures, such as the International 
Accreditation Forum (IAF) and the International Electro-technical Commission 
(IEC) (NEPAD, 2001 : para 159). 
At the international level, there is a need to facilitate the development of 
mechanisms, such as joint business councils, for sharing information between 
African and non-African firms and for working towards the establishment of joint 
ventures and subcontracting arrangements; to develop and accept a best-
practice framework for technical regulations that meet both the requirements of 
the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the needs of 
Africa (NEPAD, 2001: para 159). 
(e) Tourism 
NEPAD seeks to identify those key projects at national and sub-regional levels, 
which will contribute to regional economic integration; to develop a regional 
marketing strategy and; to promote partnerships such as those formed through 
sub-regional bodies. These include the Regional Tourism Organisation of 
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Southern Africa (RETOSA), ECOWAS and SADC (NEPAD, 2001 : para 160). To 
these ends, there is a need to forge partnerships with a view to sharing 
knowledge, as well as providing a base for other countries' entry into tourist-
related activities; to provide African people with the capacity to be actively 
involved in sustainable tourism projects at the community level; to market African 
tourism products, in particular adventure tourism, eco-tourism and cultural 
tourism; to improve regional coordination of tourism initiatives in Africa in order to 
expand and increase the diversity of products and to maximise the benefits from 
the strong interregional demand for tourism activities by developing specialised 
consumer-targeted marketing campaigns ( NEPAD, 2001: para 161). 
(f) Services that are well equipped in the field of ICTs are considered very 
important for African countries (NEPAD, 2001 : para 162). 
(g) Promoting the private sector 
NEPAD recognises the need to create a sound and conducive environment for 
private sector activities, especially for domestic entrepreneurs; to promote foreign 
direct investment and trade, especially for exports and; to develop micro, small 
and medium enterprises, including the informal sector (NEPAD, 2001: para 163). 
To these ends, there is a further need to enhance the entrepreneurial, 
managerial and technical capacities of the private sector through supporting 
technology acquisition, production improvements, and training and skills 
development; to strengthen chambers of commerce, trade and professional 
associations and their regional networks; to help organise dialogue between the 
government and the private sector to develop a shared vision of economic 
development strategy and remove constraints on private sector development; to 
strengthen and encourage the growth of micro, small and medium industries 
through appropriate technical support from service institutions and civil society, 
and improve access to capital by strengthening micro financing schemes, with 
particular attention to women entrepreneurs; to promote entrepreneurial 
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development programmes for training managers of African firms and to provide 
technical assistance for the development of an appropriate regulatory framework, 
promoting small, medium and micro enterprises and establishing micro financing 
schemes for the African private sector (NEPAD, 2001 : para 164). 
(h) Promoting African exports 
Among other objectives, NEPAD seeks to improve procedures for customs and 
drawback/rebate schemes; to address the issue of trade barriers in international 
trade through the improvement of standards; to increase intra-regional trade by 
promoting cross-border interaction among African firms; to counter Africa 's 
negative image through conflict resolution and marketing, and to deal with 
shortages of short-term skills through appropriate incentives and training at firm 
level (NEPAD, 2001 : para 165). 
To meets these objectives, NEPAD emphasises the need, at the African level , to 
promote intra-African trade ; to create marketing mechanisms and institutions to 
develop marketing strategies for African products; to reduce the cost of 
transactions and operations; to promote and improve regional trade agreements, 
foster interregional trade liberalisation and harmonise rules of origin, tariffs and 
product standards and to reduce export taxes (NEPAD, 2001 : para 166). 
At the international level, NEPAD recognises the need to negotiate measures 
and agreements to facilitate access to world markets by African products; to 
encourage foreign direct investment; to assist in capacity-building in the private 
sector, as well as to strengthen country and sub-regional capacity in respect of 
trade negotiations, to implement the rules and regulations of the WTO and, to 
identify and exploit new trading opportunities that arise from the evolving 
multilateral trading system and the need for African heads of state to actively 
participate in the world trading system under the aegis of the WTO. If, however, a 
new round of multilateral trade negotiations is started, it must take great 
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cognisance of Africa's special concerns, needs and interests in future WTO rules 
(NEPAD, 2001: papa 166). 
In addition to these requirements, NEPAD requires the provision of a forum in 
which developing countries can collectively call for structural adjustment by 
developed countries in those industries in which the natural competitive 
advantage currently lies with the developed world, and technical assistance and 
support must be provided so as to enhance the institutional capacity of African 
states to use the WTO and to engage in multilateral trade negotiations (NEPAD, 
2001: para 167). 
Moreover, NEPAD requires African Heads of State to secure and stabilise 
preferential treatment by key developed country partners, such as the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), the Cotonou Agreement, the 
"Everything But Arms" (EBA) initiative and the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA); to ensure that further multilateral liberalization does not erode the 
preferential gains of these arrangements and to identify and address deficiencies 
in their design and application (NEPAD, 2001: para 169). 
(i) Removal of non-tariff barriers 
In this respect, NEPAD appeals to the developed world in this way: 
African leaders believe that improved access to the markets of industrialised countries for 
products in which Africa has a comparative advantage is crucial. Although there have 
been significant improvements in terms of lowered tariffs in recent years, there remain 
significant exceptions on tariffs while non-tariff barriers also constitute major 
impediments. Progress on this issue would greatly enhance the economic growth and 
diversification of African production and exports. Dependence on aDA would decline and 
infrastructure projects would become more viable as a result of increased economic 
activity (NEPAD, 2001 : para 170). 
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3.B. A new global partnership for development 
Recognising the centuries-old historical injustice and the need to correct it, 
NEPAD calls for combined efforts between Africa and developed countries to 
improve the quality of life of Africa 's people as a matter of urgency. The 
injunction of the new partnership has shared mutual responsibilities and benefits 
(NEPAD, 2001 : para 171). For its part, Africa seeks to promote the expansion of 
democracy and the deepening of a culture of human rights. Such measures are 
important in creating a better world , where the resources that are used to resolve 
intra and inter-state conflicts are channelled and used effectively for more 
pressing developmental needs (NEPAD, 2001 : para 179). Therefore , it is in the 
best interests of the international community in general to provide as much 
assistance to Africa's development endeavours as possible. 
3.B.1. A new partnership with the industrialised countries and multi lateral 
institutions 
NEPAD acknowledges that Africans' responsibility to bring about change for their 
destiny must be complemented with the establishment of a new partnership with 
the industrialised North, including multilateral institutions. This partnership must 
be about setting out mutually agreed performance targets and standards for both 
donor and recipient, especially when it comes to the delivery of ODA (NEPAD, 
2001 : para 183). However, the various partnerships that have existed between 
Africa and the industrialised North on the one hand, and multilateral institutions 
on the other, will be maintained. These include the UN's New Agenda for the 
Development of Africa in the 1990s; the Africa-Europe's Cairo Plan of Action ; the 
World Bank-led Strategic Partnership with Africa ; the IMF-Ied PRSPs; the Japan-
led Tokyo Agenda for Action ; the AGOA of the United States and the ECA-Ied 
Global Compact with Africa. The intention is to rationalise these partnerships and 
to ensure that real benefits flow from them (NEPAD, 2001: para 184). 
72 
In terms of the new partnership, Africa envisages the developed countries and 
multilateral institutions to: 
• Support materially mechanisms for, and processes of, conflict 
prevention, management and resolution in Africa, as well as 
peacekeeping operations; 
• Accelerate debt reduction for heavily indebted African countries, 
coupling it with more effective poverty reduction programmes, of which 
the Strategic Partnership with Africa and the PRSP initiatives are a 
significant point of departure; 
• Improve debt relief strategies for middle-income countries; 
• Reverse the decline in OOA flows to Africa and to meet the target level 
of OOA flows equivalent to 0.7 percent of each developed country's 
GNP within an agreed period. Such funds will complement those 
released by debt reduction for accelerating poverty reduction; 
• Concretise international strategies adopted in the fields of education 
and health; 
• Facilitate the development of a partnership between countries, 
international pharmaceutical corporations and civil society 
organisations to urgently secure access to existing drugs for Africans 
suffering from infectious diseases; 
• Open markets of developed countries for goods through bilateral 
initiatives, and to negotiate more equitable terms of trade for African 
countries within the WTO multilateral framework; 
• Work in cooperation with African leaders to encourage investment in 
Africa by the private sector in the developed world , including the 
establishment of insurance schemes and financial instruments that will 
help lower risk premiums on investments in Africa; 
• Help raise consumer protection standards for exports from developed 
countries to developing countries, as applicable to domestic markets in 
developed countries ; 
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• Help ensure that the World Bank and other multilateral development 
finance institutions participate as investors in the key economic 
infrastructure projects, so as to facilitate and secure private sector 
participation; 
• Help provide technical support to accelerate the implementation of the 
programme of action, including strengthening Africa's capacity for 
planning and development management, financial and infrastructure 
regulation, accounting and auditing, and the development, construction 
and management of infrastructure; 
• Support governance reforms of multilateral financial institutions to 
better cater for the needs and concerns of African countries; 
• Help set up coordinated mechanisms for combating corruption 
effectively, as well as committing themselves to the return of proceeds 
of such practices to Africa (NEPAD, 2001: para 185). 
3.9. Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development 
According to the initiating African leaders, the implementation of NEPAD must be 
fast-tracked, in cooperation with Africa's development partners. This process is 
envisaged on the following programmes: prevention and cure of communicable 
diseases (HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis); promotion of information and 
communications technology; debt reduction and market access (NEPAD, 2001: 
para 186). While work has been done on these programmes, NEPAD 
acknowledges the need for Africa's participation and leadership to be 
strengthened for better delivery (NEPAD, 2001: para, 187). 
3.9.1. Projects 
In addition to the aforementioned programmes, African leaders propose a 
plethora of projects, which are critical for integrated regional development and 
continental regeneration (NEPAD, 2001: para 188). These projects will focus on 
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agriculture, promotion of the private sector, and infrastructure and regional 
integration. 
In agriculture, the project will address the key question of the maintenance and 
upgrading of Africa's fragile natural agricultural resources, and agricultural 
research and extension systems. In maintenance and upgrading, such partners 
as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the World Bank, the African 
Development Bank, the FAO and other bilateral donor agencies will playa key 
role (NEPAD, para 190). In research and extension systems, role players include 
the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA), the World Bank, the FAO 
and the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) 
(NEPAD, 2001 : para 191). 
In promoting the private sector, NEPAD acknowledges the critical role of 
business incubators at national levels. Therefore, the formulation of the required 
guidelines and policies for the establishment of such incubators, drawing on 
international experience and established best practice, in accordance with 
Africa 's needs and conditions, must be seen as a real neccessity (NEPAD, 2001: 
para 192). 
At the infrastructure and regional integration level, NEPAD identifies a number of 
energy, transport, telecommunications and water projects that are critical to 
Africa's integrated development. These projects are at various stages of 
development and require funding. The objective is to accelerate their continued 
development in collaboration with the African Development Bank, the World Bank 
and other multilateral institutions (NEPAD, 2001 : para 193). Convinced that 
without the necessary infrastructure these projects cannot get off the ground, 
African leaders, therefore, urge the international community to help support the 
development of infrastructure (NEPAD, 2001: para 194). 
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3.9.2. Needs assessment 
As part of assessing the required action in the priority sectors, a needs 
assessment will be undertaken, starting from the national level and leading to the 
sub-regional and continental levels. The rationale will be to assess the needs in 
five sectoral areas in terms of structures and staff (NEPAD, 2001: para 195). 
3.9.3. Management mechanism of the New Partnership for Africa's 
Development 
Since NEPAD is a programme of the African Union, designed to meet its 
developmental objectives, its highest authority is the Heads of State and 
Government Summit of the African Union (AU). 
The Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) 
comprises 3 states per AU region as mandated by the OAU Summit of July 2001 
and ratified by the AU Summit of July 2002. The HSGIC reports to the AU 
Summit annually. 
The Steering Committee of NEPAD is made up of the Personal Representatives 
of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government. This Committee oversees the 
projects and programme of development. 
The NEPAD Secretariat coordinates implementation of projects and programmes 
approved by the HSGIC. (NEPAD website: 
http://www.touchtech.bizlnepad/files/en.html) 
3.10. By way of concluding 
The New Partnership for Africa's Development is a programme, a vision and 
strategy of African renewal. Its objectives are to eradicate poverty; to place 
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African countries on a path of sustainable development; to halt the 
marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process, and expedite the process of 
integration into the world economy. It is centred on a core value and principle of 
good governance, as a basic requirement for peace, security and sustainable 
development. 
Its programme of action is a holistic one, centred on the principles of democracy, 
good political, economic and corporate governance. Its sectoral priorities are to 
bridge the infrastructural gap between Africa and the developed world, and 
human resource development, including reversing the brain drain. Recognising 
the importance of resources in the form of ODA, coupled with more debt 
reduction strategies, NEPAD appeals to the international community to establish 
a new global partnership that reduces the existing gaps between Africa and the 
developed world . All these factors combined are considered as a recipe for 
Africa's rebirth and renewal in the 21 st century. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT AND THE 
FALLACY OF NEO-LiBERALlSM: A THEORETICAL APPRAISAL 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to provide a more rigorous reading of NEPAD by teasing out 
its central ideological underpinnings. Firstly, it argues that while NEPAD is prima 
facie characterised by the injunction of Africanist and neo-liberal facets , it is more 
inclined to the latter. This inclination is mainly the result of Africa 's large 
dependence on foreign aid, and consequently the convergence of domestic and 
global forces that generally adhere to neo-liberal capitalism as an engine of 
growth and development. Secondly, the chapter evaluates the validity and pitfalls 
of neo-liberalism. Thirdly and lastly, it concludes by arguing that neo-liberal 
capitalism has entered a systemic crisis, which cannot be surpassed within the 
broader framework of neo-liberalism itself. 
4.2. The New Partnership for Africa's Development: Shifting away from or 
towards neo-liberalism? 
Finding Africa's niche of development has been the subject of considerable 
debate for sometime now. On the intellectual and ideological front, Capitalist 
imperialists had propagated a discourse on Africa's renewal that focused on 
Africa's 'evolution' towards modernity (Independent Projects Trust, 1999). This 
propagation was based on their evaluation of Africans and "their value systems 
as pagan, primitive and savage" (Murobe, 2001 :57). Recognising this 
"epistemological fallacy of mental superiority", in the words of Murobe (2001 :57), 
Africanists, therefore, saw the need for the re-invigoration of the axiology, 
epistemology, aesthetics, cosmos and the ethos of Africa. They sought to 
challenge "the ideology of western 'supremacy' and concomitant tendency to 
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accept African 'inferiority' and downplay Africa 's contribution to world civilisation 
and history" (Oembele, 1998:12). 
On the economic front, significantly influenced by the Marxist-Leninist reading of 
history, particularly that imperialism as 'the highest stage of capitalism' (Lenin, 
1991), Africanists rejected economic modernisation. They argued that capitalism 
was unknown and deleterious to Africa 's way of life. They then sought to restore 
African dignity and humanity in the face of colonialism. Thus, the African 
Renaissance, from its inception in the Oiaspora, was precisely about that. It was 
an endeavour to promote Africa 's 'state of mind' and 'unique' approach to 
problems, and a refusal to subsume a western ethos as a means of 
development. Hence the phenomenal establishment of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) in 1963, the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and 
the Final Act of Lagos in 1980, which laid the foundation for the creation of an 
African Economic Community (AEC). 
In the face of the global economic climate of the 1970s and the onset of the debt 
crisis, Western capitalist countries and their agents argued that the problem in 
Africa was the result of the structure of African governments themselves. African 
governments, they argued, were excluded from the private capital markets and 
real competition because of red tape and protectionism, which raised risks for 
investors. There were also overblown bureaucracies and excessive public 
spending, which exacerbated inflation. Added to this, according to them, was 
corruption and mismanagement, which not only hampered infrastructure delivery, 
but also engendered political instability (Independent Projects Trust, 1999). The 
World Bank's Agenda for Action emerged out of this particular context. It 
therefore recommended the rolling back of the state from the economy through 
privatisation and the opening up of the economy to private sector participation 
through liberalisation (Anyang'Nyong'o, 2002:2). Hence, the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s. 
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The introduction of SAPs in Africa must be understood within the broader 
framework of the resurgence of neo-classicalism in the early 1980s. This 
resurgence was the revived by the conservative backlash associated with Ronald 
Reagan in America and Margaret Thatcher in Britain . In fact, as early as the 
1970s, corporate think tanks, economists and political scholars, such as Friedrich 
Hayek and Milton Friedman , sought to explain the economic difficulties of late 
1970s (these included difficulties in delivering economic stability, sustained 
growth, and curbing inflation, which had reached alarming levels) by resuscitating 
the economic ideas of classical liberalism. They challenged the very idea of a 
'managed' or 'planned' economy, pointing to the inefficiency of planned 
economies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. They argued that allocating 
resources in complex and industrialised countries was too difficult a task for any 
state bureaucrats to achieve successfully (see Eccleshall, 1994; Barry, 1992). 
According to them, the responsibility of the government lay in ensuring the 
financial stability of the market through fighting inflation. They further argued that 
those governments that had pursued Keynesian policies fuelled the inflation that 
was characteristic of the 1970s (Heywood, 1992; Eccleshall, 1994; Barry, 1992). 
Consequently, in America and Britain, the state, which had once been 
considered a crucial player in the economy, was 'rolled back' and its role was 
assumed by the invisible hand of the market. In the early 1980s, both 
administrations allowed unemployment to rise sharply with the hope that the 
market solution would rectify the situation. In tackling inflation, these 
administrations cut government expenditure. Also crucial was the accelerated 
process of privatisation, in particular in Britain and France, where industries like 
telecommunications ; water; gas and electricity were transferred from public to 
private ownership. Public owned enterprises were criticised as being inherently 
inefficient because, unlike private firms and industries, they were not disciplined 
by the profit motive. This was a direct response to the 'mixed' economies 
characteristic of Keynesianism (Heywood, 1992). The consequences of this 
ideological shift and pol itico-economic re-arrangement were very profound. The 
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welfare gains of the people came under attack from these governments as they 
implemented policies of privatisation, reduced social spending, reduced taxation 
on the rich, and increased deregulation and liberalisation. 
The New Right and the Reagan administration believed that free markets, and 
not welfarism, would lead to greater growth and greater growth would lead to less 
poverty and less poverty to more democracy (Lucy, 2000). These administrations 
lashed attacks on trade unions and solidified their position through the 
transformation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, in 
particular in their operations in the developing world. Following the recession of 
the late 1970s and the debt crisis of the early 1980s, these institutions became 
more pre-occupied with stabilisation, extensive deployment of the market through 
liberalisation and the retreat of the state from the economy (Adesina, 2002b: 6). 
In short, there was renewed faith in the market. This was the essence of the 
'Washington Consensus' (Lucy, 2000). 
It was within this narrative and discourse that Africa 's political economy was 
understood by the World Bank, the IMF and some Northern governments, 
particularly America and Britain. They argued that open economies were more 
prosperous than 'closed ' ones, and that countries with free labour markets had 
lower rates of unemployment than countries who regulated markets. 
Africanists perceived the Washington Consensus as a geo-strategy by the North 
to exert its influence and dominance on poor countries. It could do so through the 
manipulation of global financial institutions, multilateral corporations and its 
comparative advantage over technological know-how. The impacts of SAPs, to 
which Chapter 2 referred, vindicate this claim. From an Africanist point of view, 
such involvement shattered any hopes of sustainable development. Instead, it 
created a "beggarly and highly embarrassing image of the continent" (Amuwo, 
2002:1). The situation was exacerbated by the emergence of what the former US 
President, George Bush, referred to as the 'New World Order'. This order had 
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been the epochal consequence of the unprecedented world politico-economic 
transformation that began in the last two decades of the last century (Stallings, 
1995; Ndi-Zambo, 2001 ; Ajulu, 2001) . This process was characterised by the 
maximisation of capital on a global scale and the simultaneous pulverisation of 
the nation-state. Thus, in the 20th century Africa had become a beleaguered 
continent (Edoho, 1997: 12). 
It is this realisation that has made Africans to introduce a new Africa, free from 
hunger, disease, ignorance and marginalisation. Consequently, as the NEPAD 
document (2001 : para 7) reads , "Across the continent, Africans declare that we 
will no longer allow ourselves to be conditioned by circumstance. We will 
determine our own destiny and call on the rest of the world to complement our 
efforts ... ". Through the adoption of NEPAD Africans aim to eradicate poverty, 
place the continent of Africa on a path of sustainable development, halt the 
marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process and enhance its full and 
beneficial integration into the world economy and accelerate the empowerment of 
women. This declaration of intent, it would seem, is not different, in form and 
content, from the previous African developmental initiatives, such as those 
enunciated in the OAU Charter, the LPA and the AEC. To that extent, the 
Africanist ideal that was so central to Africa's development in the post-
independence era does not seem to have disappeared from the African 
developmental lexicon. 
Be that as it may, one of the vexing questions is the unavailability of resources to 
kick-start Africa's development. NEPAD does acknowledge that the bulk of the 
needed resources to achieve the objective of development have to be obtained 
from outside the continent (NEPAD, 2001 : para). With 54 states and a total 
population of 778 million, Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is only about 
$535 billion , which is less than that of Spain, a country with only about 39 million 
people (UNECA 2000, cited in ACBF, 2002: 3) . With the continent's share of 
global GDP in constant decline since the 1970s, and now less than 2 percent, 
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Africa remains the continent with "most of the poorest countries as measured by 
the UNDP Human Development Index" (ACBF, 2002: 3-4). Thus, in their quest 
for development some Africans have come to realise that more, rather than less 
outside intervention is necessary (Krogh, 1985:59). 
However, the shape and form of such intervention is a highly contentious matter. 
Under what conditions should the industrialised North and multilateral institutions 
be involved in Africa's development? In other words, what should be the terms of 
such involvement and whose interests should be given primacy? These 
questions are as relevant today as they were at independence. 
Some Africanist elements tend to advocate a 'fresh start' in Africa 's development. 
For them, it is politically and morally right for Europe and the North generally to 
help address the deleterious effects of slavery, colonialism, and the Cold War on 
their continent. They further argue that Africa's debt overhang, which hampers 
economic and political reform, is a historic legacy (Dow Jones; Fine cited in 
Independent Projects Trust, 1999). As the former President of Zambia, Frederick 
Chiluba, once remarked , "Write off our debts and then see our ability to perform" 
(Fine cited in Independent Projects Trust, 1999). There are those elements, on 
the contrary, which do not reason along these lines. For them, any aid from the 
North - whether it is debt cancellation or concessions - must be policy-based , 
meaning that Africa must not take more than it can actually chew. According to 
these elements, sustainability of Africa 's development necessitates a 
transformation of politico-economic and corporate governance on the continent. 
This transformation , it is said , is necessary to attract much-needed foreign 
investments to kick-start development. However, such policy transformation is 
determined from outside the continent. It is as a result of the advice from the 
international financial institutions and Northern-donor countries. For the reasons 
stated in Chapter 1 and elucidated further in this Chapter, such policy packages 
seek to promote neo-liberalism in Africa, in line with the interests of growing 
global capital. 
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A correct reading of these recommendations suggests, at least by implication, 
that the responsibility for Africa's future lies with Africa itself because Africa's 
problem of underdevelopment is as a result of excessive public spending, 
mismanagement, poor leadership and bad governance. Hence, NEPAD 
emphasises the importance of good governance as a necessary condition for 
sustainable development. It is within this reading of Africa's experience that we 
find certain elements of neo-liberalism in NEPAD (Adesina, 2002b:8). 
This chapter is neither intending to make polemical insinuations about good 
governance, nor is it trying to be evasive about the damage that corruption and 
mismanagement have caused in Africa. Rather, the objective is to dissect and 
extrapolate some of the implications of what is controversially called 'good 
governance' in the context of Africa's development. 
Of course, if good governance and democracy were to be defined in terms of 
promoting civil liberties and be considered in the context of Africa's most 
pressing needs (poverty alleviation and development), we would have reason to 
say it is a necessity. The pursuit of good governance and democracy alone, as 
Ake (1991 :35) argues, cannot feed the hungry or heal the sick, nor will it give 
shelter to the homeless. The troubling issue is that from the 1980s, good 
governance has been defined in neo-liberal terms, merely meaning restructuring 
the African state in such a manner that it became an instrument for neo-liberal 
economic orthodoxy (Adesina, 2002b: 6). As Olukoshi (1998:25) contends: 
The Bank had no doubt that there is an organic linkage between the institution of a 
system of "good" governance and the prospect for the successful implementation of 
structural adjustment. By encouraging the rule of impersonal forces of the market and 
instituting economic "rationality" into the process of resource allocation, a system of open 
and accountable government would be encouraged. The nurturing of open and 
transparent governance will, in turn, make it difficult to justify "irrational" economic 
decisions (cited in Adesina, 2002b:7). 
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The association between good governance and protection of capital growth is 
reflected in NEPAD. Ministers of Finance and Central Banks are given wide 
leverage to review the economic and corporate practices of various African 
countries and make recommendations on the 'appropriate' standards and codes 
of good practice (NEPAD, 2001 : para 89). They then bring such 
recommendations to the Heads of State Implementation Committee of NEPAD, 
which in turn mobilises the resources necessary for the building of capacity so 
that all countries are in compliance with the mutually agreed standards and 
codes of conduct (NEPAD, 2001 : para 89). 
To further promote good governance, African leaders have adopted the 
Declaration on Democracy, Political , Economic and Corporate Governance 
(DDPECG) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). In terms of the 
former, African leaders agreed to work together in policy and action in pursuit of 
Democracy and Good Political Governance, Economic and Corporate 
Governance, Socio-Economic Development, and the APRM (DDPECG, 2002: 
para 6). In terms of the APRM, African leaders agreed to monitor the policies and 
practices of participating states so that they conform to the agreed political, 
economic and corporate governance values contained in the DDPECG (APRM , 
2002: para 2). These measures were taken because poor governance and 
corruption by African leaders are considered by NEPAD to be pervasive forces 
that have undermined development in the continent. The document reads : "Post-
colonial Africa inherited weak states and dysfunctional economies that were 
further aggravated by poor leadership, corruption and bad governance in many 
countries. These two factors, together with the divisions caused by the Cold War, 
hampered the development of accountable governments across the continent" 
(NEPAD, 2001 : para 22). 
The document further pronounces, " Many African governments did not empower 
their peoples to embark on development initiatives to realise their creative 
potential. Today, the weak state remains a major constraint to sustainable 
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development in a number of countries" (NEPAD, 2001: para 23). And it 
continues, "I ndeed, one of Africa 's major challenges is to strengthen the capacity 
to govern and develop long-term policies. At the same time, there is also the 
urgent need to implement far-reaching reforms and programmes in many African 
states" (NEPAD, 2001 : para 23). It goes on to praise the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPS) for providing a 'partial solution' to Africa 's problems by, 
inter alia, promoting reforms that removed serious price distortions (NEPAD, 
2001: para 24). 
Whether this is true is highly questionable. While adjustments may have brought 
the books to balance and resulted in higher growth rates, as in Uganda where 
about 7 - 8 percent growth rates were reported during its IMF-Ied structural 
adjustment, the main problem is that they tend to erode the benefits for the 
people. Unemployment levels are raised; social spending and health care 
systems are reduced and food subsidies are eliminated (Independent Projects 
Trust, 1999). Thus, Bond (2001) concludes that the alleged 'partial solution' was 
a reflection of an overwhelming defeat for the African nationalists, workers, 
peasants, women, children, manufacturing industry and the environment and the 
alleged 'reforms' were nothing but the imposition of neo-liberalism on the African 
masses. 
From the afore-going, it would seem that NEPAD directs the blame for 
underdevelopment on Africa itself. With this self-directed blame, Africans seem to 
have voluntarily agreed to change the political, economic and corporate image of 
the continent, with a further view to changing the investor perceptions of the 
continent. To these ends, they seem to have made it their objective to promote 
the central principles of neo-liberalism: stable environments for capital, 
independence of central bankers, and sanctity of contracts, among others 
(Adesina, 2002b:7). No wonder, then, that NEPAD was enthusiastically accepted 
by the Group of Eight Industrialised countries (G-8). The G-8 leaders hail NEPAD 
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because they say it recognises that the prime responsibility for Africa's future lies 
with Africa itself (G-8 Africa Action Plan, 2002: para 6). 
At the core of NEPAD is the idea of investment-driven economic growth as the 
engine for poverty reduction . NEPAD aims to achieve and sustain an average 
GDP growth of 7 percent per annum for 15 years (NEPAD, 2001: para 68). 
Overseas development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI) are 
considered important central elements towards this goal. While ODA is important 
and necessary25, NEPAD is quick to caution the recipient countries of ODA for 
what it euphemistically terms "more effective utilisation" (NEPAD, 2001: para 
148). This caution is broadly 'World Bankian' . According to the World Bank the 
decline of ODA in the past years can be accounted for in terms of poor economic 
performance of many traditional recipients of aid, especially in Africa, which has 
put into doubt the patience of supporters of aid programmes and increased their 
scepticism (World Bank, 1996:29). Africa has experienced a significant decline 
over the years. In 1995, ODA from the Organisation of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries to the South declined to US$59 billion, 
representing a drop of 9.3 percent in real terms over the previous year. The 
gross bilateral ODA disbursements to Sub-Saharan Africa fell even more sharply 
by over 20 percent - from US$13.9 billion in 1990 to US$10.7 billion in 1996 
(Fischer et a/., cited in Rugumamu, 1999:15). 
As regards FDI, NEPAD places emphasis on the creation of conducive 
conditions for private sector investments by both domestic and foreign investors 
(NEPAD, 2001: para 145). It also seeks to address investor perception of Africa 
as a high-risk continent by, inter alia, creating economic governance (NEPAD, 
2001: para 151). What becomes clear is that the architects of NEPAD, like most 
neo-liberals, see a correlation between private foreign investment and growth on 
25 Of course, as Leistner (1985: 62) argues, Africa's experience since independence has shown 
that there is no clear relationsh ip between volumes of aid received and the country's economic 
progress. 
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the one hand, and growth and development on the other. The chapter will argue, 
however, that there is no empirical evidence to support that view. 
Among other expected outcomes of NEPAD is the increased integration of Africa 
into the global economy (NEPAD, 2001: para 69). The view of NEPAD is that for 
centuries Africa has been integrated into the global economy mainly as a supplier 
of raw materials and cheap labour (NEPAD, 2001: para 19). The aim is to 
transform the nature of this integration so that Africa participates effectively in the 
world's economic and political affairs. While a case is being made for the 
transformation of the current global order, including its institutions, the extent to 
which such a case is made is not entirely clear. The paradox is that while NEPAD 
is critical of the prevailing global order for undermining the development of the 
South, and Africa in particular, at the same time it suggests that for Africa's 
integration to be enhanced it must liberalise. Here, one finds an underlying neo-
liberal assumption that open economies are more prone to development and 
integration into the world economy. This is the point at which NEPAD seems to 
be suffering from amnesia. Africa 's experience with liberalisation since the 1980s 
has undermined the very developmental ideal that NEPAD seeks to promote 
today. As Adesina (2002b:14) correctly reminds us, "trade regimes and practices 
of the powerful countries continue to deny African countries access to [their] 
markets - precisely in areas where Africa has a comparative advantage" (See 
also Nabudere, 2002; Keet, 2002b). 
Closely related to this amnesia is another paradox. NEPAD seeks to promote 
and build the capacity of the African state to discharge its basic responsibilities 
within the neo-liberal milieu . But liberalisation is a direct antithesis of state 
developmentalism (see Adesina, 2002b:1 9). As is argued elsewhere in the 
thesis, the new world order of which globalisation is a salient feature is 
characterised by the maximisation of capital on a global scale and the 
simultaneous pulverisation of the nation-state. But, the reasoning of the NEPAD 
document is that globalisation cannot be avoided. In fact, the document reasons 
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that globalisation has increased opportunities to create and expand wealth, 
acquire knowledge and skills, and improve access to goods and services, and 
generally to improve the quality of life of the people. It continues, "In some parts 
of the world, the pursuit of greater openness of the global economy has 
increased opportunities for lifting the millions of people out of poverty" (NEPAD, 
2001: para 32). 
The interesting question is: if globalisation has increased the opportunities to 
create and expand wealth, why does the structural divide between and within 
countries continue to widen? Here NEPAD is found wanting. The document talks 
about the structural impediments to growth and development in the form of 
resource outflows and unfavourable terms of trade. By the same token, it blames 
African leaders for impeding "the effective mobilisation and utilisation of scarce 
resources into the productive areas of activity in order to attract and facilitate 
domestic and foreign investment" (NEPAD, 2001: para 34). This is an 'IMFia' 
type of reasoning. This reasoning fails to acknowledge the fact that globalisation 
is not merely a spontaneous process, but rather a politically conscious, power-
based and power-driven process, aimed at maximising wealth in the face of 
declining profitability (Nabudere, 2002; Taylor, 2002; Ekpo, 2002; Keet, 2002b). 
While NEPAD is critical of the existing global rules, there is slippery language 
when it comes to the exact issues to be addressed within these rules. It argues 
that: 
In the absence of fair and just global rules globalisation has increased the ability of the 
strong to advance their interests to the detriment of the weak, especially in the areas of 
trade, finance, and technology. It has limited the space for developing countries to control 
their development, as the system has no provision for compensating the weak. The 
conditions of those marginalized in this process have worsened in real terms. A fissure 
between inclusion and exclusion has emerged within and among nations (NEPAD, 2001 : 
para 33). 
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For this reason , NEPAD proposes the transformation of the international order, 
including its institutions: 'We hold that it is within the capacity of the international 
community to create fair and just conditions in which Africa can participate 
effectively in the global economic and body politic" (NEPAD, 2001: para 41). As 
Keet (2002b:14) argues, NEPAD is very silent on how these global rules can be 
made fair. Rather, it recommends that African leaders must help ensure that the 
continent participates in the world trading system that operates in accordance 
with the WTO (NEPAD, 2001: para 166). While it emphasises that in any future 
rules of multilateral trading system the WTO should take into consideration the 
special interests and needs of Africa (para 166), NEPAD "does not effectively 
problematise the role and the functioning of the WTO, particularly the dominant 
role of powerful countries and the disadvantages of the weaker" (Keet, 
2002b:14). Instead, it recommends the technical assistance and support be 
provided so as to enhance the institutional capacity of the African states in the 
WTO and to engage in multilateral negotiations (NEPAD, 2001 : para 167). 
However, such support defeats the whole purpose of assisting Africa. Rather, it is 
used by the dominant countries within the WTO to simply 'wish away' criticisms 
about the manner of the existing agreements, and to serve as resistance to the 
introduction of yet more trade - related issues into the WTO regime (Keet, 
2002b:14). Perhaps, this is the reason why Taylor (2002:3) argues that NEPAD 
fits Africa within the Northern-dominated hegemonic nirvana. 
Critical to poverty reduction and sustainable development in Africa is the removal 
of the debt overhang. Currently, there are about 41 countries worldwide that are 
referred to by the WB as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), which owe 
about $170 billion to foreign creditors (Thomas, 2001 :36). More than 20 of these 
countries are found in Africa. According to the Debt Crisis Network's (DCN) 
report, A Fresh Starl for Africa, the HIPCs of Africa paid about $96 billion to the 
Northern creditors between 1984 and mid-1990s (Tiepoh , 2000: 46). The IMF 
alone, between 1986 and 1990, received more than $3 billion in debt-service 
payments from sub-Saharan African HIPCs (Ezenwe cited in Tiepoh , 2000: 46). 
90 
Zambia paid about $335 million to the IMF between 1991 and 1993, while 
Uganda paid more than $200 million to the Fund between 1995 and 1998 (West 
Africa cited in Tiepoh, 2000: 46). The problem of debt in Africa continues 
unabated despite debt relief efforts from bilateral aid donors and the Bretton 
Woods Institutions. This is mainly because the economic adjustments underlying 
the current international debt relief measures are not sustainable. According to 
Bacha (cited in Rich, 2000:43), the interest rates charged on the accumulated 
debt are higher than these countries' growth rates. Consequently, capital 
formation , economic growth and transformation in Africa are compromised (Rich, 
2000:43). These statistics attest to one thing, namely that Africa's external debt 
remains one of the major constraints to development (ACBF, 2002:12; NEPAD, 
2001: para 3). 
Instead of striving for a once-and-for-all debt cancellation, NEPAD is equivocal. 
While it is critical of the current levels of debt relief, NEPAD prefers the 
IMFlWorld Bank HIPC Initiative. Of course, NEPAD does make a case for debt 
relief plus the increased flow of ODA. But the question why the architects of 
NEPAD chose the HIPC initiative in lieu of complete debt cancellation remains 
unanswered. Perhaps, this "failure of policy nerve", in the words of Adesina 
(2002b:17), can be attributed to the common misreading of Africa's experience 
between NEPAD, Northern creditor governments and IFls. This reasoning has 
merit in itself because NEPAD and Africa's Northern development partners argue 
Africa's development vis-a-vis external debt will be determined by the key social 
and structural reforms, coupled with macroeconomic performance, that Africa 
ought to introduce. In this regard the G-8 emphasises that Africa must 
demonstrate commitment to poverty alleviation, sound financial management, 
and good governance (G-8 Africa Action Plan, 2002: para 11, Article IV.4.2). But, 
as argued earlier, good governance - political, economical and corporate - does 
not seem to bode well for the objective of eradicating poverty. In fact, the current 
debt relief measures undermine the very goal of development. What interests 
creditors, it would seem, is the commitment to what they call good governance. 
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In my view, the good governance that is emphasised in the NEPAD document is 
nothing less than a reflection of the policy orientation of the project itself. The 
NEPAD project owes its orientation to the basic tenets of neo-liberalism 
capitalism. 
4.3. Validity and pitfalls of neo-liberalism 
While quantitatively different from classical liberalism, neo-liberalism owes its 
development and evolution to the ethos of early liberals. In other words, it derives 
its basic tenets (faith in the market and market forces) from early liberalism. 
Therefore, what is new or 'neo' is not its philosophy, but the context and shape in 
which it is now applied. Following the world recession of the 1970s, there have 
been measures by the bigger powers in international relations to intensify and 
expand the market, "by increasing the number, frequency, repeatability, and 
formalisation of transactions on a global scale" (Treanor, 2003, italics mine). This 
has brought about unprecedented technological progress. Labour is no longer 
central to production and other economic activities, as the advances in 
information technology continue to grow and have proven to be very reliable and 
efficient. Some companies hire one person to operate the whole organisation or 
firm. There are relentless efforts to maximise profit, as companies now operate 
24 hours a day; international and intra-national trade no longer revo lves around 
goods only, but involves services and intellectual property; the number of small, 
macro and micro enterprises has grown significantly; the financial sector 
continues to grow, as demonstrated by the ever-increasing number and 
independence of central bankers and corporate agents and relations between 
different countries are no longer exclusively the terrain of governments, rather 
they have also come to be controlled by transnational corporations, companies, 
and individuals. In particular after the collapse of the Soviet Union, international 
financial institutions and multinational corporations have been given much 
leverage in 'governing' and regulating the economic activities of states 
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worldwide, albeit not of the powerful nations. It is in this sense, perhaps, that 
neo-liberalism has been used interchangeably with globalisation. 
However firm the hold of neo-liberalism is on the contemporary world, there are 
increasing indications that its underlying conceptual and theoretical tenets are 
flawed . For a start, the free market is not as self-regulating as they would like us 
to believe it to be. This had become clear as early as the 19th century. The global 
economy experienced recurring depressions in the 19th century, in which the 
plight of the poor and the working class was very much at stake. Severe and 
prolonged depressions afflicted the world in 1873-1878 and 1893-1897. Others 
were of course shorter. In America alone, eight recessions, which worsened into 
depressions occurred in 1807, 1837, 1873, 1882, 1893, 1920, 1933 and 1937 
(Kangas, 1998; Blair, 1998). 
The most notorious depression in the 20th century was the 1929 Great 
Depression. Following the Wall Street Stock crash of 24 October 1929 and the 
Great Depression that hit the world, there were high levels of unemployment, 
poverty and moral degeneration. Numerous explanations for the causes of the 
depression and the possibility for its cure came up. While many explanations 
were complicated , John Maynard Keynes came up with an explanation of 
economic slumps that was surprisingly simple. Keynes reasoned that there were 
situations in which the capitalist market could spiral downwards into deepening 
unemployment, without having the capacity to reverse the trend (Kangas, 1998; 
Blair, 1998; Heywood, 1992; Heywood, 1999). However, not all recessions 
degenerated into depressions. For instance, the 1945-46, 1949, 1954, 1956, 
1960-61, 1970-75, 1980-83 and 1990-92 recessions never turned into 
depressions (see Kangas , 1998; Blair, 1998). 
Unlike classical economists who argued that there was a market solution to the 
problem of unemployment and all other economic problems, Keynes argued that 
the level of economic activity was geared to 'aggregate demand' - that is the 
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total amount of demand in an economy (Heywood, 1992; Heywood, 1999). The 
more jobs there are, the greater the purchasing power and hence the more 
production. By the same token, the less money in people's pockets, the less is 
their buying power and hence the lower is the production. This results in a vicious 
cycle because the lower the levels of production, the higher is the level of 
unemployment. As unemployment rises, market forces dictate a cut in wages, 
which according to Keynes, merely reduces demand and so leads to the loss of 
yet more jobs. In this sense, the market spirals downwards into depression and 
becomes incapable of reviving itself, exactly as happened in 1929. 
The cure for this, according to Keynes, was for governments to manage their 
economies by influencing the level of aggregate demand. Governments should 
expand their money supply when the economic activity falls, by building, say, 
schools, dams, bridges, roads, etc. This would lead to a rise in employment for 
construction workers and a demand for building materials. The net effect of this 
would ripple in the entire economy as new workers had purchasing power - the 
notion of the 'multiplier effect' (Keynes, cited in Heywood, 1992). In these 
circumstances, unemployment would have been successfully fought and solved, 
not by the invisible hand of the market, but by the intervention of the government 
in the economy. 
While some are still not convinced by the Keynesian explanation and cure for 
economic slowdown, there is overwhelming evidence to suggest its feasibility. 
For instance, Keynesianism was applied in America during the 1930s, under 
Roosevelt's New Deal. There is substantive scholarly literature suggesting that 
the New Deal averted disaster and alleviated misery, and that its long-term 
effects were profound. One long-term effect was an activist state that extended 
the powers of government in unprecedented ways, particularly in the economy. 
The state now moderated wild swings in business cycles, stood between the 
citizen and sudden crises, and recognised a level of subsistence beneath which 
citizens should not fall. 
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Indeed , after the Second World War, Keynesianism was widely spread as an 
economic orthodoxy in the west, replacing the laissez-faire belief of pre-war 
times, Thus, 
the collapse of largely unregulated economies in the 1930s - causing massive 
unemployment, social unrest, the rise of political extremism, and, ultimately, the most 
destructive global war in history - produced a widely based consensus that economic 
failure on such a scale could not be allowed to happen again (Panic, 1995:61) , 
Since then Western states took the responsibility of managing their economies 
so as to bring about full employment, high growth rates, price stability, external 
balance and an equitable distribution of income (Panic, 1995:62) to ensure social 
justice and, consequently, true democracy. That the unprecedented economic 
boom of the 1950s and 1960s in the West was largely due to Keynesianism is 
not a mistaken view. 
In the contemporary era, countries that have adopted market-friendly policies or 
growth -led development policies have experienced a myriad of problems, Britain 
under Margaret Thatcher and America during Reagan's era were characterised 
by insecure tenure of employment and low wage sectors and the success of 
companies was measured against the number of employees retrenched, Also 
critical was the growth of a huge black underclass (Lucy, 2000). South Africa's 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) is increasingly leading 
to a similar situation. The rationale for this strategy, from its inception, was to 
prevent the country from macro-economic vulnerabilities. That could be done 
through creating an 'investor-friendly' environment, which the government said 
was necessary for growth and equity (Nattrass in Michie and Padayachee, 
1998:647). In his 2000101 financial year budget speech for, the Minister of 
Finance, Trevor Manuel, told parliament that attracting foreign investment 
remained an important part of the government's strategy. This , he said, enabled 
his government to finance increased levels of investment, which over time would 
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create more jobs (South African government website at: 
http://www.polity.org.za/govocs/speeches/2000/sp223.html). 
It must be emphasized, however, that what has happened since the adoption of 
GEAR in 1996 has been ludicrous. Unemployment and poverty have risen. The 
emphasis on privatisation (or 'restructuring' - as the government would like us 
believe it is doing) has worsened unemployment. In 2001 about 30 percent of 
South Africa's economically active population was unemployed . This translated 
into about 4.5 million unemployed people. More than half this number were 
Africans26 (Kane-Barman, 2002). 
Bearing in mind Keynes's 'aggregate demand' and 'multiplier effect', one would 
understand that in South Africa poverty essentially results from joblessness. In 
fact, according to the opinion survey conducted by the South African Institute of 
Race Relations in 2001, unemployment was the most critical thing not yet 
addressed by government since 1994 (Kane-Berman, 2002). Also crucial is the 
gap between rich and poor that has continued to widen. People currently living in 
poverty are estimated at between 45 and 55 percent of the population. This 
translates into between 20 and 28 million people. Sixty one percent of this 
number are Africans, 38 percent are Coloureds, 5 percent are Indians and only 1 
percent are Whites (AI DC, August 2003:8). President Thabo Mbeki's notion of 
two nations in South Africa: 'white and rich ' and 'black and poor', therefore, 
makes sense. 
Of course, any criticism of the South African situation must take into account the 
legacy of a racially discriminatory past of which blacks borne the brunt. That 
being a fair remark, one must not lose sight of the fact that the gaps created by 
26 In terms of South Africa's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), Black refers to 
Coloureds, Indians and 'Africans'. The latter group is the one that has borne the brunt of 
apartheid most. Politically, Coloureds and Indians from time to time were included in the decision-
making processes. For instance, in the 1983 Tri-Cameral Parliament Africans were excluded. 
Socio-economically, their position was (and still is) worse than that of Coloureds and Indians. It 
therefore comes as no surprise that they are most marginalized group. 
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apartheid between black and white South Africans have not been properly 
addressed by GEAR and its growth-led development strategy. The response that 
one gets is that job losses and other problems associated with GEAR are merely 
short-term. This justification is reminiscent of those of Reagan and Thatcher in 
the early 1980s. The South African situation attests to one thing, namely that 
reliance on the market is bound to produce the seeds of unemployment and 
poverty. 
Another aspect associated with market failure is the perpetuation of inequalities 
in society. Reliance on price mechanisms and market forces leads to ludicrous 
results, for existing disparities between people are disregarded altogether. Neo-
liberals believe that the freer the individuals are in society the better are their 
prospects to actualise their potential. This means freedom of choice, the ability of 
the worker to choose an employer, and the ability of the consumer to choose 
what to buy and what goods or services to buy. But this belief disregards the fact 
that employers are given a "free hand in setting wage levels and factory 
conditions" (Heywood, 1992:94). Indeed, the harsh and inhuman conditions in 
which the working class lives and works impacts very greatly on their lives. The 
working class is subjected to exploitation as employers determine when they 
need labour and at what pay, irrespective of price hikes in consumable products. 
In such situations, owners get richer and the working class gets poorer. When 
governments seek to intervene here, they are perceived to be transgressing their 
primary functions and overextending themselves. For neo-liberals, the state that 
confines itself to performing its primary functions of creating conducive conditions 
for individuals to actualise their potential, and for private investors to invest, is 
likely to perform it better than an interventionist state. This reasoning is 
influenced by neo-liberals' belief that there is a correlation between individual 
freedom and prosperity. At the core of this belief is the assumption that individual 
freedom and market are the fundamental principles of liberal democracy. In other 
words, there can be no democracy without individual freedom; the latter being 
defined in terms of the market. 
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It is not clear though how neo-liberals account for some big businesses that rig 
the market in their favour. For instance, the former Chief Executive Officer of the 
South African Chamber of Business (SACOB), Kevin Wakeford, alleged in 2001 
that some business cartels in the country expedited the depreciation of the Rand 
in order to make more profits from their exports and their overseas investments. 
This prompted President Thabo Mbeki to request Advocate John Mayburg to 
investigate the allegation, under the auspices of the Presidential Commission. 
Even though the Commission did not find any conclusive evidence to prove 
Wakeford 's allegation, the fall of the Rand had adverse effects on the working 
class and the poor, who could hardly afford commodities due to skyrocketing 
prices. The point that is being made here is that indeed the market is often 
manipulated by some at the expense of others. This then poses a question as to 
in whose interests should the market be free: business elite or society in 
general? 
The idea of a free market is deeply embedded in the profit motive. From this 
premise, it follows that the interests of society at large are not provided for in free 
markets. But liberals, like Samuel Smiles (1859) argue that, a free market has a 
multiplier effect in that the extent to which individuals are not interfered with in 
pursuit of their desired goals determines, by and large, the extent to which they 
will take responsibilities for their own lives. In his book Self Help (1859), Smiles 
argued that individuals choose what to make of themselves and how to do so, 
using their natural endowments and talents. This Smilesian argument is taken to 
mean that "the free market, in allowing individuals to pursue their own interests, 
is therefore a guarantee of social justice" (Heywood, 1992: 40). Therefore, 
intervention by the state in order to bring about redistribution and welfare, in the 
language of liberals, interferes with the rights and freedoms that are in the nature 
of man to be responsible for his own life. As the New Right in Britain reminded 
the revolutionaries in the Left: 
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Welfarism saps independence, initiative and enterprise, it creates a 'new serfdom' of 
dependency. It robs individuals of the dignity and self-respect which can be gained only 
by being responsible for one's own life and well-being. Welfare, therefore, is a matter of 
individual responsib ility; it is not a social responsibi lity invested in the state (Heywood, 
1992:86). 
On the contrary though, it can be said , as T.H. Green once noted, that freedom 
"[is) not a licence for a minority to frustrate the potential of others to contribute to 
the common good by making the best of themselves" (Eccleshall, 1994:52). In 
the contemporary global order, gaps between rich and poor are increasingly 
growing wider. This is mainly due to the retreat of the state from the economy 
and to the emergence of the market as the sole guiding principle of the economy. 
Big businesses, representing particular classes, are engaged in a persistent 
effort to maximise profit on a global scale. However, the plight of the poor is 
significantly undermined, as welfarism is, as it were, tossed into the dustbin of 
history. Worldwide, the welfare gains of the people are under attack as policies of 
privatisation, reduced social spending, reduced taxation on the rich , deregulation 
and liberalisation are implemented on an unprecedented scale. This unrestrained 
pursuit of profit, as Green reminds us, engenders new forms of poverty and 
injustice (Eccleshall, 1994:52). Complementing this argument, George Soros 
(2000) correctly cautions against a free market. According to him, a free market 
is: 
eminently suitable for the pursuit of private interests, but not . .. desired to take care of the 
common interests ... freedom, democracy, and the rule of law can not be left to the care 
of the market forces ... the global financial architecture that prevails today offers 
practically no support to those who are less fortunate (Cited in Turok, 2002:131). 
The responsibility of initiative and enterprise that liberals are arguing is inherent 
in man is not only promoted among individuals, but also among nation-states 
worldwide. For classical liberals like David Ricardo, each state has a 
responsibility to promote a free market among nations of the world through non-
interference in the tariffs on imported goods, quotas on the number of goods 
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permitted into a country, or in the form of subsidies, which have the potential to 
give one country's goods unfair advantage over others' (Heywood, 1992:38). 
This is what became known as free trade. Its rationale, accord ing to its principal 
advocate, Ricardo, was to promote each country's speciality in the production of 
those goods and services that a country was best suited to produce on the basis 
of its climate, natural resources, population and skills, among other things 
(Heywood, 1992:39). This theory has come to be known as a theory of 
'comparative advantage'. 
If theory were to be translated into practice, Africa would have prospered from its 
natural resources, given that many countries in Africa are predominantly 
exporters of primary products (Ajulu, 2001 :30). But, as early as the arrival of 
colonialists, Africa's comparative advantage worked for the benefit of colonial 
agents and not for Africans. Hardly two decades after independence, Africa's 
export commodities suffered from declining terms of trade. While they generate 
about 30 percent more exports today than in the 1980s, African exports have lost 
more than 40 percent in value due to declining terms of trade (Bond, 2001 b; see 
also Khor, 2003:55). Worse still, African exports are granted very limited access 
to the markets of the developed world, particularly of the United States, the 
European Union (EU) and Japan. These countries propagate the idea of 
comparative advantage and free trade, yet they tend to resort to protectionism 
when it suits them. For instance, the US under George W Bush has introduced 
the US Farm Act, in terms of which US farmers are provided with US$200 billion 
worth of subsidies (AIDC, August 2003:12). Through their Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), the European Union manages to subsidise their farmers by more 
that US$20 billion a year (Ie Pere, 2002; Sunday Times Business Times, 3 
November 2002). At the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001, the EU 
totally rejected the idea that it phased out export subsidies (Bello and Mittal, 
2001; Ie Pere, 2002:2). Therefore, protectionism by the developed countries not 
only undermines Africa's comparative advantage, but also creates an unfair 
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trading regime. Responding to this claim, British Prime Minister Tony Blair used a 
somewhat 'sweetheart' language: 
The truth is that the Common Agricultural Policy does damage to the developing world. 
Its maintenance in its present form is inconsistent with the commitments we have made 
to to the developing world and we have got to make sure that there's change (Sunday 
Times Business Times, 3 November 2002). 
It is not entirely clear though how this change will be brought about because the 
global financial and trading institutions, such the WB, IMF and WTO are being 
consolidated by the developed world as bastions of neo-liberal orthodoxy. They 
tend to bully Africa and other developing countries into adopting this orthodoxy. 
Under the current trading regime we are seeing "the WTO as an instrument of an 
emerging and highly centralised system of undeclared but de facto global 
government with formal coercive powers .. . " (Keet, 2000:29). 
But the coercive powers of the WTO are applied selectively at best and at worse 
arbitrarily, and are hence unjust. While the WTO promotes free trade and free 
markets on a global scale , it is only the developing world that is being forced to 
truly liberalize. The argument that is often made is that there is a need for the 
South generally to embark on liberalization measures so that North and South 
trade can compete on equal terms. The justification for this is that intervention 
hampers competition (Hirst and Thompson, 1999: 153; Independent Projects 
Trust, 1999). This is the promotion of neo-liberal austerity in its crudest form, 
albeit inconsistently. 
It makes reasonable sense then , to argue that through the WTO, in particular, the 
small elite of developed countries promotes the idea of a free market while they 
monopolise knowledge production, thereby reproducing their comparative 
advantage (Mbeki, 2001 a). This argument makes even more sense if one pays 
attention to the circumstances in which the WTO itself came into being. While 
historically trade agreements revolved around international trade in goods such 
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as manufactured products and commodities, under the current WTO trading 
regime, the ambit of international trade agreements has been extended to 
include trade in services, investments and related aspects of intellectual property 
(Chernomas and Sepehri, 2002:13). The growth in the financial service and 
technology sectors, which resulted in increasing interest in intellectual property, 
services and foreign investment, prompted the developed world to expand global 
trade into these areas where they would reign supreme and have a definite 
comparative advantage (Watkins, 1994:27). As Amuwo (2002: 62) laments, the 
WTO's powerful and wide-ranging jurisdiction is aimed at protecting the interests 
of the developed world, and not the developing world (See also Jones and 
Wittingham, 1998:93; Tandon, 2000:62). 
One conclusion can be drawn from the afore-going. There is a huge difference, 
as Higgott (1996:26) argues, between the rhetoric of free trade and the practice 
of protectionism in global trade. Complementing this argument, McGowan 
(1995:21) notes: 
International markets and trade have never been free, and .. . states regularly intervene 
in global markets to gain advantages for their business classes. In this sense the world 
has been and will continue to be more mercantilist than liberal (see also Tandon, 
2000:58). 
A further conclusion that can be drawn is that the theory of comparative 
advantage is moulded by hypocrisy and double standards from which it emerged 
and by the political ambitions it seeks to serve. The theory of comparative 
advantage has been replaced by the practice of 'competitive' advantage, with the 
North standing better chances of success than the South. 
Another area of interest with neo-liberalism is the importance attached to foreign 
direct investment (FOI). Neo-liberal capitalism makes correlations between the 
flow of FOI and growth on the one hand, and growth and development on the 
other. While the strong globalisation hypothesis is that the growing portion of 
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investment by multinational corporations is worldwide and concentrated in low 
wage and low tax countries, evidence shows this is not the case. In fact, 
investment flows are concentrated almost exclusively in the highly industrialised 
states and a few rapidly industrialising countries. During the early 1990s, 75 
percent of the total accumulated stock was located in the triad of North America, 
the EU and Japan (Hirst and Thompson, 1996:63). In the late 1990s, this triad 
received about 70 percent of global flows, and the Asian NICs received about 60 
percent (See United Nations, 1992:20; United Nations, 1998:5). 
The flow of FDI to the South has grown very minimally. FDI flows to Africa have 
risen only gradually to nearly US$5 billion - about a 5 percent increase from the 
previous year's figures (Rugumamu, 1997:14). While this is an increase, it should 
in no way be celebrated because, as Rugumamu (1997:14) states, it "compares 
very unfavourably with South East Asia which received $81 billion in financial 
flows in 1996, about two-thirds of developing countries total in that year". 
Given this skewed geographic distribution there is no evidence to suggest that 
Africa can benefit from global DFI flows. In fact, even if this trend were to be 
reversed, there still is no reason to believe that FDI flows would result in growth 
and development in Africa because FDI remains profit seeking (SACP, 2002a). 
Table 2 shows some contradictions between the cause and effect of FDI flows to 
some African countries: 
Table 2. Categories of FDI determinants 
Category I. High growth rates Category II . Medium growth Category III. Low growth rates 
rates 
Algeria Equatorial Guinea Burkina Faso 
Angola Ethiopia Burundi 
Benin Gambia Central African Republic 
Botswana Guinea Chad 
Cameroon Guinea Bissau Comoros 
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Cape Verde Madagascar Cote d'ivoire 
Congo Brazzaville Sierra Leone Kenya 
D.R.C. Tanzania Malawi 
Djibouti Zimbabwe Mali 
Egypt Niger 
Gabon Rwanda 
Jamahiriya Somalia 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Source . D costa (1999. 65). 
Those countries riddled with conflict (Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and 
Uganda) saw higher levels of FDI flows in the years 1991-1993. Those 
experiencing droughts (Algeria , Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Zimbabwe) saw an 
unexpectedly high increase in the average FDI flows in the 1991-1993 period. 
Those countries that experienced higher growth rates (Botswana, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Tunisia, Sudan) - compared to some developing countries in other 
regions - saw a huge drop of more than 50 percent of FDI flows in the 1991-
1993 period. In fact, 41 percent of those countries ranking high FDI determinants 
(category 1) had negative FDI growth rates in the years 1991-1993. However, no 
proper explanations can be given for these contradictions (D'costa, 1999: 65). 
There is also no explanation why Argentina could not avert its financial crisis 
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despite attracting US$252 million in FOI between 1994 and 1999 (SACP, 2002a). 
This uncertainty attests to one thing, namely that there is no causal link between 
FOI flows and the economic growth and development of a country (Nabudere, 
2002). 
So far, this section has been concerned with teasing out the theoretical and 
conceptual assumptions of neo-liberal capitalism. The invitation that this section 
makes to neo-liberals is that the view that respect for free market and free trade 
benefits all countries is without substance, for it fails to account for unequal 
exchange and polarisation between and within countries (Oembele, 1998: 1 0). 
The continued regional divide between North and South vindicates the claim that 
neo-liberal capitalism is flawed at best and at worst detrimental for development 
in the South. In fact, what accounts for neo-liberalism's inability to provide 
sustainable responses to global crises is the crisis in which it finds itself. 
4.4. Crisis of neo-liberal capitalism 
A suggestion was made in Chapter 2 that, the context of development in the 21 st 
century is said to have changed. The objective part of this context is 
globalisation. Globalisation is defined in various ways. For some, it is a 
'revolution' (Butros Butros-Ghali cited in Edoho, 1997:1). Others call it a 
'geopolitical earthquake' (Robertson cited in Edoho, 1997: 1). However one 
chooses to define it, the reality is that globalisation has left no corner of the globe 
untouched. It has transgressed the global political and economic domains. 
Globalisation is a process driven by policies of liberalisation in trade, finance and 
investment (Edoho, 1997; Mbeki, 2001 a; Chernomas and Sepehri, 2002; Khor, 
2003). It is facilitated by the current international relations and institutions, 
notably multinational corporations, multilateral financial and trading institutions, 
such as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. "Faster globalisation is reflected 
in the incredible growth in the size of cross-border flows of goods, services and 
capital " (Mbeki, 2001a). As globalisation accelerates national barriers in the area 
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of finance and financial markets, trade and foreign direct investment are 
gradually getting removed (Khor, 2003:51; Mbeki, 2001 a). There is now a new 
global and borderless economy that is characterised by the internationalisation of 
production as the key mechanism of economic integration (Chern om as and 
Sepehri, 2002:5). In this borderless world, multinational corporations and not 
nation states, are at the apex of global economic integration, thus making 
domestic strategic economic planning increasingly irrelevant (Ohmae, 1990; 
Reich , 1992; Horsman and Marshall, 1994; Higgott, 1996; Hamdani, 1997; 
Independent Projects Trust, 1999; Amuwo, 2002). Globalisation, therefore, is: 
Triggering a process of systematic convergence in which all governments face pressures 
to pursue more or less similar policies to enhance their national (or regional) 
competitiveness, vis-a-vis other countries, as locations for international production 
(Hamdani,1997:13). 
In this new global world order, Africa's fate is the subject of speculative views. 
Some of those views have tended to be more optimistic and others very 
pessimistic. It is not the intention of this chapter to explore these views in any 
detail. Suffice to say that either view is informed by its adherents' interpretation of 
both the current global terrain and the continent's politico-economic character. 
Particularly after the 1980s, Africa's economic performance has been appalling. 
Even worse, as the 1990s came to a close , Africa's image and global standing 
deteriorated. This has been interpreted in various sectors as Africa's 
disappearance "from the global development cartography" (Edoho, 1997:2), 
Africa's "position of structural irrelevance" (Castells, cited in McGowan, 1995:11) 
or simply "a metaphor of disaster" (Rugumamu, 1997: 1 0). These 
characterisations are not an exaggeration of Africa's position in the global 
economy. Rather, they depict just how desperate her situation is. In a highly 
'transforming' and globalising world, Africa faces more challenges than benefits. 
As succinctly put by Chole (cited in Rugumamu, 1997:12), "whatever aspect of 
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the global economy one considers - security, aid, investment, trade, the 
information revolution - Africa's prospects give no cause for jubilation". 
This rather grotesque picture of global economy does tell us that in the 
globalisation process there are winners and losers, and that this win-lose 
scenario is in fact the manifestation of the systemic crisis into which market 
capitalism has entered. There is now a crisis of declining profitability as the costs 
of production rise faster than productivity (SACP, 2002a; Brenner, 1998; Cherry, 
1987). The rising costs of production result in a slower process of capital 
accumulation and the latter results in less profit. Less profit makes the 
maintenance of those institutions, whether national or global, whose relative 
stability and reproducibility permit repeated fulfilment of an important socio-
economic function, almost impossible. The result is either stagnation or recession 
(Chernomas and Sepehri, 2002:2), which is exactly what happened in the mid-to-
late 1970s. 
The period from the early 1950s to the early 1970s was characterised by a long 
cycle of expanded production and global growth. A substantial amount of 
scholarly literature attributes this growth to the Keynesian economic policies of 
the post war era, which had replaced laissez- faire as an economic orthodoxy. By 
the 1960s, global economy was growing at approximately 5.0 percent. However, 
by the 1970s, the real growth rate had dropped to 3.6 percent; in the 1980s it 
dropped further to 2.8 and by 1990s it dropped to less than 2.0 percent (Thurow, 
1996: 1-2). Countries had difficulties with delivering economic stability and 
sustained growth. For example , the rate of profit in the manufacturing sector and 
private business sectors in the US and other major capitalist economies declined 
quite remarkably during the 1970s (Brenner, 1998, Cherry, 1987). Explanations 
for this drop resuscitated neo-classicalism in the early 1980s and accelerated the 
growth and intensity of the market in the 1990s. Thus, by the end of the 20th 
century, we had seen the emergence of a new world order that was 
characterised by the 
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... subordination of domestic economies to the perceived exigencies of a global 
economy. States willy nilly became more effectively accountable to a ne'buleuse 
personified as the global economy; and they were constrained to mystify this external 
accountability in the eyes and ears of their own publics through a vocabulary of 
globalisation, interdependence, and competitiveness (Cox, 1992:27) . 
While for some time before the 1990s, the existence of the Soviet system 
provided a global counterbalance to neo-Iiberal capitalism and had the potential 
to create an alternative world order, its collapse was of phenomenal significance 
to neo-Iiberals. For such a collapse meant victory for the market. But at the same 
time that victory "created new crises, actual and potential" (Ndzimande, 
2002a: 116). These crises were to be found in the destructive contradictions of 
neo-liberal capitalism itself; the maximization of profit on the one hand, and on 
the other a threat to human civilisation and the environment upon which that 
civilisation should prosper (SACP, 2002a). Such crises cannot be surpassed 
within the framework of market capitalism itself, however, precisely because such 
a framework creates a vicious circle of marginalisation and impoverishment of 
the weaker and poor states in the global economy by subjecting them to the 
discipline of the market (SACP, 2002a). Therefore, 
.. . the more the developing countries are integrated [into the global economy] the more 
they are marginalized and impoverished. There is no correlation - at least in developing 
countries - between high levels of integration and better standards of living, and this is an 
expression of the contradictory character of neo-liberal capitalism. (Ndzimande, 
2002a:112. Italics mine. See also SACP, 2002b). 
Thus, as Amuwo (2002:3) concludes, globalisation 
... is an economic orthodoxy that is failing the people, but enriching investors and big 
corporations ... When nation-states propose or seek to implement alternatives ... they 
are reminded by the rich and powerful nations, a la Reagan and Thatcher, that there is 
no economic alternative to the only way - the market path - of running the 'global 
economy'. 
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Complementing this view, Mbeki (1998e) cautions against the risks associated 
with the unfettered market. "The market", he laments, "is a cannibal that feeds on 
its own children" (Mbeki cited in Ajulu, 2001 :36). It has failed the world and Africa 
certainly cannot aspire to align itself with it and hope to prosper. This then calls 
for Africa, as Mbeki (1999) cautions, to challenge the faith in the free market and 
engage in a "conscious and deliberate intervention in the process of globalisation 
... to produce the results of ethics, equity, inclusion, human security, and 
sustainable development" (Cited in Ajulu, 2001 :36). In a world dominated by the 
market, there is no equity, the majority of the people are marginalized and human 
security is under perpetual threat. 
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has been concerned with teasing out the ideological currents that 
underpin the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Of interest is 
the response that the draft framework of the programme got from the North, and 
the G-8 in particular. NEPAD is the first economic initiative of Africa to receive 
such a positive welcome. However, such response is not something for which the 
architects of NEPAD deserve credit. While NEPAD is a culmination of the 
historical struggles of the African people to bring about a better Africa (and to that 
extent an Africanist project with a sense of Africanist aspirations), a more 
rigorous reading of the NEPAD document reveals a disturbing reality. 
Influenced by the IMF's and World Bank's narrative of Africa's 
underdevelopment, NEPAD tends to pay particular attention to the period from 
the 1980s onwards. Recalling the World Bank's Agenda for Action, NEPAD is 
quick to blame African leadership for failed development on the continent. 
Contrary to the narratives of the period that tend to blame the IMF and World 
Bank-led restructuring programmes of African economies, NEPAD boldly praises 
the structural adjustment programmes for providing a partial solution by removing 
serious price distortions, among other things. It merely mentions in passing the 
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failure of SAPs to pay particular attention to the provision of social services. This 
selective memory of NEPAD is not only meant to avoid the 'sensitive' historical 
fact of dependent capitalism of Africa - lest investors and the Northern donor 
community reject NEPAD as nothing but 'the same old wine' of African leaders 'in 
a new bottle' . More profoundly, it reflects consciousness modalities and a 
dynamic shift on the part of the African ruling elite towards neo-liberalism. Hence, 
its architects emphasise the importance of good governance for Africa's socio-
economic re-engineering. It is not clear though how their notion of good 
governance differs from that of the IMF, World Bank and Northern donor 
community in the last two decades of the last century. 
To argue that African leaders have shifted towards neo-liberalism is not to reject 
this ideology for the mere fact that it is neo-liberalism. Rather, the argument is 
that the theoretical and conceptual assumptions of neo-liberalism are flawed at 
best and at worst detrimental to development in the South, and Africa in 
particular. Reliance on the market, as we have noted, results in ludicrous 
outcomes. We have noted that the market fails to regulate itself. For its part, the 
World Bank would like us believe it is not arguing for an outright market. For 
instance, in its 1997 World Development Report, the Bank argued, 
an effective state is vital for the provision of goods and services - and rules and 
institutions that allow markets to flourish and people to live healthier and happier lives. 
Without it, sustainable development both economic and social , is impossible (Cited in 
Rugumamu, 1999:7). 
Even though the Bank would like us believe that it makes provisions for the state 
to be actively involved in the economy, the parameters it sets tend to subject the 
state to the dictates of the market. And we are back to 'square one', the theory of 
the market. 
Moreover, we have noted that FDI and capital flows that are considered the 
important determinants of the contemporary global economy are based on a 
110 
mistaken belief that they can help in the development of Africa. But FDI flows 
remain unevenly distributed and skewed in favour of the developed world . As 
regards free trade, we have noted that this is more rhetoric than practical, for 
protectionism in the United States, Europe and Japan hampers development in 
Africa. The conclusion from the afore-going is that the idea that observance of a 
free market and free trade brings about a better world is entirely unpalatable, as 
it fails to account for the ever-widening global inequalities between and within 
nations. 
A further observation made is that in fact the inability of neo-liberalism to address 
to the greatest satisfaction of humanity the global crises owes to the crisis it finds 
itself in. Neo-liberal capitalism has entered a systemic crisis of declining 
profitability and corresponding rise in production costs. Multinational corporations 
that, together with some institutions of global governance such as the IMF; World 
Bank; and WTO, are at the apex of a global economy, are facing a situation 
where they have to find ways and means of reducing their costs by lowering 
wages and taxes, and raising their productivity (Chernomas and Sepehri, 2002:3; 
Ndzimande, 2002a: 116). The more they do that, the more the system gets 
entrenched into a crisis and therefore incapable of reviving itself, because 
lowering wages results in global income inequalities between the rich and the 
poor; raising productivity in some situations takes place at the expense of the 
environment, as huge dams and hydro-electric power stations cause damage to 
the natural bio-diversity upon which human civilisation should prosper (SACP, 
2002a). However, this crisis cannot be surpassed within the boundaries of neo-
liberal capitalism itself, because that results in a vicious cycle of marginalisation 
and impoverishment of the weaker parts of the globe due to their subjection to 
the whims of the volatile market system. This is the contradictory character of 
neo-liberal capitalism. Therefore, Africa cannot align itself with neo-liberal 
capitalism and hope to succeed. 
III 
CHAPTER 5 
A NEW PARTNERSHIP OR ANOTHER FALSE START? IMPLICATIONS AND 
POSSIBILITIES FOR THE RENAISSANCE 
5.1. Introduction 
The New Partnership for Africa's Development recognises that critical to Africans 
taking responsibility for the development of their continent is the establishment of 
a new partnership with the North. This is in recognition of the centuries-old 
asymmetrical relationship between Africa and the North. While there is 
consensus on the need for this new partnership, there are considerable 
conceptual and ideological interpretative differences on what this should be 
about. On the one hand, there are those in Africa whose conceptualisation of the 
new partnership centres mainly on the transformation of the international political 
and economic order in favour of the developing world, of which Africa is a 
poorest region. On the other hand, there are those - found both in Africa and 
abroad - who define it in post-modernist terms according to which Africa must 
rnake a commitment to good governance as a measure of changing investor 
perceptions about the continent and embark on liberalisation, with a view, in the 
long-term, to integrating into the global economy. I call the former an 'Africanist' 
interpretation and the latter a post-modernist interpretation. 
This chapter, therefore, evaluates each of these interpretations against the 
objectives of the African Renaissance. It argues that there is no reason to 
believe that conceptualising and implementing the new partnership in post-
modernist terms will result in sustainable growth and development in Africa. On 
the contrary, there are indications that Africa's position in the globalisation 
process will deteriorate further, and surely this will be contrary to the objectives of 
the African Renaissance. This argument is based on the premise that the post-
modernist interpretation pays scant attention to the unfavourable global terrain 
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and reduces the new partnership to yet another way of giving accent to neo-
liberalism. 
Against this background, the chapter makes a case for a discourse that puts the 
transformation of the prevailing global order at the centre of the Africa-North 
dialogue; this being the only starting point for a new partnership between Africa 
and the North. For their part, African leaders need to promote democracy in the 
continent in accordance with the needs of the people of Africa. 
5.2. Africanist interpretation 
An analysis of the Africanist interpretation of the new partnership must be located 
within the North-South debate and the broader framework of the prevailing global 
order. From the Africanist point of view, relations between North and South have 
been characterised by asymmetries since the emergence of the modern world 
system. This analysis of international relations is influenced broadly by 
dependency theory. Realising this dichotomy, in the wake of the post-war 
international system, particularly the birth of the United Nations, countries of the 
South formed an alliance to seize the new material and political opportunities of 
the time, so as to engage the North as an equal partner (Murphy, 1983:56). But 
the collapse of the fixed exchange rate system in 1971 , the collapse of 
commodity prices, and the onset of the oil crisis in 1973, reversed all the gains 
that the South had made. A lot of uncertainty in the international economic 
system emerged, with the South, particularly Africa, being the hardest hit. Thus, 
we had seen the beginning of the crisis of the liberal international economic 
order, which posed profound challenges for development in the South. 
Addressing the 2th Session of the UN General Assembly, on 4 December 1972, 
the former President of Chile , Salvador Allende said: 
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It is now clear that ... we have moved backwards .. . We believe that a just and stable 
world order is impossible so long as no set of commitments and rights has been 
established to protect the weaker states ... The international community must not wait a 
moment longer .. . to try to cross the new frontiers and meet the truly vast and varied 
needs of more than two-thirds of mankind (cited in Frey-Wouters, 1980:5). 
Allende's words were suggestive of the extent to which the question of 
development in the South was complex and ambiguous. Should such 
development be conceived in accordance with the demands of the prevailing 
global order? Was it necessarily in conflict with it? Could the international order 
be transformed and adjusted to the priority demands for development in the 
South? Or conversely, could the latter be the result of the reverse adjustment? 
After assessing the situation and weighing the options, the South proposed a 
New International Economic Order (NIEO), whose aim was to call for global 
fairness and justice or global welfarism. 
However, instead of seeing a global welfare system in which both North and 
South were on an equal footing, there was renewed sympathy for neo-
classical ism in the late 1970s, which further entrenched the liberal international 
economic order at the behest of the North, particularly America and Britain. This 
shattered any hopes for global welfarism, as the countries of the South entered 
what came to be known as the 'debt crisis', and were thus subjected to the 
whims of the global economy dominated by international financial institutions. 
Hence, the structural adjustment programmes. 
Furthermore, instead of witnessing a truly 'global', 'interdependent', and 
'competitive' world, the South found itself on the margins of the global economy. 
Out of US$23 trillion of global share in 1993, the North had US$18 trillion and the 
whole of the South had only US$5 trillion, the fact that the South constituted 80 
percent of the world's population notwithstanding (Tandon, 2000:57). Africa's 
share of the global economy declined from 2.3 percent to 1.4 percent while that 
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of the North rose from 20 percent to 70 percent and to 85 percent since the late 
1970s (Tandon, 2000:57). Thus, as Sagasti (1992) concludes: 
[We] are witnessing the emergence of a fractured global order - an order that is global 
but not integrated; an order that puts all of us in contact with each other but 
simultaneously maintains deep fissures between different groups of countries and people 
within countries; an order that segregates a large portion of the world's population and 
prevents it from sharing the benefits provided by scientific advances and technological 
progress (cited in Edoho, 1997:1 99) . 
The Africanist interpretation has taken these global developments into 
consideration . Its merit is that it raises concerns about the North-South 
dichotomy and the global system in general, without prejudice. As far as the 
adherents of this interpretation are concerned, the raison d'etre and modus 
operandi of the institutions of 'global governance' , which not only influence global 
economic policy decisions, but also have wide ranging powers to shape and 
determine the political and economic design of the South (and Africa in 
particular) have a tendency to benefit the world's richest countries and 
multinational corporations at the expense of humankind. Therefore, any new 
partnership between Africa and the North must seek to problernatize the very 
prevailing global order because it is the main cause of the current divide between 
them. Recognising the centuries-old historical injustice and the need to correct it, 
there is a view in NEPAD that holds that central to this transformation is the 
injunction of the new partnership, which calls for combined efforts to improve the 
quality of life of Africa 's people as rapidly as possible. And in this, according to 
this view, there are shared responsibilities and mutual benefits for Africa and its 
partners (NEPAD, 2001: para, 171). 
This view is shared by many in Africa, and some abroad. Julius Nyerere 
(1997:150) once noted that those outside the continent of Africa - and he was 
particularly referring to the North - have a pressing duty to help Africa overcome 
its problems lest they degenerate into global crises. For Nyerere, both Africa and 
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the North had mutual obligations to fight the problems of poverty; human 
insecurity, and diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and many others. At the 
Africa-EU Summit, on 4 April 2001, President Thabo Mbeki concurred. He said 
"it is morally and politically right that the [North] should be interested to assist in 
ending poverty and underdevelopment wherever they occur" (Mbeki, 2001 b). He 
appealed to the North not to be indifferent to the deaths of millions (from hunger, 
disease, or war) simply because those millions happened not to be in the North. 
He continued: 
Any serious reflection on the future of the world economy and therefore the living 
standards of the billions who inhabit our world, will show that a strategic shift towards a 
larger world economy can only be achieved as a result of raising living standards in the 
countries of the south, and therefore the radical expansion of world markets for capital, 
goods and services (Mbeki, 2001 b). 
It seems that the Africanist reading of the new partnership, coupled with the 
views of Nyerere and Mbeki, expresses a deep appreciation of the need to 
change the moral and political design of the globe. The strength of the Africanist 
interpretation is that it acknowledges that the global order is not normal, and so is 
the plight of both Africa and the North. As it holds: 
The poverty and backwardness of Africa stand in stark contrast to the prosperity of the 
developed world. The continued marginalisation of Africa from the globalisation process 
and the social exclusion of the vast majority of its people constitutes a serious threat to 
global stabil ity (NEPAD, 2001 : para 2). 
Therefore, it is in the interests of the international community to reverse the 
abnormality of this order. Such a reversal is important for a number of reasons. 
Of utmost importance is that it challenges the global ideological landscape that 
tends to over-emphasise the post- Cold War unipolarity, that is the idea of the 
market. The emphasis of the market results in contradictions. It is precisely for 
this reason that across the African continent, there are elements that advocate a 
return to the social contract that was characteristic of the post-independence 
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period, so that further disaster and misery, that are associated with market 
failures, can be averted. Critical to this return, as Mkandawire (cited in Laakso 
and Olukoshi , 1996:33) argues, is a reinvention of an activist state that extends 
the powers of government in profound ways, particularly in the economy. Such a 
state is required to moderate wild market swings, stand between the citizen and 
sudden situation, and recognise a level of subsistence beneath which citizens 
should not fall. Therefore, one finds merit in Hirst and Thompson's (1999: 6) 
argument that the perception that this can be done through market economy, 
based on the profit motive, is entirely without substance. As Keynes wrote: 
To suppose that there exists some smoothly functioning automatic mechanism of 
adjustment which has a human heart if only we trust to the methods of the market is a 
doctrinaire delusion which disregards the lesson of historical experience without behind it 
the support of sound theory (Cited in Panic, 1995:68. Italics mine). 
The essence of an interventionist state, therefore, must seek to provide both 
economic and political leadership, and set sectoral priorities that are important in 
promoting development in areas where Africa has a comparative advantage 
(Laakso and Olukoshi, 1996; Rugumamu, 1999; Ajulu, 2002). This is very critical 
because, as Milazi (2001: 41) boldly claims, an interventionist state "is the 
principal hegemonic and organising force in Africa 's socio-economic and political 
change". 
There is overwhelming historical evidence of the role of the state in growth and 
development in the modern world. In America and Britain, as we have seen, and 
elsewhere in Western Europe, the state intervened in the economy with the clear 
purpose of meeting people's basic needs, developing internal markets, and 
ameliorating the negative effects of market failures. In the developing countries of 
East Asia, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, too, there was economic 
growth and full employment, mainly because of sustained strategies of 
intervention by the state in the economy (Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Panic, 
1995). The economy was deliberately made subservient to the state. The state 
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subordinated international financial capital to its developmental goals. Moreover, 
it promoted certain specific industries and protected them from foreign 
competition (See Wade, 1995; Vartiainen, 1995). In South Korea and Taiwan, 
private enterprises were offered subsidies by the state. This helped to guide 
domestic savings, promote close cooperation of the state and business, and 
direct large volumes of domestic capital into key strategic sectors (Vartiainen, 
1995; Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Consequently, poverty was significantly 
reduced and generally the standards of living were improved (Kim, 1995). While 
the existence of a strong state in these countries tended to be authoritarian and 
repressive, and weakened the institutions of civil society, that did not happen at 
the expense of growth and development (Wade, 1995:119; Ajulu, 2001 :39). 
However, to paraphrase Ajulu (2002: 30), the critical question is what political 
echelons will re-invent the state in Africa? I propose this question as much for the 
sake of arriving at an answer as with the intention of problematizing the vexing 
question of Africa's class character, which surfaces axiomatically in the pursuit of 
the current renaissance debate. With this question in mind, I now turn to the 
following section. 
5.3. Post-modernist interpretation 
Stephen Hayes, President of the Corporate Council for Africa, once noted: "Africa 
must build its case in such a way as to interest the financial markets of London, 
Frankfurt and Tokyo. [It] can tap into the billions that are available for investment" 
(Finance Week, 26 April 2002). Concurring with him, ahead of the Kananaskis 
Summit27 to be held in Canada in June 2002, Lucas de Lange argued: 
For Africa to succeed when presenting the NEPAD programme to the group of eight 
industrialised countries ... a clear framework will be needed within which the developed 
world can give financial and technical assistance (Finance Week, 26 April 2002). 
27 As a consequence of the Summit, the G-8 presented its Africa Action Plan, which essentially 
endorsed the NEPAD programme. 
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A correct reading of these views is that for Africa to impress the G-8 it needs to 
have a clear programme to create an investor-friendly environment. Such an 
environment must have the following - among other things - as its central 
elements : sound monetary and fiscal policies, privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises, cutting of taxes for firms, a flexible labour market and a generally 
reduced role of the state in the economy. In this environment, the role of the state 
is considered to be archaic and evil, and liberalisation to be the efficient means of 
growth and development. In essence, this means that African economies must 
find their role and fit their development to the overall development of the 
prevailing global economic system, so that they can 'catch up' with the developed 
world . For the G-8, a better Africa will be the one that evolves toward this 
'modernity'. As they state, 
The surest way to address the fundamental aspirations of the poorest countries is to draw 
them more ful ly into the global economy, and the most effective poverty reduction 
strategy is to maintain a strong, dynamic, open, and growing global economy (Cited in 
Turok, 2002:125). 
The G-8 and the North generally perceive the role of the African leadership to be 
very critical in the realization of this goal. In some Northern quarters, the 
argument that one often gets is that underdevelopment in the continent is the 
result of lack of political will to transform and 'catch up' with the developed world. 
For some US leaders, most of the problems in poor countries are of their own 
making. They say Africa's poor economic performance is caused by Africa's poor 
governance (Sunday Times, 3 November 2002). Therefore, for Africa to truly 
claim the 21 st century it will have to 'set its house into order' by being 'good'. This 
view "is premised on the idea that Africa's failure to benefit from the world 
economy since independence owes to its own interference with the marketplace" 
(Independent Projects Trust, 1999. italics mine). 
As the previous chapter has shown, by blaming the African leadership for failed 
development on the continent, it would seem that somehow the architects of 
119 
NEPAD too reason along these lines. They have therefore avowedly declared 
their confidence in liberalization. In fact, there is a prevailing argument in NEPAD 
that "in some parts of the world , the pursuit of greater openness of the global 
economy has increased opportunities for lifting the mill ions of people out of 
poverty" (NEPAD, 2001 : para 32). This view owes its origin to South Africa. 
Ahead of George Bush's visit to Africa in July 2003, South Africa's Minister of 
Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, told the media of the yields liberalization had 
produced in that country. Praising the US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA), Erwin said , "Agoa has helped to boost exports especially in sectors that 
are generally protected in the US and where, consequently, duty-free treatment 
produced great competitive benefits (Mail & Guardian Online, 8 July 2003). He 
declared that South Africa 's exports had increased from R6.7 billion in 1994 to 
R29.7 billion in 2003, and that since 2000 South Africa had begun to run a trade 
surplus with the US. He further praised the US for its 'increased' direct 
investments in Africa, from which South Africa was the largest recipient - of 
about US$3 billion or 9 percent of US assets in Africa (Mail & Guardian, 8 July 
2003). 
Whether or not the statistics provided by Erwin are correct is immaterial. The real 
issue is that the North generally has a tendency to use its dominance over 
powerful financial institutions and capital to nudge African govemments towards 
more liberalization. The US at times uses 'gentle persuasion of development 
finance', for example its AGOA, which provides incentives for African countries 
that liberalize. There are a number of opportunities in this regard: business 
partnerships, debt relief, loan guarantees and access to US markets 
(Independent Projects Trust, 1999). As good as the US intentions may sound, 
the motives are self-serving at best and at worst hamper development in Africa. 
In liberalized African economies, where companies operate on an equal basis, 
US and Northem companies stand to reap more rewards than those from Africa. 
The North-South dichotomy aside, there are weaker African states whose loses 
due to liberalization are greater than those of South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria and 
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other semi-peripheral economies. The point being made here is that Africa is not 
a homogeneous economic entity. While NEPAD provides for regional 
arrangements to complement the small size, and therefore competitiveness, of 
some African states, the behavior of semi-peripheral states in Africa undermines 
the very consolidation of such arrangements. The tendency is for such countries, 
as Murphy (1983:68) reminds us, to move toward more liberalization and to 
engage with the North (core) at the expense of their neighboring peripheral 
areas. For example, the impact of the South Africa-European Union and the 
South Africa-US Binational Commissions in the peripheral Southern African 
region cannot be ignored. It is not clear how these arrangements can help 
ensure that industrial, agricultural and services exports from SADC receive equal 
or better access to the South African market than those of the EU and US 
(Thomas, 1999: 15). In fact, the trade ratios between South Africa and other 
neighboring countries indicate that South Africa's exports to the region far 
outweigh its imports. Many of its imports come from the European Union (See 
Lee, 2001 :266-7; Thomas, 2001 :79). This has the potential for widening the gap 
between South Africa and its neighboring Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) countries, and therefore poses a serious challenge to 
regional integration that is central to NEPAD and the realization of the African 
Renaissance. 
Liberalization not only has a negative impact between countries, but also within 
countries. Given that the majority of people in Africa live in rural areas, and 
have no access to the so-called 'benefits' associated with the modern global 
economy, liberalization is likely to result in an urban/rural rift. In Southern Africa 
alone, about 80 percent of the population lives in rural areas where the nearest 
telephone is about 50 km away (Holman cited in Independent Projects Trust, 
1999). Also, given that those living in urban areas will 'catch up' and benefit from 
global networks sooner than those living in rural areas, the positive effects of 
liberalization will not be felt in the masses that are largely residing in rural areas. 
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Consequently, as liberalization intensifies, the rural lurban drift continues to 
widen. 
Therefore, a true renaissance for Africa is essential to reversing this trend . Such 
a renaissance is one that serves Africa's humanity. But it would seem that such a 
conception of renaissance is a direct antithesis of liberalization, for it inevitably 
challenges the North's neo-colonial relations with Africa, and consequently the 
neo-liberal orthodoxy that the North is currently promoting on the continent. This 
is the point where confusion on the part of the African leadership manifests itself: 
to what extent should liberalization be pursued in Africa , so that the continent's 
pressing needs are not compromised? 
In my view, the dilemma facing the African leadership must be understood within 
the broader framework of ideological modalities of the post-Cold War era. As 
Adesina (2002a:7) reminds us, there has been a significant shift in Africa's 
constitutional mode of thought and class relations in the post-1980s era, and in 
particular as the world shifted from bipolarity to unipolarity in the 1990s. In many 
parts of Africa , and not least in South Africa, there has been a tendency to over-
emphasise unipolarity, that is the inevitability of 'dancing', as it were, to the tune 
of the powerful players of the world economy, notably the United States, the 
European Union and international financial institutions. The prevailing feeling is 
that for Africa to tap into the billions of dollars available for investment, "political 
autonomy may be a hindrance rather than an asset" (Krogh, 1985:59). Some 
Africans go so far as to argue that reference to Socialist or nationalist ideologies 
that were characteristic of the post-independence period are of no relevance in 
the present, highly competitive and global economy because they drive investors 
away. The emphasis is now on attracting capital that, in the language of neo-
liberal elements within the African ruling elite, is necessary in the process of 
building a new Africa. Hence, conscious and deliberate efforts are being made 
throughout the continent to promote good governance 'as a necessary condition ' 
for sustainable development. 
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But the so-called 'good governance' has little to with the promotion of democracy 
per se - a genuine need of the people of Africa. Rather, it " .. . is largely reduced 
to ensuring the protection of private property and the implementation of neo-
liberal austerity, liberalization and privatization measures" (SACP, 2002a). From 
the 1990s, efforts have been made to give African Ministers of Finance, central 
bankers and corporate agents wide leverage in determining and shaping the 
design of their economies. This is the essence of what the international financial 
institutions and Northern governments have termed 'good governance'. The 
problem though is that good governance, so narrowly defined, promotes what 
Adesina (2003) calls 'clusters of authoritarianism' within various structures of 
governance, as corporate agents, central bankers, and finance ministers often 
make decisions without having due regard to the interests of the electorate. The 
imposition of liberalization policies on the African masses clearly undermines the 
very core principle of majoritarianism that underpins democracy. As succinctly 
put by Cerny (1996:97): 
On a more prosaic level, African leaders are themselves less and less willing ... to 
pursue policies that are democratically desired unless such policies do not cause capital 
flight or do attract capital from abroad (especially financial capital) (Italics mine) . 
In many parts of Africa , opposition to liberalisation policies is often resisted by 
those in government and labelled 'anti-transformation', 'counter-revolutionary' or 
adherents of 'obsolete Marxist ideology'. Conveying a message that was clearly 
reflective of the interests of capital, in his May Day address in 1994, South 
Africa's then President, Nelson Mandela remarked, "In our economic policies .. . 
there is not a single reference to things like nationalisation, and that is not 
accidental. There is not a single slogan that will connect us with any Marxist 
ideology" (Sunday Times cited in Marais, 1998:146). Justifying low wages in the 
public sector, Mandela, at the end of the 1994 Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) conference, said "unless we sacrifice, [unless] we have that 
determination to tighten our belts ... it is going to be difficult to get our economy 
to grow" (Cited in Marais, 1998:160). 
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This latter remark is reflective of the extent to which government elites in Africa 
often nudge masses toward political and economic 'suicide' . In the case of South 
Africa, the policy document of the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP), as agreed upon by both the ANC and the labour movement in a workshop 
held in Harare in 1990, had a socialist democratic element in it as it embraced 
proposals for the extension of public ownership ; state regulation of credit; a 
prescribed high-wage economy and a centralised role for organised labour in 
policy formulation (Lodge, 1999:4). It was a policy geared to transform society 
economically and was intended to meet basic needs; develop human resources; 
build a more powerful and democratic economy and a democratic state and 
society (Lazar, 1996:616). In a democratic economy, the state would assume a 
leading and enabling role for sustainable growth (Lazar, 1996: 616). This was a 
social contract in a literal sense of the term. The policy shift of the ANC when it 
came to power in 1994 signalled what Amilcar Cabral (1979) referred to as " .. . [aJ 
betrayal of the objectives of national liberation" (Cabral, cited in Adesina, 
2002a:8). 
Elsewhere in Africa irrational economic decisions that undermine the role of the 
state and its importance in socio-economic development have been made 
contrary to popular demands. For instance, in Kenya, the Kenya Electric Power 
was transferred to foreign private ownership in 2001 , despite popular demands to 
retain it under the control of the state. In Ethiopia, the Commercial Bank of 
Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation, among other important 
economic establishments, were transferred to foreign private ownership, even 
though the prevailing atmosphere was against it (The Oaily Monitor, 6 February 
2001 ). 
Liberalization in these countries and elsewhere in Africa has been made possible 
through the gentle persuasion of development assistance. The United States' 
AGOA to which I have referred, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Britain's Africa Policy and the Swedish International 
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Development Agency (SIDA) have been very instrumental in this regard . In 2000, 
USAID made a requisition of US$12, 200 000 for development for Africa. From 
some of the USAID schemes, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
benefited. For example, in 1999, it received about US$3.1 million of emergency 
assistance (usaid.gov.pubs/cp2000.ajr/Ethiopia.html). 
There are many more promises and pledges from the Northern governments to 
Africa as a result of the adoption of liberalization measures. At the end of the UN 
Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterey, Mexico in March 
2002, both the US and the EU made pledges to increase their development 
assistance to Africa with effect from 2006. Italy, France and the United Kingdom 
also made pledges to increase their development assistance to Africa from the 
current levels to an internationally agreed target of 0.7 percent of GDP in the 
coming years. The G-8, at the end of the Kananaskis Summit, also pledged a 50 
percent or more increase in their development assistance to Africa. Moreover, 
they pledged about US$1 billion to assist those countries with a shortfall in the 
financing of the enhanced HIPC debt relief initiative (Mbeki, 2003). On his visit to 
Africa in July 2003, US President, George Bush, announced that his country had 
committed itself to make US$15 billion available to Africa and the Caribbean to 
help fight the scourge of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. 
To President Thabo Mbeki , these developments indicate that there is, as he told 
parliament, "indeed a clear commitment [on the part of the North] to keep Africa 
on the global agenda and to deal with issues of poverty eradication and 
sustainable economic development" (Mbeki, 2003). Contrary to such jubilation, it 
must be stated that these 'benefits' camouflage the real intentions of the 
Northern governments and their agents , namely huge profits that Northern 
companies are making from economic liberalisation. In 1997 alone, the IMF 
ploughed US$500 million to Africa, while extracting US$1.1 billion in repayments 
excluding interests (De Sarkar cited in Independent Projects Trust, 1999). 
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Not surprisingly, while being aware of such motives, the African leadership has 
avowedly declared its confidence in liberalization. It is unfortunate that those who 
expose contradictions associated with neo-liberal orthodoxy are silenced through 
repressive means whether covert or overt. George Bush's visit to Africa in July 
clearly showed how some African leaders have given free reign, to paraphrase 
Cabral (cited in Adesina, 2002a:8), to their natural tendencies to become 
instruments of global capital and necessarily to subject themselves to imperialist 
interests. For instance, when the masses in various African countries protested 
against Bush's visit, arguing that he had come to bring the matra of neo-
liberalism, repressive and pre-emptive measures were used to silence them. A 
number of arrests in Senegal were reported. In Nigeria, people in their hundreds 
were forcibly removed from the city centre, ostensibly to make the arrival of the 
US President as smooth as possible. In South Africa, one activist of the Landless 
Peoples Movement (LPM) was arrested and charged with murder in the run-up to 
the mobilisation of poor communities around Johannesburg, while the capital, 
Pretoria was highly secured (AI DC, August 2003:12). 
These measures were taken because George Bush's visit to Africa, and the 
presence America's corporate world in Africa, as Mbeki said, was important for 
the success of NEPAD. Indeed, Bush received a very warm welcome in South 
Africa. In his media address, shortly after discussions with his South African 
counterpart, he remarked: 
I appreciate the President's dedication to openness and accountability. He is advancing 
these principles in the New Partnership for Africa's Development. He's a leader in that 
effort . The President and I believe that the partnership can help extend democracy and 
free markets and transparency across the continent of Africa. President Mbeki has shown 
great leadership in this initiative, and our country will support the leaders who accept the 
principles of reform, and we'll work with them ... (Mail & Guardian Online, 12 July 2003). 
Indeed, in pursuit of the objectives that Bush talked about, he pledged US$15 
billion to which I have referred . But, the motives for this pledge are far from being 
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covert. Given the strong global anti-US sentiment, especially in the Middle East 
(due in part to the double standards it employs on the Palestine- Israeli conflict 
and in part to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, which is reflective of growing 
US aggressive unilateral ism), Africa became somehow important to US geo-
strategic interests. Moreover, in view of the up-coming September WTO talks to 
be held in Cancun, Mexico, it was vital that the US had the support of the 
powerful African countries on the new round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
Critical to this round were the so-called four Singapore issues: investment, 
competition , government procurement and trade facilitation. Bush was very 
aware of the stance of the developing world. But the interactions he and Northern 
government leaders had had with Africa in respect of the NEPAD processes 
convinced him that African countries would be very willing to support America's 
stand. Unfortunately, the collapse of the Cancun talks signalled a backlash 
against the US and Bush, in particular, in view of the up coming Presidential 
elections, in November 2004, which is most likely to focus on the dwindling 
economy and the loss of more than 2 million jobs in the manufacturing sector 
(Financial Times, 16 September 2003). 
The point being made from the afore-going is that a degree of consensus has 
emerged between African leaders and Northern government leaders that, the 
development of Africa, and consequently its enhanced and beneficial integration 
into the global economy will be determined significantly by the extent to which 
liberalization measures are implemented in the continent. This consensus is 
moulded by certain priorities and values, which the North and some elements in 
Africa generally embrace. These include the promotion of what is controversially 
called 'good governance' and the creation of free markets from which a 
significant number of elites in Africa and their business partners abroad are 
benefiting tremendously. For example, Uganda's economic reform programmes, 
which began in May 1987, have been characterised by malpractices and 
scandals, in which President Yoweri Museveni 's favourites and relatives, such as 
his brother Salim Saleh (real name, Caleb Akandwanaho), benefited . In 1996 
Saleh's firm, Caleb's International controversially secured a bid in the 
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privatisation of the Uganda Grain Milling Corporation (UGMC). It is alleged that, 
in spite of pressure to take action against such practices, the president not only 
failed to do so, but also sought to provide friends and relatives with some political 
protection (Tangri and Mwenda, 2001). 
Another example of African elites benefiting from economic reform programmes 
is Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) in South Africa. From its inception, BEE 
was intended to address the historical 'imbalances' and eradicate inequalities 
created by apartheid, through the empowerment of black people. But it has failed 
to live up to expectations. It has enhanced the legitimacy of the free enterprise 
system by creating an influential corps of emerging black capitalists who have a 
large share in the stake intended to uplift the masses, while millions of South 
Africans are left at the margins of the economy (Kane-Berman, 2002). Simphiwe 
Mkunqwana put this point succinctly when he said: 
The current formula for empowerment was invented by the corporate world to create a 
black buffer zone in order to protect their interests. Notably, very few individuals have 
benefited from BEE and became millionaires at a stroke of a pen, such as Cyril 
Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale and Patrice Motsepe, who became mining magnates and 
are continuing to amass vast sums of money by riding on the back of the working class. 
The claim of the Black Economic Empowerment as an instrument for the eradication of 
poverty and inequality is false (AlOe, August 2003:8). 
It is my submission that such empowerment formulae as BEE tend to open the 
doors for the emerging African bourgeoisie to network and establish business 
partnerships with other bourgeois classes worldwide. As Embong (cited in Taylor, 
2002:5) remarks, in as much as capital, production, labour and culture are 
increasingly getting fused into the global economic system, classes are also 
becoming transnational. While it hardly admits that it is a class for itself, the 
transnational elite has assumed a particular class-consciousness, with distinctive 
class objectives, which are to sustain the system that serves their interests well 
and protects their dominant position in it (Cox, cited in Taylor, 2002:5). If these 
pronouncements are correct, then liberalization in Africa has heralded a new 
balance of forces and provided a basis for a systemic convergence of certain 
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national bourgeois elements and international forces that generally subsume a 
neo-liberal ethos. 
This convergence has a bearing on the objectives of the current renaissance 
discourse. While the post-colonial notion of the renaissance had essentially two 
defining characteristics: retaining a distinct African culture and breaking the 
imperialist stranglehold on the continent, both of which provided a glimpse of the 
declaration of intent and celebrated patriotism to set about a Pan-African route in 
tackling the central question of Africa's politico-economic backwardness, the 
current notion suggests certain elements of loyalty to the prevailing global neo-
liberal orthodoxy. As Vale and Maseko succinctly argue: 
The African Rena issance suggests a continental effort led by South Africa to advance the 
familiar 'end of history' thesis ... South Africa's African Renaissance ... is anchored in a 
chain of economies which, with time, might become the equivalent of the Asian Tigers ... 
In th is rendition, the African Renaissance posits Africa as an expanding and prosperous 
market alongside Asia, Europe and North America in which South African capital is 
destined to playa special role through the development of trade, strategic partnerships 
and the like. In exchange for acting as the agent of globalisation, the continent will offer 
South Africa a preferential option on its traditionally promised largesse of oil , minerals 
and mining (cited in Taylor, 2002:3). 
The convergence of interests to preserve the free market capitalist system does 
not suggest, however, that African elites are entirely content with the current 
position of Africa in the global economy. There is an extent to which these elites 
feel disgruntled by the manner in which the rules of the game are skewed in 
favour of the Northern elites. To paraphrase Wallerstein (1974:349), in the 
prevailing market system certain rules tend to enable some groups within the 
system to become dominant over others, by giving them a larger share of the 
surplus. Hence, conscious and deliberate efforts are being made in Africa to 
consolidate regional economic blocks so as to resist Northern hegemony. 
However, such efforts are not aimed at bettering the lives of the ordinary people 
of Africa. Rather, they are reflective of the struggle for a global 'piece of cake' 
between different bourgeois classes . Certain such classes in Africa are making 
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efforts to enhance their position within their national domains, in their regions and 
in the entire continent. 
As Taylor (2002:5) cautions, it would be incorrect to assume that the 
transnational class is a "monolithic block advancing a unified and uncontested 
agenda". Of course, as he argues, there are certain tensions and disagreements 
that characterise their relations. "Nevertheless", he maintains, "such a 
transnational elite has become increasingly aware of shared values and interests 
that transcend petty and immediate strategies (Taylor, 2002:5-6). 
From the afore-going, what conclusions can be made about the idea of the new 
partnership between Africa and the North? It would seem, as Taylor (2002:11) 
correctly notes, that the intention on the part of the African elite is not to get 
global rules re-written. Rather, the aim is to challenge the North using the neo-
liberal strategy it uses on Africa. In this game, it is not the corporate world that 
gets harmed, but the masses of Africa. It is therefore not surprising that NEPAD 
is increasingly becoming bourgeois with bourgeois aspirations. No wonder then, 
it was well received by the G-8. Its acceptance has enabled African leaders and 
some elites to deflect scepticism from the masses by lamenting, as Professor 
Wiseman Nkuhlu, Chairperson of the NEPAD Steering Committee and Economic 
Adviser to President Thabo Mbeki, did when he declared: 
We are at a significant juncture in history. A critical mass of leadership has developed 
both on the continent and abroad and that are genuinely committed to the regeneration of 
the continent. We must grasp this precious opportunity. We must maintain the present 
good-will and momentum in ensuring implementation. We cannot afford to fail (African 
Business, May 2002). 
Professor Nkuhlu's words camouflage the real intentions of the combined efforts 
of the leadership of both Africa and the North. Contrary to the narratives of the 
period that tend to praise the leadership of the North for genuine commitment to 
economic re-engineering of Africa, little has happened to change the plight of the 
continent since the first slogan of 'economic transformation ' featured in Africa's 
politico-economic lexicon in the early 1980s. IMF-managed, the initiatives to 
130 
restructure African economies tended to promote neo-liberalism at the behest of 
the North. While they brought the books to balance and resulted in higher 
economic growth rates, as they did in Uganda, they were characterised by a 
corresponding rise in unemployment levels , reduced health care facilities, 
elimination of food subsidies and engendered a myriad of other social problems 
that at times caused political instabil ity (Adepoju , 1993; Kanji and Jazdowska, 
1993; Bromely and Bush, 1994; Williams, 1994; Krugman, 1995; Dembele, 1998; 
Independent Projects Trust, 1999). 
Judging NEPAD, and especially its proposed partnership with the North, by the 
nature of its objectives and the functional mechanisms in place, a correct 
conclusion is that it reflects spin-doctored neo-liberalism. As such, it is not clear 
how it will avoid producing similar yields to those of SAPs (Founou-Tchuigoua, 
2002:23, 26; Taylor, 2003: 21). Only when a poor woman in the rural Transkei (in 
the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa) begins to hope that her life is about 
to change does it appear that her optimism of the will is never measured against 
the pessimism of the intellect. For yet another false start has begun to dawn. 
5.4. Towards a new partnership 
We have noted that the Africanist and neo-liberal elements that drive the current 
renaissance discourse continue to be marked by relations of what Milazi (2002: 
44) calls "alternate correlates of accommodation and struggle". The struggle 
between these elements is not about to wither, though. The real challenge is how 
to develop economic and political strategies that address the pressing domestic 
demands, while enabling the continent wherever possible to compete with the 
outside world . The starting point is for the African ruling elite to do what Amicar 
Cabral (1979) called "committing suicide as a class [and] be restored to life in the 
condition of a revolutionary worker completely identified with the deepest 
aspirations of the people to which [it] belongs". This, as Cabral stressed, involves 
"repudiating the temptations to become 'bourgeois' and the natural pretensions of 
its class mentality" (Cited in Adesina, 2002a:8). Failure on this front has 
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engendered a particular political climate, which generations and generations of 
Africa to come will have to grapple with . Political leaders like the former Zaire's 
Mobutu Sese Seko; Nigeria's former head of state, Sani Abacha; and many 
others, left numerous problems that did disservice to the people of Africa. 
Therefore, rebirth of Africa, as cautioned by Mbeki (1998b), is impossible: 
.. . when its upper echelons are a mere parasite on the rest of society, enjoying a self 
endowed mandate to use their polit ical power and define the use of such power such that 
its exercise ensures that our continent reproduces itself as the periphery of the world 
economy, poor, underdeveloped and incapable of development ... (Cited in Ajulu , 2002: 
34). 
Thus, one finds merit in Mbeki's (1998b) plea that "we must rebel against the 
tyrants and dictators, those who seek to corrupt our societies, and steal the 
wealth that belongs to the people" (Cited in Ajulu, 2001 :34). 
Closely related to corruption and tyranny are the quests for a th ird term for the 
president in Zambia under Chiluba; in Malawi under Muluzi and the 'alleged' 
election rigging in Zimbabwe's Presidential election in 2002, coupled with the 
break-down of law and order (which has done great harm to that country's 
economy and to that of the region). All these bring political anarchy to the 
continent. It is for this reason that the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
of NEPAD has been hailed in some quarters as an indication of commitment on 
the part of African leaders to change the political character of the continent. That 
being said, Africans must be vigilant of some forces - not least Africa's own 
conservative forces - which seek to make this a condition for getting financial aid 
from the North. Nabudere (2002) correctly criticises this 'trade-off or quid-pro-
quo, which is reminiscent of the logic underlying the IMFI WS's structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs), for it fails to give Africa's developmental needs 
the serious attention they deserve. Rather, as Keet (2000:24) recollects, this 
quid-pro-quo continues to integrate Africa into the global economy in a manner 
that reflects neo-colonialism and subordination . While good governance has 
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been long overdue in Africa , it must not be a pre-condition for the support of the 
North. Therefore, th is "genuine democratic demand of the African people ... must 
be guaranteed with or without NEPAD" (Nabudere, 2002:21). 
Politically, the majority of Africa is still volatile as there are numerous conflicts in 
Comoros; Liberia; Sierra Leone; the Great Lakes Region ; Somalia; Sudan and 
elsewhere in the continent. These conflicts destroy the very fabric upon which the 
foundations for sustainable development and rebirth of the continent could be 
laid. The establishment of a Peace and Security Council of the African Union in 
March 2004, hopefully, will be very instrumental in ending these conflicts. In fact, 
the deployment of the South African troops on peacekeeping missions in Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Burundi and the Congo, should be acknowledged as a promising start 
to ensuring that the continent moves in the direction of peace and prosperity 
(Mbeki, 2003). 
Integral to all these processes that Africans have begun in moving the continent 
in the direction of peace and prosperity is transformed relations with the North. 
As it has been said, in their current form, these relations perpetuate global 
inequalities and a paternalistic culture of dependence between Africa and the 
North. While appreciating the commitments and pledges made by the North at 
the Tokyo Meeting in July 2000; the G-8 Summit in Genoa in July 2001; the UN 
Conference in Monterey, Mexico in March 2002; the Kananaskis Summit in 
Canada in June 2002 and the G-8 Conference in Ivean, France in June 2003, 
Africa needs to state in no uncertain terms that the conditions for getting the 
funds committed by the North must be revised . These conditions relate to the 
promotion of neo-liberal austerity, thus leaving everything to the dictates of the 
market. Weak states of Africa do not have the institutional fabric to adopt 
wholesale market economic policies. Such policies threaten the very new 
beginning Africa has declared: rise in unemployment levels and increased 
poverty. Had he been alive, Hobhouse (cited in Eccleshall, 1994:53) would have 
reminded us that: 
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Poverty and unemployment signified not a moral failure or character defect on the part of 
the individuals . .. but the structural imperfections of an economy which invariably deprived 
some people of the necessities of a worthwhile existence. 
Therefore, the new partnership between Africa and the North must be about 
common objectives, especially those adopted under the Millennium Development 
Goals. To this end, both Africa and the North must reach a common 
understanding on the following: 
5.4.1. Improved access for African exporls to Norlhern markets 
Renewed commitment - in the spirit of partnership - by the North in opening up 
their markets to exports from Africa is vital for the latter's sustainable growth and 
development, and hence for global economic and political stability. In fact, the G-
8 countries acknowledge the importance of this undertaking. As they state, "in 
order to achieve adequate growth rates, Africa must have broader access to 
markets"(G-B Africa Action Plan, 2002: para 11 Article III). It is high time that the 
North put their commitments in this regard into more concrete form because, as 
one economist put it, 
For many years the rich world has made it hard for Africa to earn an honest living through 
trade. If North America , Europe and Japan were to eliminate all barriers to imports from 
sub-Saharan Africa, the region's exports would rise by 14 percent, an annual increase of 
about $2.5 billion. Another calculation shows that developed countries' farm subsidies 
amount to over $360 billion a year, some $30 billion more than Africa's entire GOP. Also 
prices of rich countries' exports have been rising , while prices of Africa's primary products 
have been falling - by 25 percent during 1997-9 (The Economist cited in Turok, 2002: 
128). 
5.4.2. Debt cancellation 
One of the problems currently faced by Africa to achieve the necessary growth 
rates and hence development is the huge debt burden. While appreciating the 
134 
declaration of intent on the part of the North to help the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPCs) overcome the problem of debt, the more than 100 
conditionalities of fiscally prudent management that African countries have to 
comply with before qualifying yield ludicrous results. They promote liberalisation, 
which unfortunately does not serve Africa's humanity. 
5.4.3. Transformation of the current global order 
There are various reasons why the issue of transforming the international order is 
more relevant today than ever before. The first relates to the un-sustainability of 
the response of the North to the global crises. The enforcement of debt 
repayments; self-interested aid projects; enforced liberalisation, which tends to 
undermine the development of the South in general; increasing protectionism in 
the North; and financialisation of investment, all perpetuate the crisis in the 
South, and less accurately but no less certainly in the long run, in the North 
(SACP, 2002a). The collapse of the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in 
December 1999, the collapse of WTO negotiations in Cancun in September 
2003, and demonstrations elsewhere do indicate that the "Washington 
Consensus" is not sustainable. Therefore, the need to implement more 
sustainable responses to the current global economic and political crises is in the 
interests, not only of the developing world, but also of the whole of humanity 
worldwide. 
The second reason, related to the first, is that while the Cold War may have 
given rise to a new world order, signifying the triumph of the market - or what 
Francis Fukuyama (1992) called 'The end of history' - there is a reason to believe 
that challenges to market capitalism have not disappeared. As Benjamin Barber 
(1999) analytically reminds us, the ideological conflict has now taken new forms, 
as manifested by the growing nationalist and religious forces or Jihad that 
challenge the 'secular, market-driven consumer society' or Me World. The 
emergence of the Jihad must be understood within the broader framework of the 
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alternatives to capitalism that are making their way through , as global poverty is 
increasing everyday. But the maintenance of the system by the imperialist power 
of the 21 st century, the United States, has taken new forms, in particular in the 
wake of September 11. It is characterised by increasing aggressive unilateralism. 
The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in March 2003 is emblematic of 
the imperialist aspirations to remain an imperialist power. As the Secretary 
General of the South African Communist Party (SACP), Blade Ndzimande, once 
noted, "we are seeing the ugly side of imperialism - its propensity to violence. 
Look at the arrogance of George Bush ... All those things underline that 
capitalism is in crisis" (Mail &Guardian, 19-25 July 2002). 
As much as the 19th century colonialism was resisted, at times through violent 
means, the 21 st century imperialism is fought through what America pejoratively 
calls 'terrorism'. However, no matter how much effort America puts into fighting 
terrorism, it is far from winning that war because it does not want to address its 
underlying causes. Therefore, without addressing with the greatest urgency 
these underlying causes, the world is likely to see more 'September 11 '- type 
attacks. To paraphrase Woodrow Wilson, surely, that is not the way to preserve 
the world for peace, democracy and prosperity. 
The third reason relates to global environmental degradation. Large projects, like 
huge dams, mines, hydro-electric power stations and some operations of TNCs 
are a threat to the bio-physical environment and natural resource base 
(Krugman, 1995:132). Table 3, for instance, shows the annual deforestation of 
some African countries as a result of projects prescribed by the World Bank in 
the name of SAPs. 
Table 3. Natural forest area 
Total Area (thousand Total Area (thousand Annual deforestration 
sq. km) sq. km) 1981- 90 
(% of total area) 
1980 1990 
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Ghana 109 96 1.3 
Ivory Coast 121 109 1.0 
Kenya 13 12 0.5 
Madagascar 171 158 0.8 
Nigeria 168 156 0.7 
Tanzania 379 336 1.2 
Source. World Bank, 1994b, Table 33. Cited In Lenslk, 1996.112. 
Given that environment is a resource or a major asset in the struggle to preserve 
conditions for the survival of human civilisation , there is reason to link its 
degradation with human insecurity. In fact, the Rio Earth Summit and the 
Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development held in 1992 and 
2002, respectively, were precisely about that. These Summits concluded that the 
protection of the environment and social and economic development were 
fundamental to sustainable development. 
5.5. Conclusion 
The afore-going discussion has been crucial in that it has shown different 
conceptual and ideological differences that the idea of the new partnership has 
received, both in Africa and abroad. From an Africanist point of view, the new 
partnership should centre on the transformation of the international order, 
precisely because this order is the cause of the current divide between Africa and 
the North. The operations of the institutions of global governance have, since the 
early 1980s, further worsened the position of Africa in the global economy. As 
Africa entered the 21 st century, its situation in this economy gives no cause for 
hope. It is vital, therefore, that in calling for transformation of the current order, 
there is an intention to challenge the very idea of the market. From an Africanist 
perspective, in essence this calls for a re-invention of the state in the economy so 
as to avert further disaster and misery that is associated with the market. 
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The vexing question, however, is who will re-invent the state in Africa? The 
answer to this question is not easy, especially if one considers the extent to 
which the African ruling elites have allowed themselves to be swayed by popular 
global ideology and faith in liberalisation. The consensus between the African 
ruling elite and Northern government leaders on the importance of liberalisation 
in Africa is the central pillar of the post-modernist interpretation of the new 
partnership between Africa and the North. We have noted that the foundation of 
this consensus is shared priorities and values between the elites of Africa and 
those of the North. These values include the promotion of free markets, because 
these elites tend to benefit from them. 
Therefore, when the African ruling elite proposes a new partnership with the 
North it is not that they perceive change in the ideological current that underpins 
Africa's relations with the North as a necessity. Rather, their aim is to use the 
existing global rules to pursue their own agenda, namely to emerge as powerful 
players in the transnational elite. Such squabbles over global rules reflect the 
extent to which various segments of the transnational elite persistently try to 
emerge triumphant over one another. To paraphrase Wallerstein (1974:349), 
while the weaker players in this elite aspire to emerge as new hegemons within 
the elite, the powerful tend to maintain their dominance through the observance 
of a certain transnational culture, which serves as an ideological mask and 
justification for the maintenance of disparities that have arisen within the current 
capitalist system. 
This analysis in important in that it tells us that the NEPAD, while being an 
African project, is dominated by certain national and international forces, whose 
aim is to subject the continent to the whims of global capital. In the face of the 
volatility of the market, one question remains relevant, namely to what degree 
can the idea of the new partnership empower the peoples of Africa? It goes 
without saying that given the class character of the African ruling elite, 
empowerment of the people is not at the centre of dialogue between leaders of 
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either Africa or the North . Therefore, it is likely that the idea of the new 
partnership will represent continuity rather than change in Africa's relations with 
the North. 
A genuine partnership between Africa and the North should pay attention to three 
important and interrelated areas: market access, debt cancellation and the 
transformation of the current global order. However, this needs to be 
complemented by the promotion of democracy and accountability on the 
continent of Africa in accordance with the genuine needs of the people of Africa . 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
The adoption of the policy framework of the New Partnership for Africa 's 
Development (NEPAD) in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2001 , signified the 
culmination of the conscious and deliberate efforts by the peoples of Africa to 
achieve the goals of sustainable development on their continent. For this reason , 
NEPAD is presented by its architects as a programme, a vision and a strategy for 
Africa's renewal. The central objectives of NEPAD are to eradicate poverty; to 
place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of 
sustainable growth and development; to halt the marginalisation of Africa in the 
globalisation process and enhance its full and beneficial integration into the world 
economy (NEPAD, 2001: para 1). To these ends, NEPAD seeks to establish 
peace and security, democracy, political, economic and corporate govemance, 
as essential pillars towards addressing Africa's developmental needs. Having 
leamed from their own experiences that peace, security, democracy, good 
governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for 
sustainable development, African leaders, through NEPAD, are making a pledge 
to work, both individually and collectively, to promote these principles in their 
countries and sub-regions and on the continent (NEPAD, 2001 : para 71). The 
sectoral priorities of NEPAD are to bridge the infrastructural gap between Africa 
and the developed world, and human resource development, including the 
reversal of the brain drain. 
In many quarters, NEPAD has been hailed as the most comprehensive African 
economic initiative ever, because unlike its predecessor, the LPA, it recognises 
the organic linkage between good governance and the prospects for sustainable 
development. One of the weaknesses often attributed to the LPA was its silence 
on the transformation of domestic structures of governance and production, 
which were so perverse that they could hardly facilitate the process of 
development in the continent. While promoting more conventional state-managed 
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models of development, geared toward African 'self-reliance' was the strength of 
the LPA, its silence on governance transformation was its shortcoming (Fatton 
Jr., 1992; Rich, 2000; Adesina , 2002c). On their part, the architects of NEPAD 
boldly claim that their project "differs in its approach and strategy from all 
previous plans and initiatives in support of Africa's development, although the 
problems to be addressed remain largely the same" (NEPAD, 2001: para 59). Its 
programme of action is a holistic one, centred on the principles of democracy: 
good political, economic and corporate governance in support of Africa 's 
development. 
Recalling one of the genuine problems faced by the LPA in the 1980s, namely 
the lack of resources to kick-start development on the continent, NEPAD calls for 
combined efforts between Africa and developed countries to improve the quality 
of life of Africa's people as a matter of greatest urgency (NEPAD, 2001: para 
171). To this end, it proposes the establishment of a new relationship between 
Africa and its Northern development partners, including multilateral institutions 
(NEPAD, 2001: para 183). However, what is 'new' about this partnership has 
increasingly become nebulous and highly polemical due to conceptual and 
ideological interpretative differences it has received both in Africa and abroad. 
While some sections in Africa define the new partnership mainly in terms of the 
transformation of the international order in favour of Africa 's development, others, 
along with Northern governments and international financial institutions, define it 
in terms of more liberalisation of Africa as a measure to effectively integrate it 
into the world economy. Call the former an Africanist interpretation and the latter 
a post-modernist interpretation. 
From the perspective of the former interpretation, for centuries the global order 
undermined development in Africa such that in the 21 st century, "whatever aspect 
of the global economy one considers - security, aid, investment, trade, the 
information revolution - Africa 's prospects give no cause for jubilation" (Chole 
cited in Rugumamu, 1997:12). Human security on the continent is a matter of 
141 
concern . About 340 million people, or just half of the population, live on less than 
US$1 a day. The mortality rate of children under the age of 5 is 140 per 1000, 
and life expectancy at birth is 54 years. Only 58 percent of the population have 
access to safe drinking water. The rate of illiteracy for people over the age of 15 
is 41 percent. There are only 18 mainline telephones per 1000 people in Africa, 
as compared with 146 for the world and about 567 for developed countries 
(NEPAD, 2001: para 4). Added to these are diseases such as HIV/AIDS, which 
are spreading everyday owing to, among other things, poverty and illiteracy. 
Such diseases have increasingly become difficult to cure owing to exorbitant 
prices charged by pharmaceutical companies.za 
Aid and investment flows to the continent have been on the decline for years. 
Where they have increased they have done so very minimally. What is worse is 
that investments have now taken new forms. 
[There is now] "financialisation" of investment, with capitalist investors increasingly shying 
away from long-term commitments to "bricks and mortar" projects in favour of shorter-
term exposures that can more easily be entered into and exited from. This financialisation 
explains the increasing shift towards "hot money", which has played such a destabilising 
role in the recent period (SACP, 2002a). 
An example of financialisation of investment and the shift to hot money is 
explained by the Asian Contagion crisis of 1997-8. Even though various 
explanations have been advanced for that crisis, the sudden withdrawal of short-
term funds by investors, mainly from the West, coupled with large scale short 
selling on foreign exchange and equity markets by speculators played a crucial 
role in precipitating the crisis (Hirst and Thompson, 1999: 138). 
28 It has just been revealed that the $15 billion pledged by the US President, George Bush, to 
Africa and the Caribbean, in July 2003, to fight HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases was 
moulded by politics of greed. The Mail & Guardian Online (7 April 2004) reported that "in recent 
months ... [the Bush] administration wants to pay only for drugs made by the big US- based 
pharmaceutical companies". According to this newspaper, the Bush administration has begun 
casting doubt on the quality of cheap generic drugs that are made in countries like India and 
China, the fact that they have been approved by the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
notwithstanding. 
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Perhaps, one of the areas in which Africa has suffered most in the recent history 
is trade. Many countries in Africa are still predominantly exporters of primary 
products (Ajulu , 2001 :30). While they generate about 30 per cent more exports 
today than in the 1980s, African exports have lost value by more than 40 per cent 
due to declining terms of trade (Bond, 2001; see also Khor, 2003:55). The worst 
part of is that the important productive forces and technological know-how 
needed to diversify the export base are lacking in Africa. While there is an 
increase in demand for many manufacturing and service sector production 
processes, Africa is unable to use such opportunities to its favour. This, in all 
possibilities, leaves the continent at the margins of the global economy. From an 
Africanist perspective, for the continent's plight to improve and consequently for 
the global economy to serve all humankind, the new partnership between Africa 
and the North must seek to problematise the very prevailing global order 
because it is the main cause of the deep fissures between exclusion and 
inclusion in the global economy. 
By contrast, the adherents of the post-modernist interpretation do not perceive 
the renewal of Africa resulting merely from the transformation of the international 
order. As unfair as it may be, there is a way in which the rules of the current 
order can work to Africa's advantage. As South Africa's Minster of Trade and 
Industry, Alec Erwin once remarked, "WTO rules are sophisticated and workable. 
The alternative is chaos" (Financial Mail, 9 November 2001). Justifying his and 
his government's preferred WTO path towards addressing the fundamental 
question of development in Africa, he said "If you want to persuade someone of 
something, do it in their own language" (Financial Mail, 9 November 2001), 
suggesting in a sense that the neo-Iiberal strategy can work for Africa. 
The many 'Erwins' of Africa hold that Iiberalisation has increased opportunities to 
create and expand wealth, acquire knowledge and skills, and improve access to 
goods and services, and generally to improve the quality of life of the people. 
But, as it has been demonstrated, this argument promotes a doctrinaire delusion 
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of the effectiveness of the market without any historical evidence behind it. 
Africa 's experience with liberalisation since the 1980s has undermined the very 
ability of the continent to achieve its developmental goals. But the Northern 
governments and international financial institutions have ignored that fact 
altogether. For them, underdevelopment in Africa can be accounted for in terms 
of what they call bad governance. Owing to this narrative and discourse, NEPAD 
tends to blame African leaders for impeding "the effective mobilisation and 
utilisation of scarce resources into the productive areas of activity in order to 
attract and facilitate domestic and foreign investment" (NEPAD, 2001: para 34). 
Hence, it makes a case for good governance. I have argued, however, that what 
is termed 'good governance' not only has become a condition for receiving 
financial aid from the North, but has increasingly produced the seeds of its own 
destruction in that it promotes clusters of authoritarianism with various structures 
of government, as central bankers, corporate agents and finance ministers often 
make irrational economic decisions without being politically accountable to the 
electorate. This is the reason why I hold that the good governance that is 
tiresomely emphasised in the NEPAD project is emblematic of the post-
modernist orthodoxy that permeates the contemporary global political discourse. 
As such, it is not clear how it promotes democracy, which is the genuine need of 
the African people. 
I have further argued that the main problem with liberalisation is that it is an 
uneven process. While Africa is liberalising, the developed world continues to 
adhere to protectionist measures. The US Farm Act, the US Super 301, which is 
used to discipline those countries the US considers to be practising unfair trade, 
and the EU's CAP are examples of protectionism in the North. From these 
realities, Tandon (2000:62) argues that liberalisation is driven by the interests of 
the developed, industrialised states. Therefore, liberalisation must be seen as 
another form in which the developed world maintains neo-colonial relations with 
developing countries, and it must be emphasised that the main focus of this form 
of colonialism is Africa (Daily Monitor, 6 February 2001 ; SACP, 2002b). 
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However, some segments of the African population have, as Blade Ndzimande 
(2002b) argues, "a tendency to hanker after the phase of "benign [Iiberalisation]" 
and see the new realities as "anomalies", rather than systemic features of 
imperialism". As it has been argued, what accounts for some Africans' adamant 
loyalty to liberalisation are the benefits that they accrue from policies like 
privatisation. Privatisation in Africa is creating a corps of African petite capitalists 
who form an important segment of a transnational elite. Such capitalists not only 
pursue liberalisation, but are also engaged in politically conscious efforts to 
nudge the masses into supporting the global status quo, which serves their 
(capitalist) interests well as a class. They do so through what Ralph Milliband 
calls 'legitimation'. The essence of legitimation is such that the capitalist class 
persistently seeks to: 
Persuade society not only to accept the policies it advocates but also the ethos, the 
values and the goals which are its own, the economic system of which it is the central 
part, the 'way of life' which is the core of its being (Milliband Cited in Haralambos and 
Holborn, 1995:527). 
In the case of Africa, legitimation takes many forms. It includes the use of force. 
There are well-documented cases of this sort of legitimation. For example, Ken 
Saro-Wiwa, an Ogoni activist in Nigeria, was executed in 1995 for mobilising 
indigenous people to militate against exploitation by Shell-BP - a multinational 
company that had established economic relations with the regime of General 
Sani Abacha. Recently, in July 2003 demonstrations against the visit of US 
President George Bush to Africa by those who are opposed to neo-liberalism 
were suppressed in Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa. 
Legitimation may also take a very sophisticated form through the manipulation of 
people's consciousness by those who are in power, so that they adopt what 
Blade Ndzimande (Mail & Guardian, 19-25 July 2002) refers to as the "Lotto 
mentality and dog-eat-dog competitiveness". In this instance, one often finds 
publicity in the media for those who have made themselves multi-millionaires 
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through policies of privatisation and other measures created by neo-liberal 
capitalism. The belief that is promoted is that amassing vast sums of money, 
joining the ranks of the well-known capitalist clubs, listing in the London Stock 
Exchange and exposing your assets to equity markets is the way to create 
wealth from which all individuals in society can ultimately benefit. This basic 
proposition of Adam Smith's economic policy, that when economic phenomena 
proceed naturally they bring maximum benefit to the individual and consequently 
to his society, is entirely false (Rubin, 1979:172). Even though that economic 
theory has been proven wrong by empirical evidence, African leaders like South 
Africa's Minister of Minerals and Energy, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, persistently 
exhort their countrymen to get 'filthy rich '. Last year Mlambo-Ngcuka declared, 
'We need to create a black middle class. After all, wealth is a yardstick for 
capitalism, and we, as the ANC, don't apologise for that" (Financial Mail, 22 
November 2002). 
When labour movements and masses challenge this arrogance of the African 
ruling elite they are labelled as 'Ultra-Left', 'counter-revolutionary', and 'anti-
transformation' . President Thabo Mbeki himself is found among the ranks of the 
labellers. In 2002, he spoke his mind about what he considered as the 'Ultra-
Left' . I am here quoting him in extensio . 
... I think if you look at the position of the ultra-left globally, not just in South Africa, it is a 
group of people, they define themselves variously - as anarchists, anarchosyndicalists, 
socialists, fourth international. And they have a common platform , which is let us unite to 
defeat globalisation and let us unite to defeat neo-liberalism - which is a manifestation of 
that globalisation process. This refers to issues like privatisation of state assets and how 
you handle public finances. And so what you then get here is an interpretation of ANC 
and government policies. When we say restructuring of state assets, that is read as 
privatisation, that is read as implementation of this neo-Iiberal agenda, that is read as 
accommodation of globalisation. The demand then becomes to change government 
policies to be cons istent with anti-neo-liberal position. It is not based on any fact; it is 
based on an ideological conviction (Sunday Times , 13 October 2002). 
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The president continued : "You find them [ultra Left elements] in some of the 
leadership of COSATU making these sorts of noises. I'm sure there would be 
some in the ANC too" (Sunday Times, 13 October 2002). 
In essence, such reaction is reflective of the extent to which the values and 
priorities upheld by certain international capital ist forces coincide with those of 
African elites. Thus, the African ruling elite has become an instrumental vehicle 
to promote the interests of capital on the continent. The interests it now defends 
are capitalist class interests. Hence the idea of Africa 's new partnership with the 
North is significantly reduced to yet another way of promoting neo-liberal 
capitalism on the continent. 
I argued that integral to the idea of a new partnership must be a change in the 
conscious and moral character of the African ruling elite in favour of the deepest 
aspirations of the African people to which it belongs. By extension, this is a call to 
them to resist the temptation to become bourgeois and to use the state as a 
means of repression and promotion of the interests of global capital. This means 
that it is important that in their deliberations in respect of the NEPAD processes 
they bear in mind the objectives of national liberation, which include freeing 
Africa and its peoples from the shackles of neo-colonialism and improving the 
standard of living of the citizens of the continent. In this manner, a true renewal of 
Africa can have meaning for all the peoples of the continent. Central to this 
renewal, of course, is a transformed global order. The current order, as it has 
been repeatedly said, is not normal ; it continues to widen the gap between the 
rich and the poor between and within nations, and therefore a poses threat to the 
future of the world economy. It is only through the reversal of this abnormality 
that not only Africans, but the entire humankind, can benefit. Issues that need 
particular attention are aid, debt, and access for African exports to markets of the 
developed world . Of course, the extent to which Africa will be able to persuade 
the North toward these goals will be determined, by and large, by how much the 
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Africanist and neo-liberal facets both of which drive the current renaissance 
discourse, accommodate each other. 
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ANNEXURES 
ANNEXURE A 
In North Africa , the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which includes Algeria, Morocco 
and Tunisia, was formed in 1989. Among its immediate objectives, the AMU 
wanted to create a FTA by 1992, a customs union by 1995 and a common 
market by 2000 (Mistry, 2000:561 . But to date, very few trade relations among 
the members of AMU are in existence, rather they tend to be bilateral. Moreover, 
"AMU countries individually trade more with the EU than with each other" (Mistry, 
2000:562). As will be seen shortly, th is is the case with SADC too. 
In East Africa, the former East African Community (EAC) was disbanded in the 
1970s. But, it was succeeded, in 1981 , by a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) 
that came into operation in 1984 to include East and Southern Africa. A new 
treaty establishing the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), 
replacing the PTA, was signed in 1993 (see Mistry, 2000; McCarthy, 1996). Even 
though the PTA managed to score some successes in its early initiatives, "it was 
less successful in achieving trade liberalisation , in enhancing and diversifying 
intra-regional trade, or in creating an effective mechanism for facilitating longer-
term development and trade finance" (Mistry, 2000:562). 
There was also a failure to ratify successive rounds of talks on the reduction of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers. This was the case even under the new COMESA. 
COMESA was severely affected by the political disintegration of some of its 
members - Rwanda, Somalia , Burundi, Sudan and Zaire (DRC) (Mistry, 
2000:562). These developments prompted the former EAC to revive itself 
instead. Thus, the Cross-Border Initiative (CBI) was launched and sponsored by 
the African Development Bank, the IMF and the World Bank. Its objectives were 
to promote cross-border trade in goods and services, greater cross-border co-
operation in joint investments and market integration. But as Mistry (2000:563) 
argues, very few successes have been scored in this regard. 
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I n Southern Africa, three regional arrangements have co-existed, with partially 
overlapping memberships: SACU coupled with the Multilateral Monetary Area 
(MMA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Indian 
Ocean Rim initiative. SACU embraces South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Swaziland and Botswana. The biggest arrangement, the Southern African 
Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was formed in April 1980 with 
the purpose of reducing the dependence of the region on apartheid South Africa, 
and promoting and co-ordinating regional cooperation in development projects 
(McCarthy, 1996:218; Leistner, 1985:75). 
With the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, the relevance of SADCC was put 
in question. In August 1992, the Treaty of Windhoek transformed the SADCC into 
the SADC as a basis for regional cooperation, with more emphasis on 
infrastructural development (South African government website: 
www.gov.za/yearbookl20001/foreign .html). In May 1994 South Africa, with its 
largest and most sophisticated economy in the region, joined the SADC. This 
provided a glimpse of what the SADC could achieve in terms of development. 
However, as Mistry (2000:563) argues, among many challenges that this 
organisation has had to face, is the conflict between South Africa's short-term 
domestic priorities - such as reducing fiscal deficit, boosting domestic investment 
and employment - and its long-term economic objectives, which can be met 
through getting actively involved in the region with sustainable high-growth 
prospects. This imbalance of interests manifests itself in a number of ways. 
South Africa's membership in SADC in 1994 raised hopes for an increase in the 
percentage of goods traded . Prior to this, the total trade within SADCC countries 
was only between 4 and 7 percent (Ostergaard cited in Thomas, 2000:79). But 
now trade is in one direction: trade from the region is very minimal as compared 
to the flow of goods from South Africa to the region. At present, South Africa 
trades with the SADC member states at a ratio of 7: 1, meaning that of all South 
Africa's total exports figures 12 percent goes to the region while this country's 
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imports from the region account for only 2 percent (Lee, 2001 :266). Therefore, 
economic disparities between South Africa and other SADC member states 
continue to widen and pose a problem for the regional agenda. 
Moreover, South Africa has entered into a number of agreements with the 
European Union, the United States and China. The potential impact of the SA-EU 
Binational Commission to the neighbouring SADC states cannot be ignored. For 
instance, it is not clear how these agreements will ensure that industrial, 
agricultural and services exports from SADC receive equal or better access to 
the South African market than those of the EU (Thomas, 1999:15). This 
uncertainty is likely to thwart regional integration as envisaged by NEPAD. 
In West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States - ECOWAS 
(embracing the former French and British territories - Cape Verde, Benin, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Burkina Faso) was formed in 1975 
to speed up decolonisation by reducing the level of dependence on former 
colonial powers, and thus reduce inequalities between member states (Ezenwe 
cited in Bell, 1986:110) and to promote a free flow of trade and a common market 
by 1990 (McCarthy, 1996:214). 
However, owing to the small size of states in ECOWAS - a common feature of 
African states - very little could be achieved in promoting a common external 
tariff (McCarthy, 1996: 214). This prompted the formation of the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA -French acronym) and the Economic 
and Monetary Union of Central Africa (CEMAC -French acronym), both within 
the ambit of the ECOWAS in the 1990s. 
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ANNEXURE B 
The AEC coordinates the activities of existing and future regional economic 
communities or arrangements (RECs) in Africa. These RECs are considered to 
be the building blocks of the AEC. The currently existing RECs are the AMU, 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), COMESA, SADC and 
ECOWAS. The AEC is being implemented in six stages over a period of 34 
years, that is until 2028, in the following manner: 
• Stage one: consolidating the existing RECs and creating new 
ones where necessary (five years); 
• Stage two: stabilization of tariff and other barriers to trade and 
the strengthening of sectoral integration, especially in trade, 
agriculture, finance, transport and communications, industry and 
energy, and coordinating and harmonizing the activities of the 
RECs (eight years); 
• Stage three: the establishment of a FTA and Customs Union at 
the level of each REC (ten years); 
• Stage four: coordination and harmonization of tariff and non-tariff 
systems among RECs, with the further intention of establishing a 
Continental Customs Union (two years); 
• Stage five: the establishment of an African Common Market and 
the adoption of common policies (four years); 
• Stage six: the integration of all sectors, the establishment of an 
African Central Bank and a single currency continent-wide, the 
establishment of an African Economic and Monetary Union, and 
the creation of a first elected Pan-African Parliament (five years) 
(www.gov.za/yearbookl2001/foreign.html) 
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